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ABSTRACT 
  
Addiction and Action: Aristotle and Aquinas in Dialogue 
 
with Addiction Studies.  (August 2007) 
 
Kent J. Dunnington, B.S., Southern Nazarene University; 
 
M.A., Texas A&M University; M.T.S., Duke University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. John J. McDermott 
 
 
 The phenomenon of addiction has been a subject of investigation for a number of 
academic disciplines, but little has been written about addiction from a philosophical 
perspective.  This dissertation inserts philosophy into the conversations taking place 
within the multi-disciplinary field of “Addiction Studies.”  It contends that the 
philosophical accounts of human action given by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas 
provide means for an analysis of many of the conceptual confusions in the field of 
Addiction Studies, including those surrounding the concepts of choice, compulsion, and 
habit.  It argues that the category of habit in these two thinkers is richer and more 
complex than contemporary conceptions of habit and that the category of habit in its 
Aristotelian and Thomistic guises is indispensable for charting an intelligible path 
between the muddled polarities that construe addiction as either a disease or a type of 
willful misconduct.  Furthermore, it suggests that recognizing the distance between 
Aristotle’s social context and the modern social context affords powerful insight into the 
character of modern addiction, and that an exploration of the parallels between the habit 
of addiction and Aquinas’s development of the habit of charity offers suggestive inroads 
for thinking about addiction as a moral strategy for integrated and purposive action.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE “SCIENCE” OF ADDICTION 
 
 This is a dissertation about addiction, written by a student of philosophy.  The 
central question with which the dissertation deals is that of how to describe and 
understand addiction as human action.  This might provoke an immediate question: 
Aren’t addictions diseases and therefore not the sort of thing that humans do but rather 
the sort of thing that humans suffer?  The question might be put more trenchantly: What 
business has a student of philosophy writing a dissertation about addiction?  Shouldn’t 
that be left to the experts—the scientists?1 
 It may have been a worry such as this that led a member of a hiring committee with 
which I recently interviewed to ask me how my dissertation counted as philosophy 
instead of psychology.  I found this to be an odd question mainly because, having been 
immersed in the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas, it seemed to me that neither of them 
could have the slightest idea how to answer a question like that.  For Aristotle and 
Aquinas, the division of knowledges in contemporary academia would have seemed 
artificial and arbitrary at best.  Aristotle was not only among the profoundest 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th ed. 
1 That philosophers are worried by these questions may best explain why so philosophers have written 
little on addiction.  To my knowledge, only two monographs have been written by philosophers qua 
philosophers on addiction: Francis Seeburger’s excellent Addiction and Responsibility: An Inquiry Into the 
Addictive Mind (New York: Crossroad, 1993) and Bruce Wilshire’s Wild Hunger: The Primal Roots of 
Modern Addiction (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998).  The late philosopher, Herbert 
Fingarette, has written a well known though highly contested book about alcoholism, Heavy Drinking: The 
Myth of Alcoholism as a Disease (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), but Fingarette writes 
mainly as a participant in the field of alcohol studies.  A recent conference entitled “What Is Addiction?” 
(May 4-6, 2007), hosted by the Center for Ethics and Values at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, is 
a hopeful sign that philosophy is beginning to enter the conversation about addiction. 
 2 
“psychologists” of his day; indeed he was its leading “natural scientist.”  He believed 
that we could only come to understand human action as we grasped its similarities with 
and differences from animal movement.  So the notion that something called 
“philosophy” would have to ask permission before investigating the subject matters of 
“psychology,” “sociology,” “politics,” and even the “natural sciences” could not have 
occurred to Aristotle.  Nevertheless, such a prejudice is built into the academic 
curriculum of our day, and I should therefore like to defend my disregard of it. 
 I eschew the artificial division between the disciplines, not the various findings of 
the disciplines, and I trust that this dissertation attests a willingness to interact with 
different disciplines, especially the so-called social sciences of psychology and 
sociology.2  I also interact throughout with the discussions taking place within the 
biological sciences, but, insofar as the researchers in these fields—especially neurology, 
genetics, and pharmacology—are assumed to be the “experts” on addiction, I would like 
in this introduction to briefly articulate both the achievements and the limitations of 
biological and medical approaches to addiction.  I do so by examining, first, how the 
biological sciences attempt to define addiction; second, how they attempt to assess risk 
for addiction; and third, the attempts to treat addiction through medical intervention.   
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The literature on addiction in each of these fields is vast.  The most comprehensive psychological 
approach can be found in Jim Orford, Excessive Appetites: A Psychological View of Addictions, 2d ed. 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2001).  To my knowledge, there is not a “standard” text in the sociology 
of addiction, but one of the seminal works on alcoholism is D.J. Pittman and C.R. Snyder, Society, Culture 
and Drinking Patterns (New York: Wiley, 1962). 
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Science and the Defining of Addiction 
 The Institute of Medicine defines addiction as a “brain disease” characterized by 
“compulsive use of a drug,” which is “manifested by a complex set of behaviors that are 
the result of genetic, biological, psychosocial, and environmental interactions.”3  The 
American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association offer 
similar definitions.  The term “substance dependence” is used as an equivalent to 
“addiction” by each of these classification systems, and it is in fact the related 
phenomena of “tolerance” and “withdrawal” that have been central to the medical and 
scientific establishment’s attempts to define addiction.   
 Tolerance is defined as “a physiological process in which repeated doses of a drug 
over time elicit a progressively decreasing effect and the person requires higher or more 
frequent doses of the drug to achieve the same results.”4  Withdrawal is the dysphoria 
resultant on cessation or curbing of the person’s use of the drug, involving the body’s 
agitation at the disruption of the modified equilibriums it has established through the 
process of use.   
One inroad to understanding the neurological processes behind the tolerance and 
withdrawal associated with substance abuse is to learn that the human brain produces its 
own drugs and, in turn, “takes” the drugs it produces: the brain produces 
neurotransmitters which are absorbed by the brain’s neuroreceptors.5  Substances such as 
                                                 
3 Institute of Medicine, Dispelling the Myths About Addiction: Strategies to Increase Understanding and 
Strengthen Research (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997), 13. 
4 Ibid. 
5 This information is readily available in numerous sources, but I have found very helpful Avram 
Goldstein, Addiction: From Biology to Drug Policy, 2d. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  A 
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nicotine, alcohol, opiates, cocaine and amphetamines, cannabis, and caffeine are 
considered particularly addictive because they either mimic or block the brain’s natural 
drugs.  Thus, for example, heroin (an opiate) mimics endogenous opioid peptides 
(endorphins) and binds with opioid receptors whereas caffeine blocks certain neurons 
from sending the neurotransmitter adenosine, which is responsible for feelings of 
drowsiness, to the relevant neuroreceptors.  Exactly how this mimicking and blocking 
activity translates into the positive reinforcing (pleasure-causing) and negative 
reinforcing (pain-reducing) properties of addictive substances is still only vaguely 
understood, but the accepted view is that the various drugs set off complex chain 
reactions that eventuate in the release of the neurotransmitter dopamine, and that it is 
dopamine which causes the hedonic or anti-dysphoric effects that reinforce drug use. 
But how does this process cause tolerance and, subsequently, withdrawal?  I adapt 
and modify an example provided by neurologist Gerald May.6  Imagine that someone 
who is agitated decides to calm down by taking a Valium.  As the chemicals from the 
Valium enter the person’s bloodstream, they bind onto certain neuron’s (call them 
“agitation neurons”), thus blocking those neurons from sending their messages of 
agitation to other relevant neurons (call them “receiving neurons”).  These receiving 
neurons, experiencing a sudden decrease in messaging, respond by trying to stimulate 
the agitation neurons to get back to work, but, given the blocking effect of the Valium, 
this attempt at stimulation fails.  If the resultant disequilibrium is relatively short-lived, 
                                                                                                                                                
helpful discussion of the neurology of addiction in layman’s terms can be found in Gerald May, M.D., 
Addiction and Grace (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988), ch. 4. 
6 Addiction and Grace, 80-83. 
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the neurons can quickly regain their former symbiotic equilibrium, but if the person 
continues to take Valium, both sets of neurons respond in an extreme way.  The agitation 
neurons grow accustomed to the Valium and change their physical structure in such a 
way that they are less affected by it.  The agitation neurons now require more Valium to 
be quieted.  This is tolerance.  The receiving neurons change as well, however.  Since 
they continue to experience a lack of messaging from the agitation neurons, they too 
change their physical structure, increasing the number and sensitivity of their receptors 
so as to catch as many stray molecules of the “agitation neurotransmitter” as possible.  
As the person continues to take Valium, both of these physical transformations 
proliferate, constantly seeking to reestablish the equilibrium that has been lost.  Now 
suppose that the person suddenly stops taking Valium.  Immediately, the agitation 
neurons go berserk.  They have grown “stronger” through their struggle against the 
blocking effects of the Valium, and now they flex their muscles.  To make matters 
worse, the receptors of the receiving neurons have become exceedingly numerous and 
sensitive in their efforts to capture every last bit of stimulation possible from the blocked 
agitation neurons.  Now that the frenzied agitation neurons are firing hordes of 
transmitters across synapses to the receiving neurons, the receiving neurons are all-too-
prepared to accept them.  The person without the Valium is consequently agitated, far 
more agitated than the original agitation that led him or her to take the Valium.  This is 
withdrawal.  
Although I have used the example of a chemical substance to exhibit the dynamism 
of tolerance and withdrawal, this example could be extended to cover any kind of 
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symbiotic neuronal arrangement, which is to say, tolerance and withdrawal are 
possibilities with respect to almost any kind of human behavior.  Chemicals like Valium 
can be particularly addictive because they affect the brain in an immediate and extreme 
way since receptors for these chemicals already exist in the brain but are in no wise 
prepared for the sudden and radical imbalance that these chemicals introduce.  But, 
structurally, there is nothing taking place in substance addiction that does not take place 
generally on the neuronal level, i.e., processes of neuronal feedback, habituation, and 
adaptation.  Neurologically, then, so long as tolerance and withdrawal are taken to be the 
defining characteristics of addiction, there is no basis for limiting the scope of addiction 
to substance addictions, to the exclusion of what are often referred to as “process 
addictions”—addictions to shopping, sex, the Internet, religion, etc. 
There is a tendency, in the medical and scientific literature, to define addiction in 
terms of tolerance and withdrawal, that is, to equate addiction with some level of 
physiological “dependence.”  This will not work, for quite simple reasons.  On the one 
hand, tolerance and withdrawal occur to countless persons of whom we would not say 
that they are addicted.  Surgery patients who are given morphine or some other pain 
reliever quite often develop tolerance and withdrawal symptoms from the medication, 
but few of them become addicted.  Most of them quit using the medication straightway 
at the prescribed time, despite the experience of withdrawal symptoms.  On the other 
hand, large numbers of persons whom we would tend to consider addicted experience 
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little or no tolerance or withdrawal symptoms from their addiction.7  For example, many 
U.S. soldiers used heroin intensively and at length during their tours in the Vietnam War, 
but the majority of them stopped using upon return, reporting no withdrawal symptoms.  
Tolerance and withdrawal symptoms, therefore, cannot be considered either necessary or 
sufficient conditions for addiction. 
That is not to say that tolerance and withdrawal are insignificant in relation to 
addiction, only that they are not definitive of addiction.  We can imagine two persons, 
one who spends a month in the hospital on morphine, the other who spends a month 
regularly experimenting with morphine, and we can suppose that, at the end of the 
month, both are subject to similar levels of tolerance and withdrawal.  Upon release from 
the hospital, the first person promptly stops using morphine.  The experimenter with 
morphine does not stop, however, and claims to be addicted.  What is the difference 
between the two?  That is the question this dissertation pursues.  Whatever the 
difference, is it not a simple matter of tolerance and withdrawal. 
It is interesting to note that, as the evidence has mounted against defining addiction 
in terms of tolerance and withdrawal, the scientific and medical establishment has relied 
increasingly on the notion of “compulsion” in offering definitions of addiction.  But, to 
return to the imagined case of the hospital patient and the heroin experimenter, in what 
sense do we learn what addiction is by being told that the former, upon cessation of 
morphine use, is not compelled to continue to use whereas the latter, upon cessation of 
                                                 
7 This has been demonstrated in a number of separate studies.  See, e.g., Mark Keller, “On Defining 
Alcoholism: With Comment on Some Other Relevant Words,” in Alcohol, Science, and Society Revisited, 
edd. Lisansky Gomberg, Helene Raskin White, and John A. Carpenter (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1982).  Nevertheless, this evidence has been largely ignored in much of the medical 
literature on addiction.   
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heroin use, is compelled to continue to use?  If the difference cannot be fleshed out in 
terms of differing levels of tolerance and withdrawal, to what might scientists appeal in 
order explain why one is “compelled” and the other not? 
 
The “Science” of Assessing Risk 
 In recent years, with rapid advances in genetics, researchers have suggested that the 
difference between the non-addict and the addict might be explained by differences in 
genetic make-up.  The claim is that some persons are genetically predisposed to certain 
kinds of addiction.  Early advances in the genetics of addiction were the result of studies 
of the difference in alcoholism rates between fraternal and identical twins.  In general, 
identical twins had more similar rates of alcoholism and alcohol-related problems than 
did fraternal twins although there was nothing approaching an exact correspondence.  In 
an effort to control for environmental factors, studies were then conducted on adopted 
children who were separated at birth from their biological parents.  In general, adoptees 
that had at least one alcoholic biological parent were found more likely to be alcoholic 
than adoptees who did not have an alcoholic biological parent.  In one study, the rate of 
alcoholism in the former group was four times that of the rate of alcoholism in the 
latter.8  
 More recently, geneticists have succeeded in isolating genes specifically related to 
certain substance addictions.  So, for example, a 2005 study reported that a particular 
                                                 
8 See Donald Goodwin, Alcoholism: The Facts, 3d. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 13, 
for a summary of this and several other studies, as well as a general synopsis of findings relating 
alcoholism to heredity. 
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variation of the mu-opioid receptor gene led to increased sensitivity to the effects of 
addictive substances and therefore to higher risk of addiction.9  Other studies have 
demonstrated that a variant of the alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH) gene increases the risk 
of alcoholism, and that this particular variant is more prominent in persons of European 
descent.10  Similar studies are being conducted in genetics laboratories around the world, 
and new findings are made public on a regular basis.11 
 However, when we examine the proposed connection between these genes and 
increased risk for substance addictions, we run into a familiar problem.  The connection 
has to do primarily with three factors.  Persons who have these genes exhibit a more 
immediate and powerful attraction to the relevant drug upon use, and/or develop 
tolerance to the drug more quickly and severely, and/or experience more acute 
withdrawal symptoms in the absence of the drug. We have already established that the 
occurrence of tolerance and withdrawal does not constitute either a necessary or 
sufficient condition for addiction, and the same can be said for the occurrence of intense 
hedonic or anti-dysphoric experience of a drug.  Many persons experience intense 
sensory gratification from using a drug but nevertheless do not become addicted.  
Indeed, such an intense experience may provide powerful reasons not to use the drug 
again, let alone become addicted to it.   
                                                 
9 Ying Zhang, Danxin Wang, Andrew D. Johnson, Audrey C. Papp, and Wolfgang Sadee, “Allelic 
Expression Imbalance of Human Mu Opioid Receptor (OPRM1) Caused by Variant A118G,” Journal of 
Biological Chemistry 280 (2005): 32618-32624. 
10 John I. Nurnberger, Jr., and Laura Jean Bierut, “Seeking the Connections: Alcoholism and Our Genes,” 
Scientific American, April 2007. 
11 For an up-to-date log of the most important findings, as well as a measured assessment of the relevance 
of these findings to addiction research and therapies, see the webpage of the Genetic Science Learning 
Center at the University of Utah: http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/units/addiction/genetics/ 
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 With respect to each of these factors, whether or not a person becomes addicted has 
to do, not simply with the experiences of gratification, tolerance, or withdrawal, but 
rather with the significance that the person discerns or invests in those experiences.  That 
is to say, experiences of gratification, tolerance, or withdrawal rarely directly cause 
addictive behavior but rather enter into an agent’s rational appraisal of whether or not to 
engage in addictive behavior.  Addiction is “ends-oriented” or “goal-directed.”12  This is 
why it could never be true to say that genetic research will provide a sufficient causal 
account of addiction.  Therefore, the following optimistic conclusion of Donald 
Goodwin on this matter is unwarranted:  
The ultimate jackpot in alcoholism research would be the identification of a 
single gene or group of genes that influences drinking behavior…When an 
"alcogene" has finally been identified, if ever, it may turn out that a single gene 
determines whether a person is alcoholic or non-alcoholic.13   
 
It could never turn out that a single gene or group of genes determines whether a person 
is alcoholic because genes do not determine persons, as Goodwin’s own studies of 
alcoholism rates in identical twins should have made clear.  If genes alone caused 
addiction, then every person with the ADH1 variant of the alcohol dehydrogenase gene 
would become an alcoholic, which is of course not the case.  Most genetic researchers 
openly acknowledge this, and many of them implore the general public to recognize the 
limitations of their research.  As Wolfgang Sadee, one author of the study on the mu-
opioid receptor gene, points out: “Regardless of what gene variant someone has, 
everyone has the potential to become addicted. So it is not that some people will be 
                                                 
12 “At heart all addictions are driven by the same impulses and most accomplish the same goals; you just 
use a different substance, or take a slightly different path, to get there.”  Caroline Knapp, Drinking: A Love 
Story (New York: Dial Press, 1996), 123. 
13 Goodwin, Alcoholism, 86. 
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completely protected against addiction...This finding just points to one of the factors that 
control susceptibility.”14 
 Developments in the genetic research of addiction should not be discounted.  They 
provide us with important tools for the prevention and treatment of various kinds of 
addiction although the sufficiency of these new tools is often irresponsibly overstated.  
But these developments do not lessen the fundamental need for an attempt to understand 
addiction from the perspective of human action.  If we discovered a gene that 
predisposed to courage, would it cease to be important to attempt to understand what is 
rightly called courage and how courage could be pursued and developed by human 
agents?  Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas would have thought so.  In fact, neither of them 
would have been surprised to hear of a “genetic predisposition” to certain types of 
human activity since this could only be a more specific statement of what they already 
believed to be the case, namely that human beings are born with bodily “natures” that 
predispose them to act in some ways rather than others.15  Take Aquinas, for example: 
But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some 
appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings.  For some are disposed from their 
own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like.16 
 
                                                 
14 A summary of the study as well as these comments by Sadee can be found in Eva Gladek, “Addiction 
Gene,” on the Sciencentral webpage at:  
http://www.sciencentral.com/articles/view.php3?article_id=218392744&cat=1_1 
15 It is reported that Aristotle said: “Foolish, drunken, and harebrained women most often bring forth 
children like unto themselves.”  Quoted in Autobiographical Writing Across the Disciplines, edd. Diane P. 
Freeman and Olivia Frey (Durham, NC: Duke University press, 2003), 320.  I have not been able to locate 
this passage in Aristotle’s writings.  Although both Aristotle and Aquinas believed in natural dispositions 
to act in certain ways, they differ in their assessments of how determinative such natural dispositions are 
of human behavior.  See my n. 17 in Chapter II for elaboration on this important point. 
16 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre 
Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press, 1981), 1-2.51.1.  Hereafter, all citations from the Summa Theologica will be 
supplied in-text.  Thus, 1-2.51.1 denotes Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part (Prima 
Secundae), Question 51, Article 1. 
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By reason of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either well or ill to 
certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts 
of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or 
hindered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the rational powers 
also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist.  In this way one man has a 
natural aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance. 
 
Aquinas continues this passage by making a distinction between “inchoate” and 
“perfect” possession of dispositions, and it is this distinction that enables Aquinas to 
show why “natural dispositions” cannot fully account for the existence of temperate or 
courageous persons. 
In these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural 
aptitude, inchoatively,—but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, 
while the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of 
action, but on various modes, in respect of the various matters, which constitute 
the sphere of virtue’s action, and according to various circumstances (1-2.63.1).17 
 
For Aquinas, then, a natural predisposition to courage, for example, does not thereby 
remove courage from the “sphere of virtue’s action.”  What is the “sphere of virtue’s 
action,” and what determines its boundaries?  For Aquinas, the sphere of virtue’s action 
is the same as the sphere of human action in general—“moral acts are the same as 
human acts” (1-2.1.3)—and the boundary of this sphere is marked by the line between 
voluntary and involuntary action.18  Voluntary action, in turn, implies knowledge of an 
                                                 
17 This is an opportune place to clarify how words like “addiction” and “alcoholism” will be used 
throughout this dissertation.  In the contemporary idiom, one might be taken to mean any of three things 
by saying, e.g., that x is an alcoholic:  (1) x has alcoholism “in the genes” and is therefore an alcoholic 
whether he or she has ever had a drop of alcohol or not; (2) x is a practicing alcoholic, exhibiting the 
standard marks of alcoholic drinking and behavior; (3) x is a recovering alcoholic, but x is nevertheless 
still an alcoholic because he or she is especially susceptible to relapse, his or her brain chemistry has been 
permanently changed, he or she still engages in “thinking drinking,” etc.  Unless otherwise stated, I mean 
to pick out only (2) when I speak of addiction.  Following Aquinas, we might say that (1) and (3) describe 
“inchoate” addiction whereas (2) describes “perfect” or fully realized addiction. 
18 To be precise, we would have to say that for Aquinas the sphere of human action is circumscribed by the 
line between the “perfect voluntary” on the one hand and the “imperfect voluntary” as well as the 
involuntary on the other.  Aquinas (1-2.6.2) follows Aristotle (1111b8-9) in saying that animals participate 
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end, and is epitomized by an agent’s ability to give reasons for what he or she does.  It is 
because human beings have, in addition to their desires, the ability to form beliefs about 
what is suitable to them that they are able to act rather than merely be acted upon.  Thus, 
for instance, though a person may be predisposed to cowardice that person is 
nevertheless able to perform a courageous action in the face of fear because he or she 
can recognize that cowardice is not suitable to the end for which he or she strives.  
Whenever movement is connected with rationality it becomes action.   
To the extent that persons give reasons for their addictive behavior, addiction can 
and should be investigated as a form of human action.  And persons do give such 
reasons: “We all have our reasons.  We’re bored or we’re restless or we’re depressed.  
We’re worried or anxious or stressed.  We’re celebrating, or we’re grieving.”19  Even the 
frequent claim on the part of addicts that they acted “irrationally” or “insanely” is meant 
to express how bad their reasons for action were, how embarrassingly poor their 
rationalizations were for so acting.  Of course, addicts often act impulsively, without 
deliberation, seemingly “unthinkingly.”  But rationality is not limited to the exercise of 
deliberative reason alone.  It extends to habit, that philosophically slippery category with 
which this inquiry is largely concerned, and, through habit, to the very passions and 
urges that we wrongly—if Aristotle and Aquinas are right—relegate to the purely 
                                                                                                                                                
in the voluntary to some extent because, even though they cannot know that they act for some end, they 
nevertheless by nature, i.e. by instinct, do act for an end.  Animals act with purpose, but only humans act 
with intention.  
19 Knapp, Drinking, 141. 
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involuntary.  This dissertation seeks to explore the complex structure of the rationality of 
addiction, to understand addiction as a peculiarly human activity.20   
 
Medicalized Treatment 
 As scientists have developed more specific understandings of the physiological 
aspects of addiction, opportunities and means for medical intervention have increased.  It 
is not possible in this brief introduction to mention the wide variety of medical 
treatments for addiction, which have met with varying degrees of success, but we can 
gain a general sense of the types of medical intervention available by looking at the case 
of alcohol addiction.   
Medical intervention into alcoholism can be divided into types of detoxification and 
types of relapse prevention.  Withdrawal from alcohol addiction can be immensely 
uncomfortable, even deadly, and in order for an alcoholic to escape the immediate 
physical threat posed by advanced alcohol addiction he or she must manage to survive as 
the alcohol is gradually depleted from the cellular organism.  In many cases, the 
detoxification process must be controlled by pharmacotherapy, involving the use of mild 
tranquilizers such as Librium.  Stopping “cold turkey” is rarely successful unless 
accompanied by strong external enforcement and support in the form of treatment clinics 
or inpatient hospital rehabilitation programs. 
                                                 
20 I am therefore highly skeptical of the ease with which many researchers draw conclusions about 
addiction on the basis of animal experimentation.  I am doubtful that it makes sense to speak of animals 
being addicted.  Rats, for example, are quite hard to “addict,” and only become “addicts” through the 
manipulations engineered by human rationality.  For an excellent analysis of the conceptual confusions 
rampant in this area of addiction research see Stanton Peele, The Meaning of Addiction: Compulsive 
Experience and Its Interpretation (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), ch. 4. 
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 Detoxification is only the beginning of a long process of recovery, and there are 
several drugs that have been shown to be effective in aiding the recovering alcoholic in 
this process.  The oldest such drug is Disulfuram, commonly known as Antabuse.  
Disulfuram is a relapse deterrent because, when combined with alcohol, it produces an 
intensely aversive reaction characterized by nausea, vomiting, dizziness, headache, and 
difficulty in breathing.  One such experience is sufficient to prevent even the most 
inveterate alcoholic from drinking while on Antabuse, but compliance in regularly 
taking Antabuse is an obvious problem.  Naltrexone reduces the dopaminic reward—the 
“priming of the pump” phenomena—that accompanies an alcoholic’s initial relapse, 
thereby preventing a first drink from triggering the drinking binges that are otherwise so 
common once an alcoholic has relapsed.  Unsurprisingly, Naltrexone has not been found 
to increase abstinence from alcohol although it has been quite effective in curbing the 
volume of alcohol intake upon relapse.  Acamprosate reduces the feelings of anxiety and 
depression that are associated with protracted abstinence.  It decreases craving by 
diminishing the discomfort associated with sobriety.  In one large trial, after a one-year 
course of treatment, 39 percent of subjects who were given Acamprosate were still 
abstinent, as compared to only 17 percent of those who were given placebo.21  None of 
these drugs is considered addictive, and, with the exception of Disulfuram, which is 
toxic to the liver, they have minimal harmful side effects.   
It is precisely because these drugs are not addictive that they can play a supporting 
role in the process of recovery.  If they could satisfy the longings and urges that lead 
                                                 
21 Goldstein, Addiction, 154. 
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people to drink, they would likely become addicts’ new substances of choice.  This is 
readily admitted by addiction pharmacologists who, similar to their colleagues in 
genetics, continue to insist that these medicines are not “magic bullets.”  “One of the 
things that it’s most important for people to understand here is that the medicines won’t 
do the work for you,” says Mark Willinbring, M.D., Director of Treatment and Recovery 
Research at the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism.  “People have the 
idea that [upon taking these drugs] ‘I won’t want to drink anymore,’ that it’ll magically 
make the whole thing disappear.  And for the most part that won’t work.”  Charles 
O’Brien, M.D., Ph.D., Director of the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine’s 
Center for Studies of Addiction, says: “There’s no medication that I could ever conceive 
of, even in the future, that will take away the need for the struggle, the hard work that’s 
required [in recovery].”22  Despite these cautionary remarks, there is a temptation to 
believe that science is approaching an ultimate panacea.  So, for example, Dr. Matthew 
Torrington claims, 
With the scientific advances we’re making in understanding how the human 
brain works there’s no reason we can’t eradicate addiction in the next 20 or 30 
years.  We can do it by fixing the part of the brain that turns on you during drug 
addiction and encourages you to kill yourself against your will.  I think 
addiction is the most beatable of all the major problems we face.  And I think 
we will.23 
 
We might contrast this confidence in medicine’s capacity to treat away addiction 
with the skepticism voiced by a recovering alcoholic who reported: “I had access to a 
                                                 
22 From interviews that can be seen in the documentary Addiction, recently released (2007) by HBO 
Documentary Films.  The documentary also reports on a new alcoholism drug called Topiramate.  The 
drug is still in clinical trial, but has shown some promising results.   
23 Quoted in Benoit Denizet-Lewis, “An Anti-Addiction Pill?” The New York Times Magazine, June 25, 
2006. 
 17 
good medical library, but after a while, I realized the genetics and chemistry of the 
disease were of no use to me as an alcoholic.”24  What the confidence of the medicalized 
understanding of addiction overlooks is that addiction can be adequately understood only 
as we inquire into the character of addictive action from the agent’s perspective.25  What 
the medicalized response to addiction overlooks is precisely the relationship between 
addiction and rationality.  It fails to recognize that addiction, far from being a merely 
causal outcome of the experiences of pleasure, relief, craving, and withdrawal, is rather a 
function of the meaning that those experiences take on in an agent’s conception of self 
and the pursuit of a life suitable to the self.26  Furthermore, this confidence fails to 
consider why, for instance, addiction is so pronounced in contemporary Western culture 
and why religious communities and intentional communities like Alcoholics Anonymous 
and Narcotics Anonymous play such a central role in most recoveries from addiction.  
This dissertation seeks to explore such questions, not in an effort to displace the medical 
treatment of addiction but rather to place it in proper perspective. 
 
                                                 
24 Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., Alcoholics Anonymous (“Big Book”), 4th ed. (New York: 
Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., 2001), 344.  Hereafter, Alcoholics Anonymous will be 
abbreviated AA and cited in-text. 
25 Much contemporary action theory merely reinforces the scientistic tendency to evaluate and describe 
actions without reference to the agent’s perspective.  The prevailing assumption is that actions can be 
described apart from the descriptions that an agent would give of his or her actions and apart from the 
meaning that those actions carry in terms of an agent’s life project.  This is incompatible with an 
Aristotelian view of action, for Aristotle believed that two actions that from an external perspective appear 
identical might nevertheless be very different actions depending on the character of the agent, and in 
particular the desires of the agent, from which the actions spring.  For a critique of contemporary action 
theory along these lines see Charles R. Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002). 
26 Commenting on what is overlooked in any scientistic approach to addiction, William Pryor, a former 
heroine addict and a great-great-grandson of Charles Darwin, quips: “If you gathered a thousand Charles 
Darwins in a room, each with a word processor, and made them type nonstop for ten years, would they 
eventually come up with the works of William Burroughs?”  In Survival of the Coolest: An Addiction 
Memoir (Bath, Great Britain: Clear Press, 2003), 17.  
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The dissertation proceeds in four stages.  In Chapter II, I present what I take to be 
the central paradox of addiction and attempt to locate that paradox within the long-
standing philosophical paradox of incontinent action.  Aristotle is the guide here, and I 
argue that his response to the paradox of incontinence should lead us to expect a possible 
connection between addiction and habit.  Chapter III is an investigation of habit, drawing 
heavily on the thought of Thomas Aquinas, and arguing that both Aristotle’s and 
Aquinas’s conception of habit is more complex and subtle than contemporary notions of 
habit and therefore more serviceable for providing an account of addictive behavior.  In 
Chapter IV, I explore the relationship between addiction and the virtue of temperance, 
and I use the moral philosophy of Aristotle to suggest an important link between modern 
conceptions of the self and addiction.  In Chapter V, I return to the moral philosophy of 
Aquinas in order to demonstrate and mine a parallel between Aquinas’s conception of 
the virtue of charity and the phenomenon of major addiction.  In the Conclusion, I offer 
some thoughts on the implications of the study for the hope of recovery from addiction. 
One more note: although I intend the dissertation to be about addiction in general, 
the reader may notice that I give more attention to alcohol addiction than to other 
substance or process addictions.  The reasons for this are straightforward.  There is more 
literature on alcoholism than any other addiction, including scholarly literature as well as 
“folk” literature such as alcoholism memoirs and the texts of Alcoholics Anonymous.  
Additionally, alcohol is different from the other addictive substances (except caffeine) in 
that it is legal and is used by a large segment of the population who do not become 
addicted, and these differences free us from being distracted by certain prejudices that 
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might obscure our analysis if we attended primarily to less “equal-opportunity” 
addictions.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
INCONTINENCE AND HABIT 
 
According to the “Big Book” of Alcoholics Anonymous, alcoholism is “cunning, 
baffling, powerful” (AA 58).  Why this description?  The literature of Alcoholics 
Anonymous is replete with first-hand illustrations of the claim, and the persistent refrain 
is that alcoholism is baffling because of the “utter inability” of alcoholics to leave 
alcohol alone, “no matter how great the necessity or the wish” (AA 34).  “The fact is that 
most alcoholics, for reasons yet obscure, have lost the power of choice in drink.  Our so-
called will power becomes practically nonexistent…We are without defense against the 
first drink” (AA 24).  The tyranny that alcohol seems to exercise over the alcoholic’s 
“power of choice” and “so-called will power” makes alcoholism “cunning” and 
“baffling.” 
 
The Addiction Paradox 
 The central paradox of Alcoholics Anonymous (hereafter A.A.), however, is that 
this admission of powerlessness over alcohol is supposed to be the “First Step” toward 
regaining, in some sense, a power over alcohol.  “The principle that we shall find no 
enduring strength until we first admit complete defeat is the main taproot from which 
our whole Society has sprung and flowered.”27  There is a “Higher Power,” which is 
                                                 
27 Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions (New York: 
Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., 1952), 22.  Hereafter, Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions 
will be abbreviated TT and cited in-text. 
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claimed to be accessible through the alcoholic’s admission of powerlessness.  The nature 
of this “Higher Power” is intentionally left unspecified although it is most frequently 
named as “God as we understand him” (Step Three).  Yet, although much of the 
language about this Higher Power evokes a vague conception of the supernatural—a 
“Supreme Being” (AA 46), “the Spirit of the Universe” (AA 52)—it is reiterated 
throughout the A.A. literature that one who is agnostic or even atheist about matters 
supernatural nevertheless may place hope in some Higher Power.  “You can, if you wish, 
make A.A. itself your ‘higher power.’  Here’s a very large group of people who have 
solved their alcohol problem.  In this respect they are certainly a power greater than you” 
(TT 27).  It is beyond question that A.A. has “worked” for many who are agnostic or 
atheist about whether there is an “All Powerful, Guiding, Creative Intelligence” (TT 49) 
at work in the world.  Later, I shall address the connection between addiction and the 
“supernatural,” but at this point it will be worthwhile to accept the testimony of those 
who have recovered without any expectation or experience of supernatural help.  
The central paradox of alcohol addiction, again, is that alcoholics acknowledge the 
futility of their own willpower to resist alcohol, yet in a nonmedicalized program of 
recovery find access to a power sufficient to reinvigorate the once-flaccid will.  Two 
general responses to this paradox have been forthcoming.  The first focuses almost 
exclusively on the near-unanimous claim of alcohol addicts that their willpower or 
power of choice was insufficient to resist the allure of alcohol.  This response accepts as 
paradigmatic and literal those accounts of addiction such as that reported by William 
James:  
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A man who, while under treatment for inebriety, during four weeks secretly 
drank the alcohol from six jars containing morbid specimens.  On asking him 
why he committed this loathsome act, he replied, “Sir, it is as impossible for me 
to control this diseased appetite as it is for me to control the pulsations of my 
heart.”28   
 
Attempting to find an explanation for this impotence of the will, the first response 
concurs with this addict’s self-description and labels alcohol addiction a disease, 
locating the source of the alcoholic’s inability to stop drinking entirely outside of the 
will.  The material configuration of the disease, whether it be specified as neurological, 
genetic, or cellular, overpowers the alcoholic will in such a way that the alcoholic does 
not act voluntarily when he or she drinks but is rather compelled to drink.29  
The second response to the paradox of alcohol addiction focuses almost exclusively 
on the de facto ability of some alcoholics to recover from their addiction, without 
medical intervention or mystical experience.  Insofar as recovery involves the voluntary 
cessation of drinking, the alcoholic’s drinking prior to recovery is considered equally 
voluntary.  The failure of willpower on the part of the alcoholic is construed as a 
standard case of willful misconduct, akin to countless other actions that involve the 
capitulation of the will in the face of strong temptation.  What is at work in alcohol 
                                                 
28 William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 2 (New York: Dover, 1950), 543.  Another oft-cited 
example is Benjamin Rush’s quotation of one eighteenth-century drunkard who reportedly said, “Were a 
keg of rum in one corner of the room, and were a cannon constantly discharging balls between me and it, I 
could not refrain from passing before that cannon, in order to get at the rum.”  Quoted in Harry Gene 
Levine, “The Discovery of Addiction,” Journal of Studies on Alcohol 39 (1978): 152. 
29 The literature on the disease concept of alcoholism is vast.  Its seminal text is E.M. Jellinek’s The 
Disease Concept of Alcoholism (New Haven: Hillhouse Press, 1960).  The most impassioned and qualified 
of its contemporary defenders was Mark Keller, late editor of the Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol.  
See his “The Disease Concept of Alcoholism Revisited,” Journal of Studies on Alcohol 37 (1976): 1694-
1717.  The Yale Center of Alcohol Studies, which has moved and is now the Center of Alcohol Studies at 
Rutgers University, and the National Institute on Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse are both deeply invested 
in this line of pursuit, and most of the articles one finds in the several journals of alcoholism and addiction 
studies either argue for or assume the disease concept of alcoholism. 
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addiction, this response suggests, is not that a disease vitiates human willpower, but 
rather that, due to some kind of moral weakness, the alcoholic repeatedly makes a 
deliberate decision to drink.  If alcoholics do not recover, it is only because they do not 
really want to.  According to this response, “addiction is a choice.”30 
Neither response to the central paradox of alcohol addiction is adequate.31  The 
disease concept of alcohol addiction is unable to provide a coherent account of the 
obvious occurrence of recovery from severe alcohol addiction without the aid of medical 
intervention.  By insisting on the language of compulsion, the disease model is unable to 
enter into the conversation about the way in which the willpower of the addict is 
deconstructed and reconstituted through the process of recovery.  “No one ought to say 
the A.A. program requires no willpower,” reads a crucial line in Twelve Steps and 
Twelve Traditions (TT 61).  This line comes in a chapter on the Fifth Step of the A.A. 
program: “We admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact 
nature of our wrongs” (TT 55).  Specifically, the decision to confide in another is 
thought to require great willpower: “Here is one place you may require all you’ve got” 
(TT 61).  This offers a profound insight into the role of the will in recovery, an insight to 
which we will pay considerable attention later in this study.  By being directed toward 
                                                 
30 This is the title of a popular book written by psychologist Jeffrey A. Schaler.  Addiction is a Choice 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2000). 
31 Neither the disease concept nor the choice concept of addiction is solely an attempt to respond to this 
paradox.  This is especially true of the disease concept, which is arrived at through a number of different 
investigations—e.g., how should we interpret the evidence for a genetic predisposition to alcoholism?—
and serves a number of different functional roles as a theory of addiction.  For a fine effort to temper the 
claims of the disease concept of alcohol addiction while at the same time acknowledging its theoretical 
and functional worth, see George Vaillant, The Natural History of Alcoholism Revisited (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), 376ff. 
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actions and practices that are within reach of the addict, the will to resist alcohol is 
indirectly reconstituted and reinvigorated.   
 It is significant that the language of “disease” is never used in the A.A. literature,32 
although numerous editions of the Big Book were produced after the “canonization” of 
the disease concept from the early 1960s on.  Alcoholism is referred to at times as an 
“illness,” but this is rarely in a medicalized context.  Illness is taken to be an appropriate 
metaphor for the progressively self-destructive behavior of the alcoholic (AA 30), just as 
the state of mind of the acting alcoholic is said to be “plain insanity” (AA 37).33  The 
first chapter of the Big Book, entitled “The Doctor’s Opinion,” contains a letter from a 
Dr. William Silkworth, who writes that “the action of alcohol on these chronic alcoholics 
is a manifestation of an allergy” (AA xxviii).  Yet this proposed allergy is supposed to 
explain the intense cravings uniquely experienced by alcoholics and not their consistent 
failure to resist giving in to the cravings.  Furthermore, Dr. Silkworth’s medical 
speculation is never endorsed in the Big Book.  It is only said that “his explanation 
makes good sense” (AA xxvi). 
 The language of “compulsion” is not used in A.A. literature either, for A.A. rightly 
recognizes that to conceive of alcoholic behavior as compelled would call into question 
the very possibility of a non-medicalized recovery.  The picture of a total incapacity to 
stop drinking is reserved only for those “rare” cases in which even an apparently sincere 
effort to apply A.A. principles results in failure.  These are “usually men and women 
                                                 
32 Except in the “Personal Stories”—autobiographical testimonies from recovering alcoholics—in the 
latter half of the Big Book. 
33 Cf. Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor (New York: Vintage, 1979). 
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who are constitutionally incapable of being honest with themselves.  There are such 
unfortunates.  They are not at fault; they seem to have been born that way” (AA 58).  
Interestingly, the physical inability to stop drinking is traced to a constitutional lack of 
self-awareness.  Here again we note the insight that the reconstitution of alcoholic 
willpower requires the ability to exert willpower over aspects of the addict’s life other 
than drinking, in this case the relentless pursuit of honest self-appraisal.   
 The disease concept of alcohol addiction, therefore, is incapable of dealing with the 
central paradox of addiction and recovery.  The notion of disease, with its corresponding 
suggestion of a physiologically determined compulsion to drink, cannot explain the 
alcoholic’s failure to resist alcohol, for in doing so it would explain too much.  It would 
also explain why alcoholics are incapable of recovering without medical intervention, 
which is evidently not the case.34 
On the other hand, the choice concept of addiction is unable to deal with the 
paradox of addiction and recovery for different reasons.  Simply put, it makes intelligible 
the possibility of recovery only by denying the reality of addiction.  On the choice 
                                                 
34 It has been argued that effective treatment without medical intervention does not rule out the possibility 
of disease.  For example, Vaillant argues that “effective treatment of early coronary heart ‘disease’ 
probably depends far more upon changing bad habits than upon receiving medical treatment,” yet we do 
not thereby rule out calling such a condition a “disease,” Natural History of Alcoholism Revisited, 18.  
Vaillant is correct to point out the elasticity of the concept of “disease.”  We probably cannot find a list of 
sufficient and necessary conditions that would exactly correlate even the uncontested medical attributions 
of “disease.”  We must therefore take these types of arguments on a case-by-case basis.  In this case, the 
salient difference between alcoholism and hypertension is that the central symptom of alcoholism is the 
inability to consistently choose not to drink, whereas none of the central symptoms of coronary heart 
disease implicate human choice.  If the central symptom of coronary heart disease were an inability to 
consistently refuse fatty foods, would it make sense to say that it could be effectively treated by changing 
the “bad habits” of eating fatty foods?  If it could be so treated, wouldn’t that call into question its status as 
a disease?  If addiction were a disease, it would be one the primary symptom of which is destruction of 
human will.  There are such diseases—Alzheimer’s comes to mind.  But with Alzheimer’s, the only hope 
of recovery is pharmacological, which is not true of addiction. 
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model, addiction is merely a name for consistent weakness of will with respect to one 
substance or activity.  In its more cynical moments, which are all too common, the 
attribution of “addiction” is depicted as a perverse psychological form of rationalization 
and excuse.35  Addiction is therefore not qualitatively distinct from any other failure of 
willpower: some people give in to the temptation for chocolate cake, others to the 
temptation for alcohol.  Even the more sophisticated attempts to supply a choice model 
of addiction reduce addiction in this way.  Although it is recognized that alcohol is 
imbued with great significance to the alcoholic because of his or her psychological, 
sociological, and spiritual situation, the difference between alcoholic behavior and the 
behavior of one who occasionally overindulges in sweets is placed along a continuum in 
such a way as to deny the qualitative singularity of addictive experience. 
The overwhelming report of alcoholics and other major addicts flies in the face of 
this attempt to reduce addictive behavior to a type of weakness of will that is perhaps 
greater in degree but not qualitatively distinct than other failures of the will.  Calling into 
question the attempts to root addictive behavior in a complex account of all of the factors 
that can enter into the conscious addictive choice, the Big Book warns against the 
temptation to think that “ ‘conditions’ drove us to drink” (AA 47).  This is not a denial 
that addictive behavior is at some level voluntary but rather a denial that addictive 
                                                 
35 Defenders of the choice concept of addiction never tire of alleging that the disease concept of addiction 
excuses addicts from expending the effort to overcome addiction.  The assumption behind the allegation, 
however, is that excuses are the main things that stand between an addict and recovery.  The assumption 
behind the disease concept, on the other hand, is that shame and guilt are the main things that stand 
between an addict and recovery.  Although I think both models of addiction are misguided, the disease 
concept has the virtue of resting on a truthful assumption, which cannot be said of the choice concept.  The 
last thing an addict who has “hit bottom” wants is another excuse to drink or use.  
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behavior is akin to other forms of weak-willed choice, which might be more easily 
explained with sole reference to external “conditions”.  As the alcoholic interprets and 
describes his or her addictive thought and behavior, he or she testifies that the power of 
alcoholic temptation is qualitatively distinct from any other kind of strong temptation. 
“The delusion that we are like other people, or presently may be, has to be smashed” 
(AA 30).  This is, functionally, why the disease model of addiction has been so helpful to 
many addicts.  It resonates with the addict’s experience of his or her addiction as 
something phenomenologically other than everyday struggles of will.36 
We may ask whether we should simply take the addict’s interpretation of his or her 
addictive experience as a given.  We shall have a chance later to look more closely at the 
ways in which culturally mediated patterns of perception and conception affect the 
interpretation and expression of addictive experience.  For now, it will be helpful to 
proceed taking the testimony of alcoholics and other addicts at their word.  Aristotle’s 
philosophical approach is often characterized as an exercise in “saving the appearances” 
of everyday experience,37 and this initial exploration into the paradox of addictive 
experience will be a similar sort of philosophical exercise.  For Aristotle, philosophy in 
the mode of “saving the appearances” entails that “we ought to attend to the 
undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of 
                                                 
36 It is beyond question that the disease concept of addiction has been enormously helpful to addicts and 
those who care about them by removing the moral stigma that accompanies the choice concept of 
addiction, according to which addiction is simply willful misconduct.  As Francis Seeburger puts it, “If 
nothing else, the spread of the disease view of addiction has greatly helped to overcome the illusion that 
addicts as a group are significantly different from other people when it comes to matters of ethics and 
morality,” Addiction and Responsibility, 68.  My practical concern with the disease concept is that it may 
give addicts a false hope in the power of medicine to aid or accomplish their recovery.  It is for the reasons 
presented in the Introduction that I think such a hope is almost always false.   
37 For this characterization, see Martha Nussbaum, “Saving Aristotle's Appearances,” in Language and 
Logos, ed. Malcolm Schofield and Martha Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).  
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practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them 
an eye they see aright.”38  We may find that the descriptions that addicts offer of their 
experiences of addiction are not merely undemonstrated but indemonstrable, that there is 
no philosophical formulation of the range of human action that makes intelligible the 
types of descriptions that addicts give of their experience.  The burden of this and the 
next chapter will be to show, on the contrary, that addicts’ interpretations and 
descriptions of their experience can be made philosophically intelligible and that, in fact, 
though this could never compensate for the terrible carnage it unleashes upon us, 
addiction does provide us with a number of philosophically suggestive questions and 
leads.39  To construct this argument, I will depend largely on Aristotle’s philosophy of 
human action (Chapter II) and Aquinas’s rich account of the nature of habit and its role 
in human action (Chapter III) although I will push certain of their insights to conclusions 
that neither of them explicitly formulated.   
The argument of this chapter will proceed in three stages.  First, I will argue that, 
following Aristotle, we can offer three broadly differentiated categories for 
comprehending the range of addictive experience: self-indulgence, incontinence, and 
compulsion.  It will be shown that most addictive experience falls under the broad 
category of incontinence and that, moreover, all cases of addictive experience that 
exhibit what I have called the addiction paradox fall into this category.  Next, and 
                                                 
38 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon 
(New York: Random House, 1941), 1143b11-14.  Hereafter, the Nicomachean Ethics will be cited in text 
following the standard line enumeration. 
39 “It is a significant fact that in order to appreciate the peculiar place of habit in activity we have to betake 
ourselves to bad habits, foolish idling, gambling, addiction to liquor and drugs,” John Dewey, Human 
Nature and Conduct, The Middle Works of John Dewey, Vol. 14, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), 21. 
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drawing again on Aristotle, I detect three further sub-categories of moral incontinence: 
incontinence from rational choice, incontinence from early habituation, and incontinence 
from genetic predisposition (what Aristotle would have termed “nature.”)  These 
differentiations are important for helping us navigate the range of culpability and 
responsibility that can be attributed to the incontinent addict.  Finally, having thus set the 
stage, I lay out Aristotle’s explanations of incontinent behavior.  Aristotle did not offer 
just one explanation of incontinent action, and if we are to approach any kind of 
adequate understanding of addictive experience we will need to pay close attention to the 
variety of ways in which action can go wrong according to Aristotle.  The argument 
culminates in the claim that, of the two identified springs of incontinent action—passion 
and habit—habit in particular calls for further investigation as a potential source of the 
singularity of addictive experience. 
 
Addiction and Incontinence 
Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas gives particular attention to what we would today 
describe as addictive experience.40  Indeed, there is only one passing line in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7, which could be taken to indicate an awareness that such a 
type of experience might require special philosophical treatment.  There, Aristotle 
mentions two types of incontinence that are to be distinguished from the “normal” types 
                                                 
40 See Chapter IV for a brief discussion of the “genealogy” of the addiction concept.  Most scholars concur 
that the addiction concept is modern, as argued most succinctly in Levine, “The Discovery of Addiction.”  
However, scholars have identified in medieval and ancient literature numerous descriptions of behavior 
that would lead us today to apply the label of addiction.  See, e.g., John C. Mellon, Mark as Recovery 
Story: Alcoholism and the Rhetoric of Gospel Mystery (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995).  
Mellon argues against the charge of anachronism in ch. 1.   
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with which he has primarily concerned himself.  These two unique types are 
“incontinence either without qualification or in respect of some particular bodily 
pleasure” (1148a3-5).  There is no reason to identify addiction with “incontinence 
without qualification”; as the Big Book states, the alcohol addict, for example, may be 
“perfectly sensible and well balanced concerning everything except liquor” (AA 21).  
Rather, as this last quote suggests, the alcoholic is one who is incontinent with respect to 
one particular object, namely, alcohol.  The addict is indeed a most extreme and 
paradigmatic case of this type of particularized incontinence.      
Aristotle does not offer an explanation of how these types of incontinence differ 
from the more standard types, but that he thinks so is clear.  Each of these two types of 
incontinence—incontinence with respect to everything (“incontinence without 
qualification”) or incontinence with respect to one thing (“incontinence in respect of 
some particular bodily pleasure”)—is “blamed not only as a fault but as a kind of vice, 
while none of the people who are incontinent in these other respects is so blamed” 
(1148a4-5).  As will be shown in Chapter III, a crucial insight is intimated in Aristotle’s 
cryptic claim that incontinence with respect to some particular thing shares in vice in a 
way that incontinence “in these other respects” does not.  But that will have to wait.   
The mention of these two unique types of incontinence appears, but is not 
developed, during Aristotle’s well-known attempt to respond to the problem of 
incontinent action (akrasia), known in contemporary parlance as “weakness of will.”41  
                                                 
41 For Aristotle, the fundamental ethical question is not about the difference between right and wrong but 
rather about how it is possible that we know the good yet do not will it.  This is the problem of “akrasia” 
or “incontinence,” which I shall use interchangeably.  I avoid the expression “weakness of will” mainly 
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Insofar as addiction involves a certain type of incontinence—a highly particularized and 
repetitive one—we should begin by addressing what Aristotle has to say about 
incontinence in general.  It will be my contention that there are resources in Aristotle’s 
treatment of the more general problem of incontinence that can be extended and 
deepened to probe the unique nature of addictive incontinence.   
First, however, we must inquire whether every type of addictive experience is an 
experience of incontinence.  The incontinent addict is the addict who has (a) the belief 
that the addictive behavior is bad for him or her and a corresponding desire not to 
engage in it, and (b) the capacity to some degree not to engage in it, but who 
nevertheless (c) does engage in addictive behavior against his or her own better 
judgment.  Obviously, there are addictive experiences that do not fit this description.  
Aristotle would have suggested two different types of addictive experience that would 
fall outside the range of incontinence.  First, an addict could lack (a), the belief that the 
behavior in question is bad for him or her and the corresponding desire to avoid the 
addictive behavior.  The addict who engages in addictive behavior in the absence of (a) 
would be termed by Aristotle the “self-indulgent” addict.  The self-indulgent addict not 
only engages in addictive activity but also does so wholeheartedly, believing the activity 
to be a good worthy of pursuit and therefore fully desiring it.  The self-indulgent addict 
does not give in to a temptation that is contrary to what he or she believes ought to be 
done.  Rather, the self-indulgent addict believes that the addictive behavior is what ought 
                                                                                                                                                
because, since Aristotle did not have a theory of the will, he also did not set out to address the problem of 
weakness of will. 
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to be done.  There is no internal “tension” as the self-indulgent addict engages in 
addictive behavior.42 
On the other hand, Aristotle would have held that an addict could lack (b) and 
therefore not be rightly described as incontinent.  The addict who engages in addictive 
behavior in the absence of (b) would be termed by Aristotle a “brutish” or “morbid” 
addict.  It is an open question whether anyone in the contemporary world, other than 
perhaps feral children, would qualify as brutish for Aristotle.  There is no small lack of 
provincial arrogance in his attributions of brutishness, but what seems to be the 
characteristic mark of the brute is the incapacity to act rationally.  These are persons 
“who by nature are thoughtless and live by their senses alone” (1149a9-10).  The morbid 
person similarly lacks the capacity to act rationally, but for different reasons.  The 
morbid person is one who cannot rationally guide his or her actions “as a result of 
disease (e.g. of epilepsy) or of madness” (1149a11).  For epilepsy and madness are such 
that they either temporarily or permanently render the human person entirely a patient, 
removing all agency.   
It is tempting to hear in Aristotle’s language of “disease” and “madness” resonances 
of the “illness” and “insanity” language of Alcoholics Anonymous.  There is, however, a 
decisive difference between what Aristotle means by the notion of a morbid character 
and what A.A. means by speaking of the illness and insanity of the alcoholic.  For 
                                                 
42 Harry Frankfurt, in his classic essay “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in Free Will, 
2d ed., ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 335, offers a description of what he 
calls the “willing addict” that closely parallels our Aristotelian notion of the self-indulgent addict.  In 
Frankfurt’s philosophical vernacular, the willing addict is one who experiences no conflict between his or 
her first-order and second-order desires.  The willing addict wants the addictive object and wants to want 
it. 
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Aristotle, one who is morbid with respect to some potential human action is removed 
entirely from the realm of culpability and responsibility with respect to that action, 
whereas, when the Big Book uses this language it does mean to question the degree to 
which a person is culpable for his or her behavior, but it expressly does not believe that 
the “ill” or “insane” alcoholic is free of responsibility with respect to his or her addictive 
behavior.  Intuitively, we see the notions of culpability and responsibility as 
coterminous, but neither A.A. nor Aristotle—in other cases—does so.  As I will argue, 
the asymmetry is not only philosophically justified but also required for any sufficient 
characterization of a large segment of addictive behavior.  In any event, the “morbid” 
addict, on Aristotle’s terms, cannot be classified as incontinent since he or she lacks the 
capacity to act otherwise than he or she does.   The relationship of the morbid addict to 
addictive behavior is precisely the same as the relationship of an epileptic to seizures.   
There are addicts who would rightly be classified as self-indulgent or morbid on 
Aristotle’s terms.  Indeed, many addicts go through a self-indulgent phase, which is 
usually made possible by the fleeting conviction that the addiction can be maintained 
without any drastic detriment to health or well-being.  On the other hand, there are 
clearly persons who are addicts without any capacity for change.  The largest class of 
such individuals is persons with serious mental handicaps.  Interestingly, it seems likely 
that Aristotle would have put more addicts in this latter class than A.A. does.43  “There 
                                                 
43 This is an important point, and one that requires me to qualify my use of Aristotle in this dissertation.  I 
mentioned in n. 15 of the Introduction that, although both Aristotle and Aquinas acknowledge the 
existence of natural dispositions to act in certain ways, they differ in their assessments of how 
determinative such natural dispositions are of human behavior.  For many reasons, some having to do with 
the introduction of the category of “sin” by Christianity and the consequent reassessment of the 
relationship between natural contingencies and human happiness, Aquinas is much less inclined than 
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are those, too, who suffer from grave emotional and mental disorders, but many of them 
do recover if they have the capacity to be honest” (AA 58).  With respect to the 
“beggars, tramps, asylum inmates, prisoners, queers, plain crackpots, and fallen women” 
that many early A.A. groups resolved not to admit to membership, later A.A. wisdom 
came to see that “thousands of these sometimes frightening people were to make 
astonishing recoveries and become our greatest workers and intimate friends” (TT 140-
141).  
What I have called the addictive paradox does not arise for either the self-indulgent 
addict or the morbid addict.  There is nothing paradoxical about the thinking or behavior 
of the self-indulgent agent in general.  The agent is not conflicted about what he or she 
wants, nor, in normal cases, is he or she unable to bring about those wants.  There is no 
mystery in the fact that some addicts approve in every way of their addiction and 
therefore pursue it wholeheartedly.  With respect to the morbid addict, although there 
may be on some level a judgment that the addictive behavior is bad, the failure to bring 
                                                                                                                                                
Aristotle to absolve the moral culpability and responsibility of human persons on the basis of hereditary 
dispositions.  Aristotle’s suggestion of hereditary determinism is on display, for example, in the following 
passage from Aristotle: “It is surprising if a man is defeated by and cannot resist pleasures or pains which 
most men can hold out against, when this is not due to heredity or disease, like the softness that is 
hereditary with the kings of the Scythians, or that which distinguishes the female sex from the male” 
(1150b12-16).  This indicates that Aristotle may have been more sympathetic than Aquinas with the 
characterization of addiction as determined by heredity.  What Aristotle would not have accepted is the 
simultaneous claim that hereditary addicts can be held responsible for their addictions and expected to 
recover in a nonmedicalized context.  Aristotle is too consistent for this.  Hereditary determinism removes 
both culpability and responsibility on Aristotle’s account, as is clear from this and other passages.  In other 
words, if Aristotle were in A.A., he would not allow a Scythian to join, not even a Scythian king.  And 
certainly not women!  But, presumably, had Aristotle relinquished his prejudices he would have noticed 
that not all women are “soft,” and would have retracted the claim that women are by nature determined to 
be soft.  Simply because most addicts show a capacity for recovery, we must consider most addicts 
incontinent rather than morbid if we are to maintain Aristotle’s consistency.  In any event, I am interested 
in Aristotle’s account of incontinence, not because I am certain that he would have applied it to the case of 
addiction, but because it seems to me the most adequate entry point for a discussion of the philosophical 
implications of the possibility of nonmedicalized recovery from addiction. 
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action in line with such a judgment is a physically determined inability.  The addictive 
paradox, again, is that persons come to admit their own inability to resist the object of 
their addiction, only to find that they thereby begin to regain that ability.  The addictive 
paradox is, therefore, a paradox about agency.  Insofar as the morbid addict is not an 
agent but is rather a patient, there is no great mystery, although there is great sadness, 
about the morbid addict’s behavior.  The addictive paradox applies strictly to the 
incontinent addict.  Indeed, as will be shown, the addictive paradox is really connected 
to the paradox of incontinence in general, and it is due to Aristotle’s careful attention to 
this latter paradox that he is so helpful for this discussion of the nature of addictive 
experience. 
Before examining Aristotle’s attempt to deal with the paradox of incontinence, a 
few more remarks about kinds of incontinence are in order.  Just as we could find in 
Aristotle three broad categories for thinking about types of addicts, so, I suggest, we can 
find three sub-categories for thinking about types of incontinent addicts.  First, Aristotle 
speaks of cases of “simple” incontinence (1148a2).  “Simple” incontinence is 
incontinence that is acquired straightforwardly through morally incontinent behavior.  
To say that the behavior is morally incontinent is to imply some degree of culpability 
and therefore to suggest that the moral agent had the resources both to know that his or 
her action was wrong and to do otherwise.  The simply incontinent addict is, therefore, 
always an adult addict whose addictive tendencies can be explained primarily or solely 
with reference to decisions and actions that were undertaken as a competent adult moral 
agent.  Because the actions that led to the state of incontinence were themselves morally 
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culpable, the agent is held to be more or less culpable for being in the state of 
incontinent addiction.  I say more or less culpable because the degree of culpability 
depends in large part on the degree to which the simply incontinent person could or 
should have known that his or her actions might lead to a settled state of character.  
Aristotle says that “actions and states of character are not voluntary in the same way” 
(1114b30-31), which means that the simply incontinent person is not necessarily equally 
culpable for the one or several actions taken singly that eventuate in a settled character 
as he or she is for the actions that spring from that settled character.44  In any event, 
because incontinent addiction is not necessarily a permanent state (as is, for example, 
morbid addiction), the incontinent addict may also be rightly assigned responsibility for 
overcoming his or her incontinent state.  He or she is able to respond in the face of the 
incontinent state and is therefore responsible for recovery. 
Second, Aristotle speaks of cases of incontinence due to childhood habituation, or, 
more carefully, due to habituation as a result of activities engaged in when the person 
could not have been considered a responsible moral agent.  The example that he gives is 
of men who engage in pederasty because they were “victims of lust from childhood, 
from habit” (1048b30-31).  We can suppose that Aristotle, for example, might have 
included in this category persons who were raised by addicts, surrounded from a young 
age by addictive behavior, and/or encouraged or allowed from a young age to 
experiment with addictive substances or behaviors.  Similarly, Aristotle says that some 
                                                 
44 This raises a thorny set of questions.  If a person knows he or she is genetically predisposed to addiction, 
might he or she be more rather than less culpable for becoming addicted?  Are ethics professors and moral 
psychologists, e.g., more culpable than others for becoming addicts since they know so well the 
relationship between human action and character formation?   
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persons may be in a state of incontinence due to custom.  Addiction as a product of the 
binge-drinking culture that predominates on college campuses throughout America could 
stand in as an example here.45  Aristotle says that these are not cases of “simple 
incontinence,” but are rather only called incontinence “by analogy” (1049a1-3).  
Thankfully, he gives us a clue as to how these types of incontinence are and are not like 
simple incontinence.  “To have these various types of habit is beyond the limits of vice” 
(1148b34-1149a1).  What is implied in this claim is twofold.  First, the person who acts 
incontinently due to childhood habituation or custom is not morally culpable for his or 
her incontinent state or the behavior that flows from it.  In this sense, the person’s state 
and behavior is “beyond vice.”  Second, because the person’s incontinent state and 
activity is a product of habit, the person is nevertheless in some sense able to respond 
creatively to his or her situation.  Because habit is not nature, but only “like nature” 
(1152a33), it is malleable, although change requires great effort: the more deeply 
ingrained the habit, the more difficult will be the process of correction.  Therefore, the 
addict who is incontinent due largely to childhood habituation is not culpable but can be 
said to be responsible for his or her recovery although this is true to a lesser degree than 
in the case of the addict who is simply incontinent. 
Finally, Aristotle suggests that there may be cases of incontinence due to “originally 
bad natures.”  The text is hard to decipher at this point.  On one reading, it appears that 
Aristotle in speaking of bad natures means only to indicate those cases that can be traced 
to disease or madness.  Thus, we would say of a mentally ill addict, ‘He can’t help 
                                                 
45 As John Dewey points out, “custom” is just an abbreviation for “collective habit” or “widespread 
uniformities of habit,” Human Nature and Conduct, 43. 
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himself, he was just born with a bad nature.’  But Aristotle also seems to include under 
the category of “originally bad natures” the sorts of things that we would call 
dispositions, even perhaps “genetic predispositions,” without granting them the status of 
physically pre-determined necessities.  Thus, for example, Aristotle speaks of “the man 
who is by nature apt to fear everything, even the squeak of a mouse” (1149a6-7).  Here, 
we would be more inclined to say that this man has a cowardly disposition, not coward’s 
disease or a mental illness that causes cowardice.  The notion of dispositional tendencies 
toward incontinent addiction, then, would represent a third type of addictive 
incontinence.  Matters of culpability and responsibility would be qualified accordingly.46  
Each of these categorizations could be subjected to extended analysis.  This would 
be especially profitable if one were interested in elaborating a theory on the basis of 
which legal decisions could be made about the culpability of various types of addictive 
behavior.  That, however, is not the aim of this study.  These divisions are set forward 
only in very schematic terms in order, first, to show how sensitive Aristotle was to the 
complexity of human action and, second, to prevent the need for constant qualification 
throughout the rest of this project.  I have located the spearhead of our query within the 
category of incontinent addictive action, and I will speak most regularly of what has 
been further sub-categorized as simple incontinent action with respect to a particularized 
object or activity, but it should be apparent throughout that what I say would need to be 
qualified to adequately cover the further sub-categories.  With that proviso, we shall now 
be concerned with Aristotle’s explanation of how incontinent action is possible at all.   
                                                 
46 But see n. 18 for examples of the difficulties involved in making such determinations. 
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Aristotle on Incontinence 
Incontinence is a philosophical paradox in itself.  Incontinence can be characterized 
straightforwardly as what takes place when an agent acts against his or her own better 
judgment.47  It is so patently obvious from first-hand experience that this sort of thing 
occurs that it may not be immediately apparent why this is paradoxical, but that it is so 
can be shown as follows.  If, as is commonly held, agents act in such a way as to bring 
about what they believe to be, on the whole, to their greatest benefit, then how can it 
come about that an agent genuinely believes that one course of action is to his or her 
greatest benefit and yet chooses to take a contradictory course of action?  How can an 
agent choose to do that which he or she believes to be inferior to another course of action 
that was open for him or her to take? 
 In his attempt to respond to the paradox of incontinent action in Book 7 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle begins, as he often does, by registering what others have 
said about the matter.   He reports that Socrates responded to the paradox by denying 
that there was a paradox in the first place.  “For Socrates was entirely opposed to the 
view in question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one, he said, 
when he judges acts against what he judges best—people act so only by reason of 
ignorance” (1145b25-28).  Socrates’ position, then, is that genuine incontinence does not 
occur, since in any case of apparent incontinence the agent does not possess the 
knowledge with which his or her behavior is in contradiction.  We always act in accord 
                                                 
47 This is the standard contemporary characterization of incontinence, offered by Donald Davidson in his 
classic paper, “How Weakness of the Will Is Possible,” in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980). 
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with our “better judgment,” even though to others observing or to our own retrospective 
gaze it appears that we should or could have “known better.”  Incontinent action, 
therefore, is simply ignorant action and so not a moral failure. 
In accord with his methodology of “saving the appearances,” Aristotle rejects the 
Socratic response to the problem of incontinence, saying, “this view plainly contradicts 
the observed facts” (1145b29-30).  Before we move on to Aristotle’s own treatment of 
the problem, however, it will be helpful to point out two distinctive elements of the 
Socratic response that Aristotle will reject in his treatment of the problem.  Both 
elements are apparent in Plato’s well-known treatment of incontinence in the 
Protagoras.  There, Socrates says: 
It is not easy to show what it is that you call “being overcome by pleasure,” and 
then, it is upon this very point that all the arguments [for incontinence] rest.  But 
even now it is still possible to withdraw, if you are able to say that the good is 
anything other than pleasure or that the bad is anything other than pain.  Or is it 
enough for you to live life pleasantly without pain?  If it is enough, and you are 
not able to say anything else than that the good and the bad are that which result 
in pleasure and pain, listen to this.  For I say to you that if this is so, your position 
[i.e., that there is incontinent action] will become absurd, when you say that 
frequently a man, knowing the bad to be bad, nevertheless does that very thing, 
when he is able not to do it, having been driven and overwhelmed by pleasure; 
and again when you say that a man knowing the good is not willing to do it, on 
account of immediate pleasure, having been overcome by it.48   
 
In this passage, Socrates states what are to be the central theses upon which he bases 
his rejection of incontinent action as a genuine possibility.  First, he claims that there is 
one standard of value by which all actions can be measured.  Every evaluative term can 
be cast, without remainder, in terms of pleasure or pain.  There is, therefore, no 
                                                 
48 Plato, Protagoras, trans. Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 354e-355b. 
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possibility of incommensurability between value judgments and thus no genuine 
possibility for internal conflict about what is really the better course of action.  Second, 
Socrates claims that the agent is either in possession of knowledge or is ignorant.  There 
are only these two possibilities: simple knowledge or simple ignorance.   
Aristotle denies both of these theses.  First, he rejects the view that all values are 
commensurable.  He asserts that there are three possible objects of pursuit—the noble, 
the useful, and the pleasant (1140b30-35)—none of which can be straightforwardly 
translated into the other.49  Second, Aristotle denies that there are only two epistemic 
possibilities for the human agent, simple knowledge and simple ignorance.  He asserts, 
instead, a number of differentiations of knowledge and error which result in a much 
more complex account of the various epistemic situations in which the human agent may 
carry out his or her action.  
Throughout his inquiry into the sources of akratic action in Book 7 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle relies on a specific typology of moral character.  The 
virtuous agent is one who acts in accordance with his or her reason and in whom reason 
and appetite coincide: the virtuous person rationally approves the good, desires the good, 
and does the good.  The continent (enkratic) agent is one who acts in accordance with 
his or her reason but in whom reason and appetite conflict: the continent person 
rationally approves the good, desires the bad, yet does the good.  The incontinent 
(akratic) agent is one who does not act in accordance with his or her reason and in whom 
                                                 
49 Elsewhere, in the Politics, Aristotle explicitly denies the “principle” according to which “any good may 
be compared with any other,” trans. Benjamin Jowett, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard 
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1283a3-4. 
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reason and appetite conflict: the incontinent person rationally approves the good, desires 
the bad, and does the bad.  Finally, the vicious agent is one who acts in accordance with 
his or her reason and in whom reason and appetite coincide: the vicious person rationally 
approves the bad, desires the bad, and does the bad.  As should be apparent from this 
classification scheme, the action of the incontinent person is the philosophically puzzling 
action, given the assumption, which is shared by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, of the 
ascendancy of reason over appetite. 
In the course of Aristotle’s treatment of the puzzle of incontinence, two lines of 
response emerge.  There is considerable disagreement in the scholarly literature about 
what is in fact Aristotle’s position on the matter, including whether Aristotle achieves a 
unified position and whether his position is materially distinguishable from the Socratic 
position,50 but these are not the issues with which we are primarily concerned here.  
Rather, we are interested in probing each line of response in an effort to see how it might 
help us elucidate the central paradox of the addictive experience.  The first type of 
response Aristotle proposes is that, sometimes, the reasoning needed to overcome 
incontinent action is simply not completed due to the interruption of passion.  The 
second type of response he proposes is that, sometimes, although the reasoning may be 
completed it is not followed due to either the onslaught of passion or the weight of habit.  
I shall elaborate these responses as they arise in Aristotle’s treatment of the problem in 
Book 7. 
                                                 
50 For a lucid and concise treatment of these matters, see Risto L. Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in 
Medieval Thought (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), ch. 1. 
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En route to offering his first response to the puzzle, Aristotle sets aside a response 
of those who had tried to maintain the Socratic position without denying the possibility 
of incontinence.  They had proposed a distinction between knowledge and opinion, 
maintaining that the incontinent agent is one who acts, not against knowledge, but 
against opinion.  Aristotle swiftly dismisses this response, saying that “some men are no 
less convinced of what they think than others of what they know” (1146b29-30).  We 
can make no consistent claims about the relative strengths of knowledge in comparison 
to opinion because some people are so zealous that they feel more strongly about what 
they merely believe to be true than other people feel about what they know to be true.  
Aristotle accuses the proponents of this response of conflating opinion with indecision.  
If there is genuine indecision, as is sometimes the case in the realm of opinion, then we 
are not inclined to call the action that results from such indecision incontinent.  But 
whenever rational evaluation moves beyond indecision, it arrives at a rational judgment.  
Whether this deliverance is an opinion or knowledge does not matter.  What matters is 
that the agent sometimes acts against his or her rational judgment.  This is the paradox of 
incontinence.   
 Having invalidated the relevance of the opinion/knowledge distinction to the 
incontinence paradox, Aristotle proceeds by drawing a distinction that he thinks is in fact 
relevant to the paradox.  Although it does not make a difference whether a man 
possesses a rational judgment in the form of opinion or in the form of knowledge, “it will 
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make a difference whether, when a man does what he should not, he has the knowledge51 
but is not exercising it, or is exercising it; for the latter seems strange, but not the 
former” (1136b32-35).  The first type of response to the paradox of incontinence that 
Aristotle pursues rests on this distinction between a rational judgment possessed but not 
exercised and a rational judgment exercised.  In Aristotle’s terminology, this is the 
distinction between potential and actual knowledge. 
 As he develops the significance of this distinction to the question of incontinence, 
Aristotle depends on an account of action according to which action can always be 
represented as the causal effect of a practical syllogism.  A practical syllogism consists 
of two premises, one universal and the other particular.  The universal premise makes a 
universal rational judgment, for example, “Everything sweet ought to be tasted” 
(1147a29).  The particular premise makes a particular rational judgment, for example, 
“This is sweet” (1147a29).  Just as when in a theoretical syllogism assent to a conclusion 
follows from the valid connection of a universal and particular premise, so when in a 
practical syllogism a valid connection is made between a universal and particular 
premise an action is the culmination of the syllogism.  The conclusion of an agent’s 
practical syllogism with the premises “Everything sweet ought to be tasted” and “This is 
sweet” is twofold: first, there is a propositional conclusion, for example, “I will taste 
this”; second, there is the action of tasting the sweet thing. 
                                                 
51 Given Aristotle’s argument against the significance of the opinion/knowledge distinction with respect to 
the paradox of incontinence, it would have been more precise if, instead of using the language of 
“knowledge” he would always use the language of “rational judgment,” or something similar.  In fact, he 
usually uses the language of “knowledge,” as does Aquinas, but “rational judgment” could always be 
substituted without changing the argument.  Rather, such a substitution would make the arguments more 
precise. 
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 One of the central controversies in the literature on Aristotle’s ethics involves 
whether the conclusion of a practical syllogism is necessarily an action.  This has in fact 
been the standard reading, and it is defended on the basis of Aristotle’s claim that, once a 
valid connection has been made between the universal and particular premises of a 
practical syllogism, “the man who can act and is not prevented must at the same time 
actually act accordingly” (1147a30-32, my emphasis).  Alfred Mele, however, in several 
carefully argued papers, has persuasively argued that Aristotle cannot have understood 
the conclusion of a practical syllogism to be strictly an action.  He argues that, at the 
very least, we must grant that a propositional conclusion mediates between the practical 
syllogism and the resultant action, even if these two “moments” of practical reasoning 
cannot be distinguished temporally.  Explaining in what sense the conclusion of a 
practical syllogism is and is not correctly identified with an action, Mele says that if  
an agent’s forming a “concluding” opinion is virtually simultaneous with his 
performing the relevant action, then there is an extended sense of “conclusion” 
in which an (external) action is characteristically a conclusion of a practical 
syllogism.  It is not an immediate conclusion; for it is mediated by a concluding 
opinion [the propositional conclusion].  But it is “virtually simultaneous” with 
the formation of such an opinion; and, of course, the primary purpose of 
practical reasoning is, not to arrive at opinions, but to generate action.52   
 
The importance of this claim will be evident shortly as we look at Aristotle’s second 
response to the paradox of incontinence.  For now, it is important to see that scholars 
agree that, for Aristotle, every human act can be represented as the consequence 
(whether mediated or not) of a practical syllogism.  I say that every human act can be 
                                                 
52 Alfred Mele, “Aristotle on Akrasia, Eudaimonia, and the Psychology of Action,” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 2 (1985), 377.  See also Mele’s “Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 405-423; and his ‘Aristotle on Akrasia, Eudaimonia, and the Psychology 
of Action,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1985): 375-393. 
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represented as the consequence of a practical syllogism to underscore the point that 
syllogistic reasoning need not precede every human action.  Often, the construction of a 
practical syllogism is performed retrospectively to display or assess the rationality of a 
given action. 
 Based on this understanding of human action as the consequence of a practical 
syllogism, Aristotle explains how an agent can in a sense possess a judgment yet act 
contrary to that judgment.  Since, on the account Aristotle has begun to develop, all 
human action can be represented as the consequence of a practical syllogism, it seems as 
though incontinent action will require the presence, in some sense, of two practical 
syllogisms: one that, had it been rightly connected in the agent’s mind, would have led to 
right action and another that is connected in the agent’s mind that does in fact lead to 
wrong action. In every such case, the rational judgment that would have led to continent 
action is possessed by the agent, not actually, but merely potentially, at the moment the 
incontinent action is performed.  More specifically, Aristotle says that it will always be 
the particular premise of the practical syllogism that may be known potentially but not 
actually.  Aristotle suggests, although he does not clearly distinguish, a variety of ways 
in which this might occur.   
 First, the particular premise may be merely potentially known because of a lack of 
time.  The agent may be rushed or rush to act before bringing the particular premise to 
the “front” of the mind.  Second, the particular premise may be merely potentially 
known because it is not actively brought into the deliberative process.  For some reason, 
the agent simply does not import the particular premise into his or her actual thinking.  
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Neither of these types of failures is obviously a result of a conflict with the agent’s 
appetite, and they are therefore of minimal interest to Aristotle. 
 Several more ways in which the particular premise can fail to be exercised involve 
the relationship between the appetites and reason.  A third can be distinguished in the 
following passage: 
When, then, the universal opinion is present in us forbidding us to taste, and there 
is also the opinion that ‘everything sweet is pleasant’, and that ‘this is sweet’ 
(now this is the opinion that is active), and when appetite happens to be present 
in us, the one opinion bids us avoid the object, but appetite leads us towards it 
(1147a32-35). 
 
The particular premise that would lead toward continent action may be merely 
potentially known because the agent’s appetite may lead him or her “toward” the object 
of appetitive desire, and, by implication, “away from” an actual knowledge of the 
particular premise that would, in connection with the universal premise prohibiting 
certain actions, lead the agent to act continently.  We could say that what passion does in 
this instance is to push the one particular premise of a practical syllogism into the “front” 
of the agent’s mind while at the same time pushing the particular premise of another 
practical syllogism into the “back” of the agent’s mind.  So, for example, we might have 
the following two practical syllogisms: on the one hand “Everything sweet ought to be 
tasted” and “This is sweet”; and on the other hand, “I shouldn’t have more than one 
piece of chocolate cake” and “This would be my second piece.”  Incontinence could 
occur given these two practical syllogisms if appetite were to lead us “toward” 
exercising the first practical syllogism and “away from” exercising the second.  Can we 
replace the language of “toward” and “away from”, of the “front” and “back” of the 
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mind with something less metaphorical?  We could try, by following Aquinas, and say 
that the passions might (a) “prevent” the agent from considering what he or she knows; 
(b) “distract” the agent from considering what he or she knows; or (c) “pervert” the 
agent’s knowledge of the particular premise of the prohibitive practical syllogism.53 
 The following passage offers a fourth way in which an agent’s knowledge of a 
particular premise might be merely potential rather than actual: 
For outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions, it is 
evident, actually alter our bodily condition, and in some people even produce fits 
of madness.  It is plain, then, that incontinent people must be said to be in a 
similar condition to men asleep, mad, or drunk (1147a14-18)   
 
Passion might be so powerful as to change our bodily condition.  Just as sleep affects our 
bodily condition and makes theoretical and practical reasoning disappear, so the passions 
might similarly bring about a constitutional change that would make certain exercises of 
practical reasoning inaccessible.  Aquinas’s description is helpful here although it is no 
less metaphorical.  The passions may lead to incontinent action by “fettering the reason: 
in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body…Now such 
bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in 
whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered” (1-2.33.3).  This sort of analysis would 
obviously apply to addicts’ within-episode (e.g., after the first drink) “loss of control” 
                                                 
53 These are the three descriptions supplied by Aquinas in De Malo, trans. Richard Regan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 3.9, of how appetite can lead a person away from acting in accordance with a 
right judgment.  Cf. Jon Elster, Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 199, who suggests that emotion may “cloud” or “distort” reason’s 
deliverances.  “Clouding” is presented as a form of distraction from clear reason, and “distortion” as a 
form of perversion of reason’s evaluation. 
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over their addictive behavior.54  Aristotle does not address at this point the extent to 
which human action resulting from such activity on the part of appetite is compelled or 
voluntary although what he says later may suggest that such activity is only an indirect 
form of moral incontinence.  Obviously, given the evidence of within-episode loss of 
control on the part of addicts, the way in which we analyze the moral status of this type 
of effect of passion on reason is important. 
 This concludes the first line of response that Aristotle offers to the paradox of 
incontinence, the line of response according to which incontinent action is possible 
because the reasoning that would be needed to prevent it is, although within the reach of 
the agent, never actually carried out.  It should be noted that this line of response is not 
very far from the Socratic position.  In each of the four ways that passion can inhibit 
right exercise of the practical syllogism, the result is ignorance of the conclusion that 
could be characterized as “actual” knowledge or “knowledge proper.”  Aristotle admits 
as much: “the position that Socrates sought to establish actually seems to result; for it is 
not in the presence of what is thought to be knowledge proper that the affection of 
incontinence arises (nor is it this that is ‘dragged about’ as a result of the state of 
passion)” (1147b15-18).  Like the Socratic position, this Aristotelian diagnosis of 
incontinence denies the possibility of acting against one’s (actual) better judgment.  It is 
distinct from the plain Socratic position only in that it complicates the character of 
                                                 
54 For a comment on the notion of “loss of control” and how it will be used in this project, see Chapter III, 
n. 1. 
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ignorance, suggesting that there are several degrees of ignorance rather than simple 
Socratic “error.”55 
Elsewhere in the Ethics, however, a second line of response to the paradox of 
incontinence is evident.  Aristotle says things that imply that the incontinent agent may 
reach the conclusion of the practical syllogism that should lead to continent action but 
nevertheless violate that conclusion.  For example, Aristotle says that “the incontinent 
man acts with appetite, but not with choice; while the continent man on the contrary acts 
with choice, but not with appetite” (1111b12-15).  Again, “he who pursues the excesses 
of things pleasant…not by choice but contrary to his choice and his judgment, is called 
incontinent” (1148a6-10).  At numerous places throughout the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle makes the same claim, that the incontinent agent is one who acts contrary to his 
or her choice or rational judgment.  Now choice (prohairesis), for Aristotle, is the 
efficient cause of action.  “The origin of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is 
choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end” (1139a32-33).  
This claim would make “choice” identical with the conclusion of a practical syllogism, 
which is also considered the efficient cause of action.  And it would seem that Aristotle 
did in fact understand choice to be identical to the outcome of practical reasoning.  “The 
object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after 
deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our power” (1113a10-12).  
Given these claims, we are led to believe that when Aristotle says that the incontinent 
                                                 
55 Anthony Kenny, in Aristotle’s Theory of the Will (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 160-161, 
claims that Aristotle supplies three possibilities of error in place of Socrates’ simple possibility of error: 
not having knowledge and therefore being in error; half-having knowledge and therefore being in error; 
having knowledge but not exercising it and therefore being in error. 
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agent acts contrary to choice but with appetite he implies that the incontinent agent has 
in fact connected the premises of the right practical syllogism in such a way as to arrive 
at a rational judgment—“choice”—but that the agent nevertheless acts contrary to that 
judgment.  Something like this recognition that an incontinent person may actually 
possess the knowledge needed to act continently seems to be at stake in attributions of 
denial and self-deception to addicts, and we shall see in Chapter V that the phenomenon 
of denial is indeed bound up with this line of response to the problem of incontinence. 
Aristotle seems to be aware that the claim that the incontinent agent acts against 
choice does imply an explanation of incontinence that is different than the one offered in 
the first line of response.  
The last premiss both being an opinion about a perceptible object, and being 
what determines our actions, this a man either has not when he is in the state of 
passion [the first line of response], or has it [the second] in the sense in which 
having knowledge did not mean knowing but only talking (1147b8-12). 
 
In the second line of response, therefore, ignorance of the particular premise cannot be 
seen as the cause of incontinent action since the incontinent agent actually possesses the 
rational judgment that results from the right practical syllogism.  The agent possesses 
this rational judgment—his or her “choice”—but acts in violation of the judgment 
nevertheless. 
 According to this much less Socratic position, the incontinent agent acts against 
choice.  This is a strange saying to our ears.  How could an agent act against his or her 
choice?  Isn’t an agent’s choice always made evident by what the agent actually does?  
Not so for Aristotle.  But how, then, does Aristotle believe that an agent could act 
contrary to the judgment delivered by right practical reasoning?  There seem to be two 
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ways: first, because of the onslaught of passion; second, because of the power of habit.  
Both possibilities are on display in the following passage:  
The fact that men use the language that flows from knowledge proves nothing; 
for even men under the influence of these passions utter scientific proofs and 
verses of Empedocles, and those who have just begun to learn a science can 
string together its phrases, but do not yet know it; for it has to become part of 
themselves, and that takes time (1147a19-23). 
 
This passage sheds light on how an agent might indeed possess the rational 
judgment that follows from a practical syllogism and yet act contrary to that judgment.  
First, the agent might be said to be “drunk with passion” in such a way that, despite 
having arrived at the right conclusion of a practical syllogism, he or she is nevertheless 
impelled by passion to act contrary to the conclusion.  Second, the agent could “have” 
the conclusion in a sense, yet fail to act on it because it has not “become a part” of him- 
or herself, it has not become “second nature” to him or her.  Here, Aristotle connects 
incontinent action with habit, which he defines elsewhere as a kind of second nature 
(1152a31).  What seems to be lacking in this type of case is the incorporation of 
knowledge into action.  Insofar as habit is “embodied knowledge,”56 a description that 
seems apt given what Aristotle says about habit, then, in certain cases, what seems to 
interfere with the incontinent agent’s ability to act in accordance with his or her choice is 
a wrong habit or at least the lack of a right habit.  Thus, Risto Saarinen offers the 
following explanation of the passage from Aristotle.  Some “akratic people are like 
inexperienced youngsters who cannot yet profit from their knowledge, because they lack 
                                                 
56 This definition is offered by William Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
2003), 32. 
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the proper habits.  It is not the lack of knowledge but the lack of a proper integration of 
that knowledge which causes the right choice not to be followed.”57 
Proper integration of knowledge into action takes practice.  Put differently, 
following M.F. Burnyeat, “practice has cognitive powers.”58  As implied in Aristotle’s 
example of the beginning science student, we may be told and even come to believe that 
certain actions are good and noble without yet having really learned that they have this 
intrinsic value.  To really come to understand the intrinsic worth of these actions more is 
needed than mere “head knowledge,” assent to a proposition.  The knowledge must be 
translated into “heart knowledge” as well.  The student of right action must come to 
embrace in an affective way the actions that he or she has come to believe are right.  And 
this takes time and practice, which is to say that this takes habituation.   
The profound advance of this Aristotelian response to the problem of incontinence 
over that offered by Socrates is in Aristotle’s recognition that knowledge is often habit.  
Whereas Socrates thinks that it should be enough for continent action that an agent 
merely possess knowledge, Aristotle recognizes that the knowledge must inform who we 
are, including our desires, if it is to be effective.  For Socrates, the power of knowledge 
resides in its content, whereas for Aristotle the power of knowledge resides in the 
manner in which it is possessed by the knower.59  Socrates says: 
We must realize that each of us is ruled by two principles which we follow 
wherever they lead: one is our inborn desire for pleasures, the other is our 
                                                 
57 Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought, 15. 
58 M.F. Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie O. 
Rorty (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980), 73. 
59 For this way of putting it, I am indebted to Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and 
‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 
276. 
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acquired judgment that pursues what is best.  Sometimes these two are in 
agreement; but there are times when they quarrel inside us, and then sometimes 
one of them gains control, sometimes the other.60 
 
But for Aristotle, there is a third principle—habit—that mediates between these two 
principles, incorporating them into each other.  Whereas for Plato, we can never be sure 
which principle may gain control—“sometimes one of them gains control, sometimes 
the other”—Aristotle believes that we shape our lives just to the extent that our desires 
are informed by our knowledge and our knowledge is informed by our desires.  
Embodied knowledge, therefore, rather than knowledge simple is required for consistent 
continent and virtuous action, and incontinent action is often due to a lack of embodied 
knowledge.   
Let us briefly recap the two main Aristotelian lines of response to the problem of 
incontinent action.  First, Aristotle argued that incontinent action might take place due to 
a failure to complete the reasoning that would have made available to the agent a course 
of right action.  This can happen in a number of ways, including mere lack of time or 
simple failure of attention to all of the premises that the agent knows potentially.  But 
most often, passion is the culprit, for passion can prevent an agent from focusing on the 
right particular premise or can lead an agent, by distraction, to allow an important 
particular premise to slip to the “back” of the mind.  Passion can also effect a bodily 
change so drastic as to prevent an agent being able to think clearly about the action at 
hand.  Second, Aristotle argued that incontinent action might take place even when an 
                                                 
60 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, in Plato: Complete Works, 237d-238a. 
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agent has arrived at a right rational judgment.  Passion can again play the culprit, but it is 
also possible that the failure is due to some failure of habit.   
These two lines of response are correlated by Aristotle’s later distinction between 
two types of incontinence: weak incontinence and impetuous incontinence.  “Of 
incontinence one kind is impetuosity, another weakness.  For some men after 
deliberating fail, owing to their emotion, to stand by the conclusions of their 
deliberation, others because they have not deliberated are led by their emotions” 
(1150b19-22).  The impetuous incontinent agent does not complete deliberation, and 
thus acts out of ignorance of a right judgment.  The weak incontinent does in fact 
complete deliberation, arriving at a right judgment, but does not operate on the basis of 
the right judgment.  
Impetuous incontinence is obviously applicable to a number of cases of addictive 
weakness of will.  Take, for example, the case of Fred, as reported in the Big Book of 
A.A.  Fred was an alcoholic who admitted that he had many of the symptoms of 
alcoholism, but doubted that he needed to become an A.A. in order to put an end to his 
drinking.  Here is Fred’s story in his own words. 
I was much impressed with what you fellows said about alcoholism, and I 
frankly did not believe it would be possible for me to drink again.  I rather 
appreciated your ideas about the subtle insanity which precedes the first drink, 
but I was confident it could not happen to me after what I had learned… 
  In this frame of mind, I went about my business and for a time all was well.  I 
had no trouble refusing drinks, and began to wonder if I had not been making too 
hard work of a simple matter.  One day I went to Washington to present some 
accounting evidence to a government bureau… 
  I went to my hotel and leisurely dressed for dinner.  As I crossed the threshold 
of the dining room, the thought came to mind that it would be nice to have a 
couple of cocktails with dinner.  That was all.  Nothing more.  I ordered a 
cocktail and my meal.  Then I ordered another cocktail…I remember having 
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several more that night and plenty next morning…[After that] I know little of 
where I went or what I said and did.  Then came the hospital with unbearable 
mental and physical suffering. 
  As soon as I regained my ability to think, I went carefully over that evening in 
Washington.  Not only had I been off guard, I had made no fight whatever 
against the first drink.  This time I had not thought of the consequences at all.  I 
had commenced to drink as carelessly as though the cocktails were ginger ale 
(AA 40-41). 
 
This is a standard case of impetuous incontinence.  Fred did not even begin to carry out 
deliberations that might have presented him with courses of action alternative to taking 
the first drink.  As he reports, nothing other than the thought of the cocktail crossed his 
mind.  He did not think of the consequences of his actions.  He engaged in no rational 
“fight” with his first impulse whatsoever. 
 This is a baffling scenario, and it is repeated in personal stories of addiction.  In 
Chapter III, we shall look more closely at what goes wrong in cases such as these.  But 
cases of impetuous incontinence are not as baffling as cases of weak incontinence, which 
are even more predominant in personal testimonies of addictive experience.  Take, for 
example, the following recollection of a young female alcoholic. 
I picked up a half gallon of whisky one day after work and drank over one-third 
of it in less than four hours that same night.  I was so sick the next day, but I 
made it to work.  When I got home from work, I sat on my parents’ sofa and 
knew, I knew, I would start working on the half gallon again, despite the fact that 
I was still very ill from the night before.  I also knew that I did not want to drink.  
Sitting on that sofa, I realized that the old “I could stop if I wanted to, I just don’t 
want to” didn’t apply here, because I did not want to drink.  I watched myself get 
up off the sofa and pour myself a drink.  When I sat back down on the sofa, I 
started to cry.  My denial had cracked; I believe I hit bottom that night, but I 
didn’t know it then; I just thought I was insane.  I proceeded to finish the half 
gallon (AA 324). 
 
This is an extreme case of incontinence.  Indeed, the way the addict describes her 
experience communicates an experience of compulsion, and we can only know that she 
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was not unqualifiedly compelled because she eventually stopped drinking in a 
nonmedicalized program of recovery.  This seems to be an obvious experience of what 
in the contemporary scholarship on Aristotle is often referred to as “clear-eyed akrasia.”  
She ‘watches herself’ pour another drink.  She knows that she should not drink, but she 
also knows that she will.  This is a powerful depiction of the “divided self,” a 
phenomenon that is central to addictive experience.  And yet this is precisely in line with 
the character of weak incontinence.  This woman was in definite possession of the 
knowledge that she should not drink, yet she drinks anyway.  This is not a case of 
passion interrupting the deliberative process.  In fact, passion does not obviously enter 
into the picture here at all.  She drinks against her own better judgment and even against 
what seems to be her predominant desire.  She knows she should not drink.  She does 
not want to drink.  Yet she drinks.  How is this possible?  The bafflement of this kind of 
case far exceeds that of any form of impetuous incontinence.  If, as I have suggested, 
there is a power other than passion which can give us insight into the nature of weak 
incontinence, surely accounts such as this one demand an investigation of such a power.  
And so I contend that, if we are to penetrate the more baffling components of addictive 
experience, we will need to examine the nature of habit.  What I have tried to establish in 
this chapter is that incontinence in all of its varieties cannot be comprehended on the 
basis of the features of ignorance or passion alone.  The relationship between habit and 
incontinence may be the source of many of the most perplexing aspects of addictive 
experience.     
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Aquinas on Incontinence 
In Chapter III, I will be examining the nature of habit.  I shall use the thought of 
Aquinas to carry out this examination since Aquinas develops more fully and carefully a 
philosophy of habit than does Aristotle.  But there may be a worry about this sort of 
procedure since we have not said much about Aquinas’s own views on the problem of 
incontinence.  In fact, Aquinas’s views parallel those of Aristotle very closely.  There are 
two substantial disagreements.   
The first divergence from Aristotle comes in Aquinas’s response to the question of 
whether the incontinent agent acts “by choice.”  We recall that Aristotle says explicitly 
that “the incontinent man acts with appetite, but not with choice” (1111b12-14).  And we 
recall that this caused certain problems for Aristotle’s philosophy of human action 
because it is not clear how appetite can lead a person to act in a certain way without 
involving in some way or other the agent’s capacity of choice.61  Aquinas answers the 
question slightly differently, and is therefore able to avoid this problem.  Aquinas says 
that “sinful and virtuous acts are done by choice (secundum electionem).”62  In some 
places, Aquinas seems to contradict himself on this point since he frequently repeats, 
although rarely without qualification, Aristotle’s claim that the incontinent agent sins 
“without choice” (e.g., 1-2.79.4).  Aquinas clarifies what he means by this in Article 12 
of Question 13 of the De Malo.  “There can be choice even in a sin of weakness, and yet 
choice is not the primary source of such sinning, since emotions cause the sinning.  And 
                                                 
61 In fact, Aristotle himself gets tripped up by the problem when he says in a more colloquial context, 
“That is true, for instance, of incontinent people; for they choose, instead of the things they themselves 
think good, things that are pleasant but hurtful” (1166b8-10, my emphasis).   
62 De Malo, 3.9 
 59 
so we do not say that such a person sins by choice (ex electione), although the person 
sins while choosing (eligens).”  Thus, where Aristotle says that the incontinent person 
acts against choice with appetite, Aquinas says that the incontinent person acts against 
choice while nevertheless choosing.  Therefore, Aquinas’s position on incontinence 
would include everything in the two lines of Aristotelian response, but it would add to 
those responses the further claim that the incontinent will consents to appetitive desire.   
Aquinas does not indicate that he considers this to be a serious departure from 
Aristotle.  He seems to think that his “acting against choice while choosing” analysis 
corresponds quite closely to Aristotle’s “acting against choice voluntarily” (or 
“willingly,” as Ross translates) (1152a15).  Thus, in the Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas comments on this passage in Aristotle as follows:  
The incontinent person sins willingly enough, for he knows in a way (i.e., in 
general) what he does and why and the other circumstances.  Therefore his act is 
voluntary.  Still he is not bad because he does not act by choice; when he is not in 
the throes of passion, his choice is the good or equitable.  But when passion 
sweeps over him, his choice crumbles and he wills evil.63  
 
Nevertheless, we must admit that Aquinas’s view of the matter has been influenced by 
Augustine who, on the standard view, introduced the notion of the will into the 
philosophical discussion of incontinence.64  This introduction of the will into the 
problem of incontinence leads Aquinas to draw a clearer distinction between the 
propositional conclusion of a practical syllogism and the corresponding action.  The 
                                                 
63 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C.I. Litzinger, O.P. (Notre Dame: 
Dumb Ox Books, 1993), #1461.    
64 Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1982) has been most responsible for securing this consensus.  There is a considerable literature on the idea 
of the will in Augustine.  For some of the important disagreements in the literature see Saarinen, 
Incontinence in Medieval Thought, ch. 2. 
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propositional conclusion is a judgment, and the “consent” of the will is thought to be 
necessary to move from judgment to action. Thus, Aquinas’s ex electione/eligens 
distinction implicates the human will in a more explicit manner than does Aristotle’s 
choice/voluntary action distinction.   
 Aquinas’s other clear disagreement with Aristotle comes as a result of this first 
departure.  For, since Aquinas clearly asserts the consent of the will as a prerequisite for 
any human action, and since he insists that the will is a rational appetite, he must 
conclude that every action, even incontinent action, is performed under the aspect of 
good (sub ratione boni).  Thus, whereas Aristotle seems to deny that the forbidden 
action under the condition of incontinence is judged to be a good, Aquinas claims that 
during the moment of incontinent action the agent arrives at a particular judgment that 
the proposed forbidden act is good.65  
                                                 
65 For the clearest discussion of these central differences between Aristotle and Aquinas on incontinent 
action, see Bonnie Kent, “Transitory Vice: Thomas Aquinas on Incontinence,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 27 (1989): 199-223. 
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 CHAPTER III  
HABIT AND ADDICTION 
 
 Providing a definition of addiction is notoriously difficult.  There are as many 
contemporary “official” definitions as there are fields of research that have a stake in the 
understanding and treatment of addiction.  Psychological, psychiatric, pharmacological, 
sociological, and medical manuals vie for privilege of place in offering a definition, 
while insurance and drug and alcohol governance agencies pick and choose among the 
alternatives.  Because of the enormous economic implications of both the sale of 
addictive substances and the medical treatment of addictions, it is demanded that the 
definitions on offer be capable of making clear distinctions between who is and who is 
not addicted.  For this reason, the experience undergone by those who are addicted is 
often overlooked in favor of more “objective” measures.   
 In this study, however, we are interested in the experience of addiction because we 
seek to make addiction intelligible as human action, and we suspect that exploring what 
it is like to be addicted may supply us with important insights into the structure of 
human agency and the sources of human action.  We need not, then, worry about 
providing an exact definition of addiction before proceeding to talk about it.  It is enough 
that there are very clear cases, which no one—unless he or she denied that addiction was 
a meaningful concept at all—would fail to describe as addictive behavior.  We are 
interested in asking what the experience of being addicted can teach us about the 
complexity of human action, and, conversely, how a careful analysis of certain aspects 
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of human agency can illuminate some of the more perplexing elements of addictive 
experience. 
 Despite the ongoing pursuit of a definition of addiction, it is common for experts to 
specify addiction by listing a number of its characteristic “marks.”  Often, the need for 
clear demarcation of addicts intrudes, and we are told, rather arbitrarily, that if we check 
“yes” to, say, seven of the ten marks, we are probably addicted.  Implicit in this 
approach is the admission that none of the “marks” is a necessary condition for 
addiction.  Nevertheless, inquiring about the “marks” is the most natural inroad to an 
exploration of addictive experience, and so this chapter will proceed by doing just that. 
 Although there is no standard list of the marks of addiction, there is remarkable 
consensus in the literature on the most prevalent among them.  Three marks frame the 
broad outline of addiction: craving (which encompasses the marks of tolerance and 
withdrawal outlined in the Introduction), loss of control,66 and relapse.  These marks are 
fundamental because they continue to be offered, despite the problems raised in the 
Introduction, as first-order explanations of addictive behavior.  These three marks will 
be explored in this chapter.  The chapter is an attempt to provide the philosophical 
backdrop that can make the phenomena of craving, loss of control, and relapse 
                                                 
66 Although it is the centerpiece of the disease concept of alcohol, the concept of loss of control is often 
not clearly specified.  What exactly do, say, alcoholics lose control over?  The ability to resist the first 
drink or the ability to stop drinking once they’ve taken the first drink?  Donald Goodwin, a leading 
“alcohol studies” expert, contends that “loss of control refers to the alcoholic’s inability to stop drinking 
once he starts,” Alcoholism, 90.  But this restriction poses a dilemma on the standard disease view of 
alcoholism.  For if loss of control is triggered only after the first drink, why should the alcoholic not 
simply be able to resist the first drink?  This leads to a broadening of the “loss of control” concept to apply 
to the inability to abstain over time, i.e., the inability to prevent relapse.  More often, then, loss of control 
is meant in this more general sense.  The concept itself is deeply problematic, and cannot withstand either 
analytic scrutiny or empirical testing (see Fingarette, Heavy Drinking, 32-39).  I use “loss of control” to 
locate this more general feature of the addictive experience, one that can only be made intelligible, I am 
convinced, in terms of habit. 
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intelligible.  In subsequent chapters, I will fill out our account by exploring several other 
marks of addiction, including shame and guilt, obsession, and denial.  The thesis that I 
will pursue throughout this chapter is that craving, loss of control, and relapse can each 
be illuminated with reference to Aristotle’s explanations of incontinent action as 
sketched in Chapter II.  Craving will be shown to be tied to the way in which passion can 
interrupt and derail the deliberative process that is constitutive of continent action.  Loss 
of control and relapse will be shown to be tied to the way in which habit holds sway over 
moral agency even in the face of seemingly successful deliberation.   
  
Passion and Craving 
As stated, passion can interrupt and vitiate the deliberative process of prudential 
action two ways.  First, passion can lead an agent “toward” an incontinent action, and, 
by implication, “away from” a continent action by pushing one practical syllogism into 
the “front” of an agent’s mind at the expense of another, right practical syllogism.   This 
happens whenever strong emotion67 “prevents” or “distracts” an agent from considering 
what he or she knows, or “perverts” an agent’s knowledge of the particular premise of a 
syllogism that would lead to continent action.  Second, passion can actually alter our 
bodily condition in such a way as to “fetter” and “hinder” the use of reason (1-2.33.3).  
Each of these ways in which passion can derail continent action can be concretized by 
looking at the role of craving in addictive behavior. 
                                                 
67 I use the terms “passion” and “emotion” interchangeably. 
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 Most addictive experience is characterized at some point by the phenomenon known 
as craving.  Craving is a complex concept, difficult to define, but two common albeit 
imprecise distinctions will help to elucidate it.  The first, widely assumed and employed 
throughout the literature, is between “physical craving” and “psychological craving.”68  
The second is between craving as a result of the hedonic “pull” of euphoria and craving 
as a result of the hedonic “push” of dysphoria.69 
 Physical craving is the intense and persistent desire to engage in addictive behavior 
as a means of escape from bodily discomfort.  It is therefore driven by a feeling of 
dysphoria.  Its characteristic symptoms can include cold sweats, nausea, and 
uncontrollable shaking.  These bodily experiences are often said to be consequences of 
physical withdrawal from an addictive substance, and the withdrawal consequent on the 
lack of the substance is said to be evidence of physical tolerance and dependence.  There 
are addicted persons who experience no physical craving, and there are persons who 
experience physical craving whom we would not tend to describe as addicted.  
Nevertheless, physical craving often accompanies the experience of addiction. 
 Physical craving would seem to be a clear instance of the way in which strong 
desire can obstruct continent action because it is associated with what Aquinas describes 
as “a certain alteration in the body” (1-2.33.3).  Some bodily pleasures, we are told, 
                                                 
68 Both philosophically and biologically, this distinction is finally untenable.  In addition, the distinction 
has often been put to work to fortify the fallacious claim that addiction can be equated with biological 
dependence and therefore can be comprehended scientifically and healed medically.  I am thus hesitant to 
employ the distinction, but I do so for the simple reason that it correlates certain of our phenomenological 
intuitions.  Therefore, when I talk, e.g., of “physical withdrawal” or “bodily discomfort,” I basically mean 
that the agent can point to what ails (the head if it’s a headache, the stomach if it’s nausea, the hands if its 
tremors, etc), and when I talk of “psychological withdrawal,” I basically mean that what ails is not 
similarly locatable by the agent.   
69 Elster, Strong Feelings, 62, uses the metaphors of “push” and “pull.” 
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cause a “bodily transmutation” (1-2.31.5).  Incontinence in response to this altered 
bodily state would therefore be an instance of passion’s ability to hinder the operation of 
reason because of its connection to an experience of a certain bodily state.  Addictive 
substances, accordingly, “are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence 
various griefs arise” (1-2.31.5).   
 How are we to understand human action in the face of strong visceral desire?  We 
can imagine cases in which bodily discomforts cause desires, even strong desires, which 
are nevertheless quite easily resisted.  Even a very thirsty person can resist the desire to 
drink from a stagnant pool of water that he or she knows to be infested with harmful 
bacteria, especially if there is reason to believe the thirst can be safely relieved at a later 
point.  But we can push this example to the point where the power of choice seems to be 
in serious jeopardy.  Simply removing the expectation that the thirst can be relieved in 
some other safe way pushes us in this direction, and it is not hard for us to imagine a 
thirst so intense that a normal person would drink what he or she knew to be harmful or 
even deadly water in the absence of a reasonable hope of future relief.  Or imagine the 
physical discomfort that accompanies the need to urinate.  Is there not a point at which 
the power of choice becomes incapacitated by such discomfort and must relent in the 
face of the desire to urinate?  How are we to analyze the behavior of agents in such 
circumstances?  If an agent believed that urinating outdoors was morally wrong, but 
nevertheless found him- or herself in such a bind, would we rightly label his or her 
behavior incontinent (pun intended)?  In these cases, there seems to be some point at 
which the dysphoria of bodily discomfort becomes so intense as to move the agent 
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beyond the range of normal human action, and to remove the agent’s behavior from the 
realm of moral appraisal.70 
 If this is the case, then we need to ask whether there could be physical cravings so 
intense that an agent could not be reasonably expected to resist them.  It seems to me 
that this is so.  Take, for example, William Burroughs's explanation of why heroin 
addicts are unable to voluntarily resist taking heroin in the face of certain withdrawal 
symptoms.  “The reason it is practically impossible to stop using and cure yourself is 
that the sickness lasts five to eight days.  Twelve hours of it would be easy, twenty-four 
possible, but five to eight days is too long.”71  We can imagine a similar explanation of 
why a person stranded at sea would eventually be practically unable to resist drinking 
seawater, even if he or she knew it would eventually kill them. 
 There is, therefore, no great mystery to instances of incontinent behavior that can be 
explained with reference to intense, what Aquinas calls “vehement” (1-2.31.5), visceral 
desires.  Indeed, we may only be speaking analogously when we label such behavior 
incontinent. 
                                                 
70 Elster, Strong Feelings, ch. 5, offers a helpful schematic continuum of human choice.  At one extreme 
are things that we can only describe as happening to us—“reflex behaviors,” such as falling asleep.  
Falling asleep does not count as human choice in any sense; it is simply an event.  At the other extreme is 
“rational choice,” in which the agent deliberates on the basis of non-visceral desires, beliefs, and 
information he or she has about the situation.  Between these extremes are the possibilities of “quasi-
action,” “action without choice,” and “minimal choice.”  Elster gives as an example of a quasi-action 
someone who finally gives in to an intense need to urinate, and as an example of an action without choice 
a castaway who finally drinks seawater from extreme thirst, even though he knows it will kill him.  A 
minimal choice is reward-sensitive although not rational; it is instantiated when an agent is not in ideal 
deliberative conditions but is nevertheless able to exercise choice on the basis of perceived rewards.  Most 
instances of physical craving would put the agent somewhere between action without choice and minimal 
choice, neither of which can be subjected to unqualified moral appraisal.   
71 William Burroughs, Junky (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 94. 
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 But not all craving rises to the level of vehemence that would explain apparently 
incontinent behavior.  It is understandable that many addicts must be literally locked up 
for some period of time upon cessation from their addictive activity since they are 
practically incapable of resisting the overwhelming push of bodily dysphoria.  But at 
some point, usually no sooner than the evidence of physical craving has subsided, the 
addict must be released to fend for him- or herself.  This is not because the addict is free 
of craving.  Rather, it is because the craving has ceased to be primarily physical and has 
become predominantly psychological.  What difference does this make? 
 Psychological craving can occur in response to the hedonic pull towards a state of 
euphoria that is thought to be achieved through addictive behavior, or in response to the 
hedonic push of certain dysphoric psychological states, such as the experience of shame 
or guilt, the feeling of being trapped in what seems to be a ruinous life, or a more 
generalized depression about the vacuity of a life without the stimulating or numbing 
effect of addictive substances.72  Generally, psychological craving is characterized by a 
mix of euphoric and dysphoric urges. 
We have drunk to drown feelings of fear, frustration and depression.  We have 
drunk to escape the guilt of passions, and then have drunk again to make more 
passions possible.  We have drunk for vainglory—that we might the more enjoy 
foolish dreams of pomp and power (TT 44).   
 
Insofar as they are incentives to incontinent behavior, both types of psychological 
motivations—euphoric and dysphoric—fall under what Aquinas calls “inordinate 
concupiscence,” which he describes as “turning inordinately to mutable good” (1-
                                                 
72 In his classic novel, Elmer Gantry (New York: Penguin, 1967), 175, Sinclair Lewis describes Elmer’s 
response to “quitting” two of his addictions.  “It was an agony of restlessness and craving, but he never 
touched alcohol or tobacco again, and he really regretted that in evenings thus made vacuous he could not 
keep from an interest in waitresses.” 
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2.82.3).73  Concupiscent desire in general is “caused by love of the object” that is 
pursued (1-2.25.2), which love can arise in response either to the “good which gives 
pleasure to the senses” (1-2.30.2) (euphoria) or in response to “the sorrows that arise 
from the absence of those pleasures” (2-2.141.3) (dysphoria).   
For Aquinas, the craving of concupiscence is distinct from the craving due to bodily 
alteration because the former is an effect of memory, whereas the latter is an effect of 
some generally locatable bodily transmutation.  When we consider pleasure as “existing 
in the memory,” we see that “it has of itself a natural tendency to cause thirst and desire 
for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was when he 
experienced the pleasure that is past” (1-2.33.2).  Here, Aquinas describes what in the 
literature of addiction is known as cue-dependence: psychological craving is most 
intensely evoked when an addict finds him- or herself in situations that, in the past, were 
associated with addictive activity.  Of course, one of the marks of the addict is the way 
in which the addictive activity pervades every aspect of life, which means that, at least at 
                                                 
73 The term “inordinate concupiscence” is not redundant for Aquinas, as it would be, for example, for 
Augustine.  For Augustine, all concupiscence is inordinate desire, but for Aquinas, concupiscence belongs 
to human beings by nature (hence the designation of the “concupiscible” sensory power), and becomes 
incontinence, vice, or sin only when it transgresses the bounds of reason.  “Since, in man, the 
concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, as 
it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, 
for a man, contrary to reason” (1-2.82.3).  There is, then, an important distinction in Aquinas between 
ordinate and inordinate concupiscence.  The distinction should not be confused with another distinction 
that he makes between “natural concupiscence,” the desire of things suitable to a person, and “acquired 
concupiscence” (also called “cupidity”) the desire of things “apprehended” to be suitable to a person (1-
2.30.3).  If a person breaks a religious obligation to fast because that person is hungry, the person acts out 
of inordinate, albeit natural, concupiscence, since it is suitable to human persons to eat when hungry.  If a 
person attends the ballet, the person is acting out of acquired concupiscence—watching ballet is not 
something a person needs by nature—but not necessarily acting out of inordinate concupiscence.  The 
category of concupiscence, then, is generally neutral for Aquinas, and may require further specification.  
Unfortunately, Aquinas does not always supply such specifications, but it is usually clear from the context 
whether Aquinas means created concupiscence or the concupiscence from Original Sin. 
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first, there are few times and places in which the recovering addict is not prompted by 
memory to psychological craving.  Nevertheless, as the past recedes, the addictive 
behavior becomes associated most strongly with the more salient features of the 
addictive ritual, such as bars, certain people, certain places in the city, or certain kinds of 
activity.  Thus, one of the most-repeated nuggets of A.A. wisdom reminds the recovering 
addict to be vigilantly aware of the “people, places, and things” that inevitably cue 
psychological craving for addictive behavior.   
 What is the relationship between psychological craving and incontinence?  For 
Aristotle and Aquinas, as we have already shown, desire, even when it is not rooted in 
bodily need, can derail an agent’s pursuit of continent action by making the agent over-
consider a certain particular premise at the cost of under-considering, and eventually not 
considering, another particular premise.  The strong psychological desire for an object 
can “distract” or “prevent” the agent from considering the particular premise that he or 
she knows potentially but needs to exercise in order to act continently.74   This is the 
reasoning behind Aquinas’s simple but profound insight that “the most effective remedy 
against intemperance is not to dwell on the consideration of singulars” (2-2.142.3).  
Since action is always derivative of the consequence of two premises—a universal and a 
particular or “singular”—dwelling on the particular inappropriate object of desire can 
have no other effect but to, sooner or later, bring the agent to subsume that particular 
                                                 
74 John Dewey colorfully describes the way in which an object of desire can cloud and distract our 
deliberations: “The object thought of may simply stimulate some impulse or habit to a pitch of intensity 
where it is temporarily irresistible.  It then overrides all competitors and secures for itself the sole right of 
way.  The object looms large in imagination; it swells to fill the field.  It allows no room for alternatives; it 
absorbs us, enraptures us, carries us away, sweeps us off our feet by its own attractive force,” Human 
Nature and Conduct, 135.  This is a description of the addictive phenomenon known as crowding out. 
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premise under it’s corresponding universal premise, bringing about incontinent action.  
“When the attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in respect of other 
things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them” (1-2.33.3).75   
Are we then simply at the beck and call of our concupiscent desires, including our 
inordinate concupiscent desires?  Aquinas does not think so.  This is because the will 
exercises some power over desire.  Although concupiscent desire often comes to us 
unbidden, as an event in our psychological lives, we are not without resources for 
dealing with it.  The will is capable of directing the intellect away from consideration of 
the occurrent desire.  As human agents, it is within our power to voluntarily choose not 
to dwell on inordinate concupiscent desires that intrude upon us.  “Although the will 
cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising…yet it is in the power of 
the will not to will to desire, or not to consent to concupiscence.  And thus it does not 
necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence” (1-2.10.3).  For Aquinas, the will is 
able to move the intellect and therefore is able to direct and redirect the gaze of the 
intellect.  Thus, for example, “the will can avoid thinking about happiness insofar as the 
will moves the intellect to its activity,”76 and, by extension, it is possible for the will not 
                                                 
75 Compare William James’s assessment of what the “drunkard” must do to resist temptation.  “But if he 
once gets able to pick out that way of conceiving from all the other possible ways of conceiving the 
various opportunities which occur, if through thick and thin he holds to it that this is being a drunkard and 
nothing else, he is not likely to remain one long.  The effort by which he succeeds in keeping the right 
name unwaveringly present to his mind proves to be his saving mental act,” Principles of Psychology, Vol. 
1, 565.  James cites Aristotle’s discussion of the “practical syllogism” in the Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, as 
the source of this insight.   
 The influence of William James on the founder and founding of Alcoholics Anonymous has been 
well documented.  See, for example, Susan Cheever, My Name is Bill: His Life and the Creation of 
Alcoholic’s Anonymous (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), ch. 21.  In particular, James’s The Varieties 
of Religious Experience (New York: Mentor, 1958) is one source of A.A.’s central tenet that recovery 
from alcoholism usually requires some kind of “conversion experience.”   
76 De Malo 6.1 
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to think about the object of a particular concupiscent desire.  The will is thereby able to 
avoid incontinent action by presenting an “obstacle” to the formulation of the practical 
syllogism that would lead to incontinent action.  It can present an obstacle to this process 
either “by removing the consideration that induces the will to will it or by considering 
the contrary, namely, that what is presented as good is not good in some respect.”77 
 Taken singly, then, there is never a case of concupiscent desire that the will is 
unable to resist by redirecting the gaze of the intellect.  However, when we put the 
matter this way, we begin to see how the psychological craving that accompanies 
addiction represents a special threat to the will’s ability to resist concupiscent desire, for 
the desires that constitute psychological craving never come singly.  The desire of 
psychological craving is unlike any other type of desire, not in its intensity—which can 
vary widely—but rather in its resilience.78  Addictive desires are indefatigably persistent.  
They intrude upon the agent’s consciousness not once or twice but repeatedly.  Every 
effort to direct the gaze of the intellect away from the object of desire or to call the 
intellect to reflect on the inferiority of the object of desire is met, not by relief from the 
immediate threat, but rather by a new attacker in a similar guise.  If the conflict between 
the will and non-addictive inordinate concupiscent desire (e.g., the desire for one too 
many pieces of cake) is a battle, that between the will and addictive craving is a war of 
attrition.  Why does the will play “second fiddle” to resilient desire in such wars, asks 
William Irvine. 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 R. Jay Wallace, in “Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections,” in Free Will, ed. 
Gary Watson, makes much of the distinctively resilient nature of addictive desire.  
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For the simple reason that they [resilient desires] refuse to fight fairly.  The 
emotions, in their dealings with the intellect, don’t use reason to gain its 
cooperation.  Instead they wear it down with—what else?—emotional entreaties.  
They beg, whine, and bully.  They won’t take no for an answer.  They won’t give 
the intellect a moment’s peace.  In most cases, the best the intellect can hope for 
is to withstand these entreaties for a spell.  Then it succumbs.79  
 
Gerald May puts the same point more succinctly: “Willpower and resolution come and 
go, but the addictive process never sleeps.”80  Psychological craving is the great ally of 
particularized incontinence simply because it pits a force of seemingly inexhaustible 
resources against a limited power, the human will.  Aquinas encourages the would-be 
continent agent to resist dwelling on singulars, but psychological craving makes this 
nearly impossible.  As soon as one singular is banished from the scene, another appears.  
Craving fires volley after volley of singular desires into an agent’s consciousness, 
gradually exhausting the limited power of human will.  When we consider the peculiar 
nature of psychological craving, we are struck by the fact that what comes to seem 
paradoxical is not the possibility of incontinent addictive behavior but rather the 
possibility of continence in the face of addictive desire.   
 
Aquinas on the Necessity of Habit 
 We are now in a position to think about the importance of habit in an account of 
human action.  The problem we face is that of a disparity between the power of certain 
types of desire and the power of human will.  Some visceral desires—we have attended 
to those associated with the physical craving experienced by some addicts—are so 
                                                 
79 William Irvine, On Desire: Why We Want What We Want (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 76. 
80 Addiction and Grace, 52. 
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intense as to straightway overpower human will.  If we take the analogy of a 
weightlifter, some types of visceral craving are akin to a weight that simply exceeds the 
capacity of a weightlifter.  No matter how strong the weightlifter, there is always a 
weight that is simply too heavy.  Other types of desire—we have attended to those 
associated with the psychological craving experienced by addicts—overpower human 
will, not by reason of their intensity but rather because of their resilience.  Taken singly, 
the agent could reasonably be expected to resist this sort of desire, but taken in 
succession they wear out the agent’s endurance.  The agent suffers from “weakness of 
will.”  A weightlifter may be able to lift 200 pounds once or twice, even once or twice 
several times throughout the day.  But to expect the weightlifter to be able to do 25 or 50 
or 500 repetitions at that weight would be unreasonable.  Sooner or later, endurance 
fails.  The weightlifter suffers from “weakness of muscle.”  The analogy between 
“weakness of will” and “weakness of muscle” is an important one because it highlights 
the fact that “weakness of will” need not imply moral failure.  It may indicate moral 
failure just as “weakness of muscle” may—perhaps the weightlifter was lazy in his 
training.  But “weakness of will” is fundamentally a function of the limitations of human 
will and not of moral failure. 
 The human will is a power that must be flexed in and through the process of 
deliberative action.  It is not some measureless metaphysical faculty, not some third term 
separable from reason and appetite.  The will, for both Aristotle and Aquinas, is rational 
appetite, appetitive reason.  Practical reasoning is like reasoning in general in that it 
demands effort: concentration and discipline.  Deliberative action is inherently fragile 
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and unstable because it requires an agent with finite powers to engage in an activity the 
nature of which is to deplete those powers.  Despite the privilege that Aristotle and 
Aquinas grant to the human person in virtue of its unique rational nature, neither would 
suppose that the successful moral life is one of constant deliberative engagement.  A life 
that is perpetually involved in dealing with moral crises of action will inevitably be a 
failure.  The problem with such crises, for Aristotle and Aquinas, is not that they are 
irresolvable, but rather that they tax the moral agent. The goal of moral training is the 
formation of moral habits, because habit names the possibility of acting well without the 
exertion that is required of deliberative practical reasoning.  Neither Aristotle nor 
Aquinas would consider crises of the will failures.  They are inevitable even for those 
with right habits, because habits sometimes come into conflict.  Deliberative “choice” is 
what must take place when habits collide.  But since an agent is incapable of sustaining 
indefinitely the kind of vigilance required for right practical reasoning, such crises, 
although providing opportunity for creative action, must end in failure unless they 
quickly become integrated into patterns of habitual thought and behavior.  “The purest 
will, the most heroic flexing of the moral muscle, cannot exist for more than a second 
unless it quickly becomes rooted in ordinary habits.”81   
As Aquinas puts it, habits are not necessary for humans to act, but they are 
necessary for humans to act well.  This claim comes in Question 49, Article 4 of the 
Prima Secundae, on “Whether Habits are Necessary.”  This article, which has received 
                                                 
81 Mariana Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 37.  Valverde’s is one of the most philosophically and historically astute 
treatments of addiction available.  It has gone largely unnoticed in the field of addiction studies, perhaps 
because of its genealogical and feminist mode of engagement.  I am indebted to Peter Ferentzy for 
directing me to Valverde’s work.  
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comparatively little attention, is crucial for everything that Aquinas goes on to say about 
the role of the virtues in human action.  In this article, Aquinas makes the ambitious 
claim that habit (habitus)82 must be included as an irreducible component of any 
ontology that is adequate to the scope of human action.  His claim of irreducibility is the 
ambitious one, and Aquinas understands that in order for it to be established, he must 
respond to the argument, which seems implicit in most contemporary action theory,83 
that all that is required for a full account of human action is the posit of human will. 
Habit implies relation to an act.  But power [i.e., the power of the will] implies 
sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, without any habits, are 
principles of acts.  Therefore there was no necessity for habits [in a complete 
ontology] (Obj. 2).   
 
The objection is simple: there is nothing that “habit” explains that “will” has not already 
explained.  Taking any one human action, we seem to be able to explain that action 
solely by referring to the power of human will.  Habit therefore becomes superfluous as 
a principle of explanation, and, if so, not a necessary component of an ontology of 
human action.   
 Aquinas responds to this objection with two claims, but before doing so he states the 
nature of a habit and what kinds of things might be said to need them.  “Habit implies a 
disposition in relation to a thing’s nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which 
                                                 
82 How to translate habitus is a perennial question of Thomist scholarship.  Anthony Kenny, in the 
definitive Blackfriars translation of the Summa, argues that it should be translated as “disposition” rather 
than “habit.”  For reasons I will address shortly, this seems to me to be an unhelpful and misguided 
translation.  I will therefore, and despite all of the possible confusions that result from the contemporary 
use of the word “habit,” continue to use habit for Aquinas’s habitus.  It should become clear throughout 
the exposition how Aquinas’s use of the term differs from contemporary usage.   
83 I have found only one essay on the theme of habit in what would be considered contemporary “action 
theory,” Timothy Duggan’s “Habit,” in Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, ed. Peter 
van Inwagen (London: D. Riedel, 1980).  As an exercise in analytic philosophy, however, this article is 
limited to how people use the word “habit” today.  It is therefore an example of the attenuated conception 
of habit that Aristotle and Aquinas help us move beyond. 
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disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto.”  The space for such a disposition is 
only possible (1) where there is a distinction between a thing’s being and that thing’s 
activity; and (2) where there is more than one activity to which a thing stands, at any one 
time, in potentiality.  Condition (1) means that there is “no room for habit” in God, 
because there is no potentiality in God: God’s action is identical to God’s being.  
Condition (2) means that there is no room for habit in nonrational things, including 
nonrational animals, because, given the set of conditions in which such things find 
themselves, they are always determined by nature (in the case of animals by “instinct”) 
to respond in one way to any given situation.  Once we know everything about an 
animal’s needs and the circumstances the animal is in, we already know how the animal 
will respond.  The animal, therefore, is never at one time actually open to more than one 
course of action.   
 There is “room” for habit, therefore, only in rational animals, namely in human 
beings,84 whose existence is not identical with their activity and who may be actually 
open to various alternative courses of action.  Habit, we are told, could make sense as an 
explanation of why a particular human agent acts one way or another, since we cannot 
explain the action simply with reference to the agent’s essence (as with God) or simply 
with reference to some determined causal connection between the agent’s needs and his 
or her environing surroundings (as with animals).  But this is not enough to establish 
Aquinas’s ambitious claim.  He is arguing, not that habit can be an explanation of human 
activity, but that, in order to explain the full range of human action, we must at times 
                                                 
84 Aquinas thinks there is room for habits in angels, too (1-2.50.6). 
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offer an explanation in terms of habit.  How so?  Aquinas provides two arguments for 
this position.   
First, he says, what stands in need of explanation is not merely each single event in 
an agent’s history of action, taken separately, but also the fact of an agent’s ability to act 
consistently (whether “well” or “ill”) over a prolonged period of time.  Postulation of 
human will explains why it is possible in a given situation that an agent act in any of 
several ways, but it cannot explain, what is also true, why it is sometimes probable that 
an agent will act one way rather than another.  Why does this need explanation?  
Because human will is not a logical construct but rather a human power.  Human will is 
embodied and executed through the material conditions of human personhood.  As 
Aquinas puts it, although will is a function of the soul, the operations of the will proceed 
“from the soul through the body” (1-2.50.1).  We cannot, therefore, pretend that the will, 
since rooted in the immaterial soul, is unconstrained by the body.  This is why Aquinas 
says that habits of the will, although primarily habits of the soul, are secondarily habits 
of the body (1-2.50.1).  Like the intellect and the sensitive appetite, the rational appetite 
is subject to alteration, corruption, and exhaustion.  How else can we account for 
Aquinas’s clear position that transmutations in a person’s body will affect a person’s 
will?  Deliberative choice is carried out, not by transcending the desires naturally 
conditioned on our material existence, but, through the exertion of the intellect, by 
ordering those desires.  The will has a structure, susceptible to being trained and 
conditioned, but also, then, susceptible to breaking down.  Given this fact, the consistent 
exercise of the will in any one direction is in need of explanation.  A principle of 
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explanation beyond the mere power of human will is needed to account for how the will 
perseveres in courses of action that would exhaust the will were it operating purely 
through deliberation.  
 Second, Aquinas says that we need a principle of explanation over and above the 
existence of a power of will because human action is highly complex.  In any human 
action, “several things should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways.”  Human 
action entails “the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative 
adjustability...Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations 
several things must concur which may vary in their relative adjustability, it follows that 
habit is necessary.”  Will, therefore, is not a simple but a complex power, requiring the 
cooperation and coordination of a number of different powers.  Execution of the will 
requires the bringing into alignment of various powers at work in the agent, or else the 
exertion required to act in the face of contradictory impulses.  Whenever this latter is 
required, Aquinas says that the agent is in a state of internal violence.  Both the 
incontinent and the continent moral agent are subject to this internal violence, and, 
because of the limited power of human will, perseverance in the face of internal violence 
cannot be expected.  Violentia non durant.85  
 Habit supplies the needed principle of explanation on both counts.  Habit explains 
how the will can act consistently and successfully without being worn down by the 
weight of desire or tripped up by uncoordinated desires, because habits qualify and 
                                                 
85 John Dewey shows the necessity of habit with a helpful metaphor: “A savage can travel after a fashion 
in a jungle.  Civilized activity is too complex to be carried on without smoothed roads.  It requires signals 
and junction points; traffic authorities and means of easy and rapid transportation.  It demands a congenial, 
antecedently prepared environment.  Without it, civilization would relapse into barbarism in spite of the 
best of subjective intention and internal disposition,” Human Nature and Conduct, 19. 
 79 
coordinate desires.  The importance of this point cannot be overstated, and it is often 
overlooked in studies of Aquinas’s moral theology.  Many habits, and in particular many 
of the virtues, cannot be understood apart from the passions to which they give shape 
and coordination.  For Aquinas, habits are fundamentally strategies of desire.86  How, 
more specifically, do habits strategically rectify the problem of limited human will? 
 
Aquinas on Habit 
 Aquinas says a great deal about habit, both in his Treatise on Habits (1-2.49-89) and 
elsewhere, but we can begin to answer this question by noting four central 
characteristics.  First, a habit is an “accidental quality” (1-2.49.2).  Both descriptors are 
significant.  To say that a habit is accidental is to say that an agent does not have it by 
nature, but rather that habits are acquired in the course of an agent’s existence.  The 
quality of habit is therefore “adventitious, being caused from without” (1-2.49.2).  To 
say that habits are “caused from without” is simply to say that they do not proceed 
automatically from an agent’s nature.  And to say that habits are qualities is to say that 
they are modifications of an agent.  “Quality, properly speaking, implies a certain mode 
of substance” (1-2.49.2).  When a substance acquires a habit, the substance in its essence 
persists through the acquisition.  The substance is modified but not replaced by 
something altogether different.  We can therefore put the claim that habit is an 
“accidental quality” into somewhat more familiar idiom by stating that habit is an 
acquired modification of an agent. 
                                                 
86 I owe this way of putting it to Paul J. Wadell, C.P., The Primacy of Love: An Introduction to the Ethics 
of Thomas Aquinas (New York: Paulist Press, 1992). 
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 Second, habits are difficult to change.  “We call habits those qualities which, by 
reason of their very nature, are not easily changed” (1-2.49.2).  That habits should be 
difficult to change is a necessary correlate to their function, which is to provide stability 
and consistency to human action.  Human action as exercised through the process of 
practical reasoning is inherently tenuous precisely because that upon which the process 
is thoroughly dependent, namely passions and judgments, can be easily lost, ignored, or 
overcome.  Incontinent action, we have shown, is possible for this very reason.  
Therefore, if habits are to provide a kind of constancy not available through unrooted 
practical reasoning, they must be things difficult to change or lose.  If our habits can be 
changed as easily as our minds or our feelings, they provide no alternative to the shaky 
character of deliberative reasoning.  The more entrenched the habit, the more perfectly it 
performs its task.  Aquinas distinguishes between a disposition and a habit by referring 
to this characteristic of relative permanence.  “Disposition, properly so called, can be 
divided against habit…as perfect and imperfect within the same species; and thus we call 
it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be 
easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily” 
(1-2.49.2).   
 Third, habits are qualities “whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill” 
(1-2.49.1).  What does this tell us?  At first glance, it tells us that there are both good and 
bad habits.  They may dispose an agent to act well or ill.  But, they always incline an 
agent to act either well or ill with respect to some type of circumstance.  It would be 
contrary to the nature of a habit to incline an agent to act, sometimes well, sometimes ill, 
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with respect to the same type of circumstance.  Therefore, what is implicit in the claim 
that habits dispose an agent to act well or ill is that (a) habits make an agent consistent in 
his or her actions.  Implicit in this claim is the further claim that (b) habits make an agent 
successful in his or her action.  If an agent repeatedly tries but frequently fails to juggle, 
we would not say that he or she has the habit of juggling.  Habit is a success term.  If a 
person has a habit that person is able to consistently and successfully act in a specific 
way.  Aquinas thinks that, in addition to enabling consistent success, a habit disposes an 
agent to act ill or well because (c) habits make the “thing be done with ease” (1-2.49.2).  
This characteristic is tightly connected with the others.  It is the stable permanence of 
habit that makes habitual action consistent.  This consistency is possible because the 
action does not tax the agent’s will in the way that deliberative action does.  Thus, the 
ease with which the agent acts habitually is, in addition to being a source of pleasure (1-
2.53.1), that which secures the consistency of habitual action.  Consistency, success, and 
ease, therefore, are the characteristics of habit that guarantee that a habit will dispose an 
agent to act well or ill. 
 Fourth and finally, as has been already mentioned, habits are characterized by a 
propensity to act “on cue.”  Aquinas says that, because pleasure can be anticipated 
through the faculty of memory, a person may become disposed in such a way as to react 
habitually to the slightest provocation of that memory (1-2.33.2).  We must be careful, as 
will become apparent shortly, not to confuse this propensity to act at provocation with 
instinct.  Nevertheless, when presented with the appropriate object, a habituated agent is 
able to act at once, without effort, and often without any explicit consciousness of what 
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is being done.  Habit is such, therefore, as to require a specific act of the will to prevent 
the habituated action from being performed upon provocation.  
We can now elaborate the concept of habit.  A habit is a relatively permanent 
acquired modification of a person that enables the person, when provoked by the 
relevant stimulus, to act consistently, successfully, and with ease with respect to some 
objective.87  
Before we proceed to state more specifically some of the types of habit possible for 
human agents, it will be helpful to try in a different way to locate the importance of habit 
in a philosophy of human action.  This can be done by exploring the way in which habit 
mediates between some of the extremes that bound our conception of human action.  
First, habit mediates between action and capacity.  Second, habit mediates between 
instinct and disposition.  Third, habit mediates between determinism and free will.  
Fourth and finally, habit mediates between the involuntary and the voluntary.  Carefully 
articulating the nature of this mediation is an important step in avoiding a number of 
pitfalls that we face, particularly given the contemporary understanding of habit, in 
trying to decipher its place in Aquinas’s theory of human action. 
 Habit represents a possibility that is, strictly speaking, neither purely an action nor a 
capacity.  Aquinas puts the matter like this: “Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: 
and in this respect it can be a principle of operation.  It is, however, in a state of 
potentiality in respect to operation” (1-2.49.3).  This somewhat technical statement can 
                                                 
87 Throughout the development of this definition, I have been dependent on George Klubertanz, Habits 
and Virtues: A Philosophical Analysis (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965) and on Robert 
Brennan, Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophic Analysis of the Nature of Man (New York: MacMillan, 
1941). 
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be broken down by way of a simple analogy.  Every normal human person has the 
capacity to speak French.  Sometimes, human persons actually speak French.  But this 
distinction—between being capable of and actually speaking French—does not enable 
us to make out all of the important distinctions with respect to French-speaking.  For, 
given this distinction, there is no way to differentiate between my not speaking French at 
this moment and some Frenchman’s not speaking French at this moment.  We both alike 
have the capacity to speak French.  But surely there is an important difference, given that 
I have never learned French.  For when we say that the Frenchman can speak French we 
mean something different than when we say that I can speak French.  When we say that I 
can speak French, we only mean that it is for me a logical possibility.  But when we say 
the Frenchman can speak French, we mean more than that.  We mean that he stands in 
some intermediate position between having the mere logical potential to speak French 
and actually speaking French.  Habit names this intermediate position.  Both the 
Frenchman and I possess the capacity to speak French.  Neither of us (I have stipulated) 
is actually speaking French.  But the Frenchman has the habit of speaking French 
whereas I do not.88 
 Inside the bounds set by action and capacity, there are two further possibilities 
between which habit mediates.  On the side of action there is instinct, and on the side of 
capacity, there is disposition.  A habit is neither an instinct nor a disposition,89 but it 
                                                 
88 The example belongs to Anthony Kenny, Introduction to St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, Vol. 
22, Dispositions for Human Acts, trans. Anthony Kenny (London: Blackfriars, 1964), xxi. 
89 For Aquinas, habitus belongs to the genus of dispositio, but can be distinguished from dispositio at the 
specific level (1-2.49.2).  Aquinas follows Aristotle in this: “Habits are at the same time dispositions, but 
dispositions are not necessarily habits,” Categories, 9a10-11. 
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mediates between the two.  We can therefore posit the following schematic ontology of 
action.   
          Action — instinct — habit (habitus) — disposition (dispositio) — capacity (power) 
A habit is like an instinct in that it can make action easy and seemingly effortless.  
Sometimes, a habit can make for the possibility of acting without conscious thought, and 
this is why it is easily confused with instinct. Thus, for example, Brian Davies is careless 
when he writes that Aquinas “is concerned with the acquiring of character which enables 
people to act instinctively.”90  Aquinas could not have considered this an achievement, 
since instinct names a tendency toward action that is not in any way responsive to 
reason.   
Davies’s mistake comes from a tendency, present in early twentieth-century 
psychology, to take motor habits as the paradigm for all habits.  If we think of all habits 
as being patterned upon motor habits, we see how easily habits can be mistaken for 
instinct, since motor habits are most effective to the extent that we do not mentally focus 
on how to do them. 91  But Aquinas would insist that even motor habits, which have 
salient characteristics similar to those of instinct, are different than instinct in that they 
can be blocked and transformed, usually over much time and with great effort, by the 
application of reason.  Instincts are not like this.  Instinct can be transformed only by 
                                                 
90 Brian Davies, Introduction to De Malo by Thomas Aquinas, trans. Richard Regan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 31. 
91 As William James lucidly described, motor habits are performed in the absence of conscious thought, 
and, indeed, such conscious thought seems to disrupt the fluidity of their performance: “Our lower centres 
know the order of these movements [of motor habit], and show their knowledge by their “surprise” if the 
objects are altered so as to oblige the movement to be made in a different way.  But our higher thought-
centers know hardly anything about the matter.  Few men can tell offhand which sock, shoe, or trousers-
leg they put on first.  They must first mentally rehearse the act; and even that is often insufficient—the act 
must be performed…No one can describe the order in which he brushes his hair or teeth; yet it is likely 
that the order is a pretty fixed one in all of us,” The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, 115. 
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operant conditioning, as is the case with animals.  “The sensitive powers of dumb 
animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such 
animals act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to 
operations” (1-2.50.3).  An instinct does not imply the power to refrain from the 
instinctual action, whereas a habit does imply this power.  Animals “have not that power 
of using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, 
properly speaking, there can be no habits in them” (1-2.50.3).  We must therefore be 
careful to maintain a distinction between instinct and habit, lest by obscuring the 
distinction we obscure one of the most important characteristics of habit: its 
responsiveness to reason and, therefore, its connection with the voluntary.   
But we must also note the similarities between habit and instinct, and this will 
enable us to see how Davies and others might confuse the two.  For when we say that 
habit, unlike instinct, is responsive to reason, that should not be taken to imply that 
habitual actions can be arrested, and habits dispelled (or, on the other hand, habitual 
actions incited, and habits acquired) simply by performing an act of will.  On the 
contrary, habits, like instincts, take on a life of their own, as it were, and often, “on cue,” 
provoke habitual actions that are quite recalcitrant to whatever intention, good or bad, an 
agent might have at the moment.  This is why Aristotle says that “habit is hard to change 
because it is like nature (1152a30-31), and why Aquinas, following Aristotle, tells us 
that “a habit is like a second nature” (1-2.53.1).92  Indeed, as we shall see, it is precisely 
addictive action’s similarities, in many respects, to the true compulsions of instinct that 
                                                 
92 In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas suggests that a habit, for Aristotle, 
“brings about a quasi-nature,” #1370. 
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has lead, given the contemporary loss of a robust philosophy of habit, to the assimilation 
of addiction to the purely involuntary category of disease.  Despite their similarities, 
however, Aquinas insists that habits are different from instincts because habits are 
responsive to reason.  But when Aquinas says that habits, unlike instinct, are responsive 
to reason, he is not thinking primarily in terms of the power of rational deliberation to 
overcome habitual actions “on the spot,” although this is at times possible.  Rather, 
Aquinas is interested in the way in which reason can develop strategies, manipulate 
circumstances, and inform alternative modes of character in such a way that, gradually 
and indirectly, given habits can be transformed, and, correspondingly, the actions that 
flow from them.  
 On the other side, there is danger of confusing a habit with a disposition.  A habit is 
like a disposition in that it can be changed.  But a habit is unlike a disposition in that it 
cannot be easily changed but only with great effort.  Dispositions are different than 
habits “in the point of being easily or difficultly lost,” respectively (1-2.49.2).   
The conflation of habit and disposition has become especially conspicuous in some 
contemporary efforts to revive the distinctive significance of Thomistic habit.  Thus, in 
his translation of Aquinas’s Treatise on Habits, Anthony Kenny chooses to translate 
habitus as “disposition” and dispositio as “state,” despite what seems to be the natural 
English translation of habitus as “habit” and dispositio as “disposition.”  Kenny justifies 
the translation by warning that we cannot accept at face-value English transliterations of 
Latin words, such as “action” for actio or “habit” for habitus, since these English 
transliterations often bring with them centuries of accreted meaning that should not be 
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read back into the Latin roots of the term.  Kenny’s warning is an important one, for we 
must be careful to arrive at an understanding of habitus based on the way in which 
Aquinas uses it, rather than simply assuming that we already know what he means.  
Kenny’s translation, however, ends up distorting Aquinas’s meaning, rather than 
clarifying it.  For when Kenny proclaims what his preferred translation should enable the 
reader to recognize, the distinction that he draws between Aquinas’s habitus and our 
“habit” is not one to be found in Aquinas.  “The difference between disposition [habitus] 
and habit,” Kenny argues, “might be roughly characterized thus.  If one has a habitus to 
ϕ then it is easier to ϕ than if one has not: examples are being generous and speaking 
French.  If one has a habit of ϕ-ing, then it is harder not to ϕ than if one has not: 
examples are smoking and saying ‘I say!’ before each sentence.”93  Here, Kenny claims 
that, whereas our contemporary use of “habit” implies a difficulty in stopping doing 
something, Aquinas’s use of habitus implies an ease of doing something.  But, it’s being 
hard to quit smoking, for example, is merely the flip-side of the coin, for Aquinas, of its 
being easy to continue.  There is no distinction, for Aquinas, between activities that are 
easy to do and activities that are hard not to do.  Either may fall under the category of 
habit or disposition, depending on how easy it is to do them and how hard it is to stop.  
The ease of action and the difficulty of avoiding action are correlated throughout for 
Aquinas.  It is not accidental that Kenny lists positive tendencies as habitus and negative 
tendencies as habits, for when we attend to positive tendencies we are more surprised if 
they are performed with ease whereas if we attend to negative tendencies it can be 
                                                 
93 Kenny, Introduction to St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, Vol. 22, xxx.
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surprising how difficult they are to resist.  If being generous is a habitus (and it clearly is 
for Aquinas since it is a virtue), then being stingy will have to be one as well (and clearly 
it is for Aquinas since it is a vice).  But we are more inclined to characterize acting 
stingily as something difficult to stop rather than something easy to do.  Should we 
therefore characterize being stingy as a habit but not as a habitus?   
What Kenny’s odd distinction obscures is the importance of the question, for 
Aquinas, of whether, e.g., smoking is in fact a habit or a disposition.  Clearly, Aquinas 
would think that being generous and speaking French are habits, as well as being stingy.  
It seems equally obvious that he would consider saying ‘I say!’ before each sentence to 
be a disposition, unless it is a function of some kind of deeply ingrained obsession.  But 
what about smoking?  There is no indication in anything that Aquinas says that should 
lead us to believe he would not consider it a habitus in those who find it difficult to quit.  
The question for Aquinas would be, how difficult?  If it is deeply entrenched and 
requires much effort, creativity, and ingenuity to quit smoking, smoking counts as a 
habit for Aquinas.  If it is not yet deeply entrenched and can be rooted out simply by 
recognizing that smoking is a problematic behavior, it is probably not a habit but a mere 
disposition.  Often, a tendency is more or less entrenched depending on the degree to 
which the tendency implicates an agent’s emotions.  Thus, frequently picking one’s nose 
is more often than not a dispositional tendency, whereas frequently smoking is more 
often than not a habitual tendency.  “The word habit implies a certain lastingness” (1-
2.49.2).  It does not imply any kind of distinction between the ease of doing versus the 
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difficulty of not doing.  “The word disposition does not” imply a certain lastingness (1-
2.49.2). 
 At this point, the reader may be worried by an analytical vagueness that plagues the 
distinction between habit and disposition.  By what standards are we to decide whether a 
particular tendency to act has or has not enough “lastingness” to be considered a habit?  
There seems to be no set of standards that can remove all ambiguity; there will always 
be borderline cases.  But this should not allow us to discount the importance of the 
distinction for Aquinas.  The distinction between habit and disposition is not, for 
Aquinas, merely arbitrary.  “These differences, though apparently accidental to quality, 
nevertheless designate differences which are proper and essential to quality” (1-
2.49.2).94 
 Careful attention to how habit mediates between action and capacity and, 
particularly, between instinct and disposition, enables us to avoid twin dangers that stalk 
the language of habit in the contemporary discussion of addiction.  One such tendency is 
to conflate habit and instinct and therefore dismiss the claim that addiction is a habit.  
This sort of mistake is evident in the following passage from Francis Seeburger.  
In the final analysis, there is nothing “habitual” about injecting oneself with 
narcotics twice a day over a prolonged period.  Something that has become 
habitual is something one has learned to do without thinking about it.  That is the 
role of habit: to allow us to do things without having to bother to think about 
doing them, or about what we are doing while we do them.  Thus, for example, 
after we struggle long enough with them, the movements and bodily adjustments 
involved in riding a bicycle or in swimming become habitual to us, so that when 
we climb on a bike or jump into a swimming pool we don’t have to think about 
                                                 
94 Thus, for example, when Donald Goodwin, Alcoholism, 54, claims, “There is evidence, in fact, that 
‘true’ alcoholism is not on a continuum with heavy drinking but a separate entity,” he is not saying 
anything that cannot be illuminated by Aquinas’s philosophy of habit. 
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what we are supposed to do; we just do it.  That description does not, however, 
fit the case of someone injecting himself or herself with heroin twice a day.  On 
the contrary…addicts quite consciously invest the whole activity of their drug 
taking with significance.  They tend to ritualize it, sometimes giving even the 
most trivial surrounding circumstances the status of inviolable rites.95 
 
As is apparent from the examples Seeburger gives, he assumes that motor habits are 
paradigmatic habits, and, therefore, that a lack of thought pertaining to the action under 
question is a necessary condition of habit.  Habit has been conflated with instinct, as an 
unthinking response in a particular situation.  But for Aquinas, this would be an odd 
restriction on habit, not least because Aquinas believes that one of the faculties of 
persons that can become habituated is the intellect.  Seeburger, in describing how the 
whole activity of addictive behavior becomes invested with conscious meaning, has 
noticed a centrally important characteristic of addiction, one to which we will devote 
considerable attention in Chapters IV and V.  He has not, however, given us any reason 
to think that addictive behavior is non-habitual, on Aquinas’s broader understanding of 
habit.  
 There is an opposite danger of conflating habit with disposition and thereby 
dismissing the prospect that addiction is a habit.  So, for example, one reads in the 
literature of AA that certain types of alcoholics discovered that they did not just have a 
bad habit of drinking alcohol, but that, indeed, they were alcoholics.  “By going back in 
our own drinking histories, we could show that years before we realized it we were out 
                                                 
95 Addiction and Responsibility, 45-46.  It is worth noting, however, that despite this explicit rejection of 
thinking of addiction in terms of habit, Seeburger, in part because he is careful to avoid the categories of 
disease and compulsion, cannot help slipping back into thinking of addiction in terms of habit.  “The best 
way to define the alcoholic is not as someone who habitually drinks, but as someone who habitually 
chooses to drink,” p. 90.  I am not sure this is the best way to “define” alcoholic, but I think Seeburger is 
right that alcoholism has something to do with habit. 
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of control, that our drinking even then was no mere habit, that it was indeed the 
beginning of a fatal progression” (TT 23, my emphasis).  The adjective “mere” is telling 
here.  If one reads this passage further, it becomes clear that a distinction is being sought 
between those who may be “merely” problem-drinkers and those who are “full-blooded” 
alcoholics.  What distinguishes a problem-drinker from an alcoholic, however, is 
precisely what distinguishes, for Aquinas, a disposition from a habit.  A problem-drinker 
indeed has a tendency to drink, but, upon recognizing the ill effects of his or her 
behavior, he or she is able to stop drinking more or less straightforwardly, without 
drastic measures.  The alcoholic, on the other hand, may recognize the nature of his or 
her problem without being able to root out the tendency to drink simply by deciding to 
do so.  So the problem drinker has a “habit” in the sense that a person might have a 
“habit” of chewing his nails.  “It’s just a bad habit,” we say.  But, again, excepting 
strange neurotic obsessions, Aquinas would not likely consider nail biting a habit, but 
rather a disposition.  Both problem-drinkers and alcoholics have tendencies toward 
alcohol, but one tendency is easily lost and the other is not.  This parallels exactly the 
distinction that Aquinas wishes to make between a disposition and a habit.  Aquinas 
would say that an alcoholic has a habit, though by no means a mere habit (this would be 
oxymoronic for Aquinas) of drinking, whereas a problem-drinker has a disposition to 
drink.  
Next, it should be increasingly clear how the language of habit mediates between 
the absolutisms of determinism and free will.  Habitual action is like free will in that it 
connects up at some level with reason.  On the other hand, habitual action is like 
 92 
determinism in that the actions performed by habit do not issue directly from the process 
of deliberative reasoning that is constitutive of free will.  We have already noticed 
Aquinas’s notion of a habit as a “second nature.”  “A habit is like a second nature, and 
yet it falls short of it.  And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be 
taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty” (1-2.53.2).  If 
something acts a certain way “by nature,” that thing is determined to so act.  In animals, 
we call that instinct.  A habit is a “second nature” because, although it is not strictly 
speaking mechanical, it nevertheless proceeds from the agent effortlessly and without 
exertion of will, apparently “naturally.”  Mariana Valverde nicely summarizes the way 
in which habit mediates between determinism and free will.  Habits are “patterned acts 
that are neither fully willed nor completely automatic,” which “inhabit the hybrid zone, 
often known as second nature, that has always been neglected by theology and 
philosophy.”96 
 Valverde’s comment about the neglect of the category of habit among theologians 
and philosophers is interesting given the aims of this study.  Such neglect has not always 
been the case.  As Valverde rightly notes, “in Aristotle’s time theorizing habit was the 
fundamental business of professional ethical philosophers.”97  Valverde overlooks the 
medieval tradition, including Aquinas, but she rightly points out the relative absence of a 
philosophy of habit through the modern and “post-modern” period, with the notable 
exceptions of the American pragmatists, particularly William James, Charles Peirce, and 
                                                 
96 Valverde, Diseases of the Will, 36-37. 
97 Ibid., 40. 
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John Dewey.98  What is particularly interesting about the way in which habit was re-
introduced into the discussions of early 20th century psychology and the philosophy of 
human action is the way in which it was brought in as a corrective to an overstatement of 
the scope of absolute freedom of volition.  James, for example, speaks of the “force of 
habit” precisely to show that most human action is not nearly so “free” as certain 
philosophies of a vaunted free will would lead us to suppose.  But, strangely, in the 
discussion surrounding addiction, habit is no longer seen as a corrective to an 
overemphasis on freedom and volition but rather as, in the opposite direction, an 
opponent to the disease concept of addiction.  In a complete reversal, this use of habit 
aligns habit with the freedom of the will.  What is important to see in all of this is that 
habit genuinely stands midway between both determinism (disease) and free will 
(choice), and therefore acts as an important corrective in both directions.  When we say 
that addiction is a habit, we are trying to say something different than that addiction is a 
disease or a choice, although in so doing we are recognizing that salient features of both 
concepts will factor into our use of the category of habit. 
 Finally, we could say that habit mediates between the voluntary and the involuntary.  
For, as we have already mentioned, habits qualify the passions.  Craig Steven Titus puts 
                                                 
98 I am embarrassed to say that I conceived and outlined this dissertation before reading John Dewey’s 
remarkable Human Nature and Conduct.  I had already become convinced that, although William James’s 
work on habit was immensely important for the renascence of the concept of habit in early 20th century 
psychology, there was little in his work on habit that had not been covered more thoroughly by Aristotle 
and Aquinas.  Furthermore, I worried that James focused too narrowly on motor habits as the paradigmatic 
habit in terms of which other habits are to be explained.  Neither of these criticisms apply to what Dewey 
has given us in Human Nature and Conduct, which is both original and systematic in its outworking.  
Although Dewey is not a primary interlocutor in this study, I am sure that reading Human Nature and 
Conduct has affected my thinking about habit.  I anticipate the opportunity to give Dewey, as well as 
James and Peirce, more studied attention in future projects on the place of habit in a philosophy of human 
action. 
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the point succinctly: Aquinas shows us how habits “instill intelligence in emotions.”99  
But if this is so, then we cannot easily make the customary distinction between actions 
as things that we make happen and emotions as things that happen to us, between actions 
as purely voluntary and emotions as purely involuntary.  Habit names the possibility of 
partial responsibility for and control over our emotions.  For both Aristotle and Aquinas, 
it is within our power, for example, to develop the habit of courage, which is to say that 
it is within our power both to develop our capacity to act in a certain way in a 
circumstance that calls for courage and to develop our capacity to feel a certain way in a 
circumstance that calls for courage. 
We should notice one more way in which habit problematizes our everyday view of 
the voluntary/involuntary distinction.  Both Aristotle and Aquinas are quite clear that 
habits—“states of character”—are voluntary, as are the habitual actions that flow from 
them.  Aquinas restates Aristotle’s position (1114a12-23) in the Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
Evil habits are not subject to the will after they have been formed.  He says that 
because a person becomes unjust voluntarily, it does not follow that he ceases to 
be unjust and becomes just whenever he may will.  He proves this by means of a 
likeness in the dispositions of the body.  A man who in good health willingly 
falls into sickness by living incontinently, i.e., by eating and drinking to excess 
and not following the doctor’s advice, had it in his power in the beginning not to 
become sick.  But after he has performed the act, having eaten unnecessary or 
harmful food, it is no longer in his power not to be sick.  Thus he who throws a 
stone is able not to throw it; however once he has thrown the stone he has not the 
                                                 
99 Craig Steven Titus, Resilience and the Virtue of Fortitude: Aquinas in Dialogue with the Psychosocial 
Sciences (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 116.  A fascinating 
neurological confirmation of this comes from Christiane Northrup, M.D., who says, “Not only do our 
physical organs contain receptor sites for the neurochemicals of thought and emotion, our organs and 
immune systems can themselves manufacture these same chemicals.  What this means is that our entire 
body feels and expresses emotion—all parts of us ‘think’ and ‘feel’…The mind is located throughout the 
body,” quoted in Wilshire, Wild Hunger, 74. 
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power to take back the throwing.  Nevertheless we do say that it is within a 
man’s power to cast or throw a stone because it was from a principle under his 
control.  So it is also with the habits of vice; that a man not become unjust or 
incontinent arises from a principle under his control.  Hence we say that men are 
voluntarily unjust and incontinent, although, after they have become such, it is no 
longer within their power to cease being unjust or incontinent immediately, but 
great effort and practice are required.100 
 
There has, in fact, been some confusion among Aristotle and Aquinas scholars alike as 
to the proper statement of the relationship between habit, habitual actions, and the 
voluntary.  Take, for example, the following three claims, all from eminent scholars. 
A habit, for us, is a kind of addiction.  For Aquinas, however, a habitus puts 
one’s activity more under one’s control than it might otherwise be.101 
 
A habitus, or disposition, we are told more than once, is what can be exercised at 
will; but an action, in so far as it becomes a habit, to that extent escapes 
voluntary control.102 
 
Moral habitus do not become ‘almost or quite involuntary,’ but rather they allow 
us to act more voluntarily.103 
 
Davies and Titus say that habits put our activity “more under our control” than it 
otherwise would be, making us to act “more voluntarily.”  Kenny says much the 
opposite: the more habitual an action, the more it “escapes voluntary control.”  What are 
we to make of this confusion?  The confusion can be addressed if we recognize that we 
might mean one of two things by calling something more or less voluntary.  On the one 
hand, we might think of the ultimate in voluntarity as being that which is most 
expressive of an agent’s character.  Or, on the other hand, we might think of the ultimate 
in voluntarity as being that which is most susceptible to an agent’s immediate control, 
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i.e., as being that which an agent is most arbitrarily free to do or leave undone.  If we 
take voluntarity in the first sense, habitual actions are indeed the most voluntary of our 
actions, because they flow, not just from some fleeting deliberative process, but rather 
from the source of who we are, our characters.  If we take voluntarity in the second 
sense, habitual actions are indeed the least voluntary of our actions, because, since they 
flow from deeply ingrained habits, they are least susceptible to fleeting deliberations or 
desires to “do otherwise.”   
So, in addition to mediating between the voluntary and the involuntary, habit 
problematizes our customary assumptions about the relationship between responsibility 
and “the ability to do otherwise.”  We are accustomed to expect a direct relationship 
between the two: the greater the arbitrary freedom to do otherwise, the greater our 
responsibility for our action.  But for Aristotle and Aquinas, there is in a sense an inverse 
relationship between the two.  Rather than implying that the problem is in some sense 
“external” to an agent, the loss of immediate control over our actions may tell us that the 
problem is deeply “internal,” deeper in fact than our cleverness or skill in practical 
deliberation; the problem may be in a sense one of who we are.   
I hope that the reader will not at this point jump to conclusions and take me to be 
implying that addiction, rather than being a disease, is a symptom of moral depravity or 
an extreme character flaw.  I will in fact argue directly against these all-too-common 
views.  But what I will be arguing is that addictions, rather than being things, like 
diseases, that we have are more like things that we become. 
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 The aim of this inquiry into the mediating character of habit has been to create space 
between such absolute binaries as action/capacity, instinct/disposition, determinism/free 
will, and disease/choice, space that can be made intelligible as a locus of habit.  But now 
we must ask more specifically about the kinds of habit that can occupy this space.  
Habits, we have seen, belong peculiarly to rational animals, namely human persons.  
But, more specifically, for Aquinas habits belong to persons as qualifications of the 
powers (or faculties) of human persons.  Therefore, we have to ask about these powers 
separately, whether and how they are susceptible to becoming habituated.  Aquinas 
undertakes this sort of inquiry in Question 50 of the Prima Secundae, “Of the Subject of 
Habits.”  There, he responds to questions about whether there are habits in the human 
body, the soul, and more particularly, the sensitive part of the soul, the intellectual part 
of the soul, and the will.  He answers yes to all five questions, although the body is said 
to be the subject of habits only analogously and imperfectly.  We could, following 
Aquinas, ask about the capacity for habituation of each separate power of a human 
person, 104 but this would take us too far from the center of our inquiry.  So we shall have 
to ask about a select number of these powers, mainly those that can be seen to have 
direct bearing on our thesis that addiction is habitual human action.   
                                                 
104 George Klubertanz, in Habits and Virtues, provides this sort of exhaustive inquiry into the various 
human powers that are subject to habituation, trying along the way to show the continuities and 
discontinuities between a Thomistic psychology and the psychology of Klubertanz’s time (1965).  To my 
knowledge, there have been no similar contemporary attempts.  Craig Steven Titus, in Resilience and the 
Virtue of Fortitude and Adrian Reimers, in The Soul of the Person: A Contemporary Philosophical 
Psychology (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), endeavor to put Aquinas 
in conversation with contemporary psychology, but neither does so with particular attention to Aquinas’s 
“faculty psychology.”   
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Broadly speaking, Aquinas analyzes the human person in terms of three “souls,”105 
each of which consists of a variety of powers: the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual 
souls.  We are interested in the capacity for habituation of the vegetative powers and of 
several of the sub-powers of the sensitive soul: the imagination, the cogitative 
estimation, and the memory.  By asking about whether and in what sense these powers 
may become habituated, we will begin to understand the force of Aquinas’s claim that 
habits are necessary because, in order to dispose an agent to act well or ill, “several 
things should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways.” 
 The specific powers of the vegetative soul are the nutritive (the power of 
preservation), the augmentative (the power of growth), and the generative (the power of 
reproduction) (1.78.2).  Because the powers of the vegetative soul “have not an inborn 
aptitude to obey the command of reason” Aquinas claims, “therefore there are no habits 
in them” (1-2.50.3).  The digestion, growth, and generation of human persons are not in 
any sense dependent upon the direction of reason and therefore cannot be seen, strictly 
speaking, as subjects of habits.   
But it may be that these powers are to some extent capable of being manipulated in 
such a way as to acquire modifications.  For example, certain kinds of grasses can 
sustain human life, though a period of adaptation is required before the nutritive power is 
capable of assimilating them.  More germane to our own study are the physiological 
modifications that accrue throughout the process of substance addiction.  Are these 
                                                 
105 Although, importantly, Aquinas does not “divide” or “partition” the human person into three parts.  
This was the position of Bonaventure, but Aquinas makes clear that the human person is one substance 
(1.76.3-4). 
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modifications instances of habit?  Aquinas would probably not have considered them 
habits. “We call dispositions those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their 
very nature are easily lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g., sickness and 
health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason of their very nature, are 
not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g., sciences and virtues” (1-
2.49.2).  The physiological aspects of addiction, therefore, would not be as tied to habit 
for Aquinas as the so-called psychological aspects.  This is because the body can be 
reconditioned relatively quickly in comparison with the soul.  Insofar as addiction is a 
sickness of the body, Aquinas would consider it in terms of dispositions.  But insofar as 
it is a sickness of soul, we are dealing with full-blown habit.  
Modern science has in one sense confirmed, in another sense disconfirmed 
Aquinas’s reticence to elevate any acquired modification of the body to the status of 
habit.  On the side of confirmation, research has shown that the human brain has a 
remarkable capacity to recover from damage sustained through drug use.  In terms of the 
capacity for normal levels of information processing and retention, the modifications 
acquired by the human brain during intense and prolonged drug use are indeed merely 
dispositional, within limits.  On the side of disconfirmation, however, research has 
shown that certain neurological modifications having to do with the relationship between 
drug use and experiences of gratification, tolerance, and withdrawal are often permanent.  
So, for example, when addicts relapse, even after prolonged periods of abstinence, their 
drug use rapidly elevates to levels of consumption equal to or even greater than the 
levels of consumption at the time of cessation.  This is why relapse is physiologically 
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distinguishable from the original process of addiction.  It seems to me, then, that there 
are indeed habituations of what Aquinas calls the vegetative soul, although, as we 
grapple with the relationship between these habits of the vegetative soul and addiction, 
we must bear in mind the limitations, outlined in the Introduction, of any attempt to 
comprehend addiction in terms of the phenomena of gratification, tolerance, and 
withdrawal.  It remains true, in the case of the recovering addict as in the case of the 
experimenter with addictive substances, that addiction (or relapse) is primarily a 
function of the meaning and significance that those visceral phenomena take on in the 
agent’s view of him- or herself and the life-project he or she envisions. 
Among the powers of the sensitive soul are the interior powers of imagination, 
cogitative estimation, and memory.  Imagination is the power that allows for “the 
retention and preservation of [sensible] forms” (1.78.4).  Are there acquired 
modifications of this power?  We must be careful here to distinguish between 
modifications of the power and the exercise of the power as it eventuates in 
modifications of the agent’s knowledge.  Learning takes place through the exercise of 
imagination, i.e., through the retention of information whether visual, verbal, tactile, or 
whatever.  But this occurs naturally, as it were, and need not imply a modification to the 
imaginative power.  We do, however, seem capable of developing certain habits of 
imagination.  The skilled artist has developed a particular way of “seeing” the world and 
retaining in imagination that vision.  The artist does not have a modified external power 
of sight—he or she may be as far- or near-sighted as the next person—but the artist has 
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developed his or her imagination in such a way that he or she “sees” a different world 
than the next person.   
 The estimative power enables a function similar to that of the imagination.  Whereas 
the imagination allows for the apprehension of sensible things, the estimative power 
allows for “the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses” 
(1.78.4).  By “intentions,” Aquinas means the insensate qualities of objects, such as a 
thing’s goodness or badness, suitability or unsuitability.  Aquinas leads us toward an 
understanding of what he means to pick out with the estimative power by first showing 
how the estimative power must function in animals.  There is nothing in a lamb’s sense 
perception of a wolf to tell it that the wolf is bad, an enemy to be avoided.  This 
information must come from elsewhere, and Aquinas says that it comes from the 
estimative power, through which animals “perceive these intentions only by some 
natural instinct” (1.78.4).     
 Human persons have instincts too.  Babies, for example, instinctively cry when a 
loud bang is made in front of their face.  In cases of extreme panic, human beings may 
act automatically and instinctively from fear.  But our instincts are rudimentary as 
compared with those of other animals.  Most of our immediate estimations of the objects 
and situations we encounter are discursive rather than instinctive in nuce.  As Aquinas 
puts it, whereas animals perceive good and evil in objects by way of instinct,  
man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas.  Therefore the power which 
in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the cogitative, 
which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions.  Wherefore it is also 
called the particular reason (1.78.4).   
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The cogitative estimative power, therefore, is the site of a “compenetration of reason into 
sense.”106  It is the paradigmatic locus of habit as embodied knowledge. 
 The important difference between the cogitative estimative power and the powers 
that belong to the intellectual soul—deliberative reason and will—is the immediacy with 
which the estimative power recognizes objects or situations as good or evil, suitable or 
unsuitable.  The estimation seems to come with the sensory experience, although it is of 
course impossible to perceive good or evil with the exterior senses.  Whenever there is 
an immediate and definite link between a subject’s perception of an object and the 
subject’s appetency for the object, it is this link that the estimative power explains.  In 
animals, the link comes already forged, a natural instinct.  But in human beings the link 
is forged through reason, although not, as we will see, necessarily at the level of rational 
deliberation. 
 Because the cogitative estimation is rarely acting in the absence of other activities, 
including deliberative rational judgment, it can be difficult to isolate.  The most obvious 
examples are cases in which, in our contemporary idiom, we might say we just have an 
“intuition” that something is bad or inappropriate or unsuitable or, on the other hand, 
good, appropriate, or suitable.  For instance, when a person at a dinner party lacks tact, 
we sense this immediately, without any need for rational consideration.107  Indeed, we 
often might find it difficult to explain in words why we consider this person to be 
tactless; we just know it when we see it.  Now this kind of estimation is obviously not a 
consequence of some explicit rational judgment, but neither is it instinct.  It is made 
                                                 
106 Klubertanz, Habits and Virtues, 46. 
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possible by a long history of learning, learning “manners” from our elders, watching the 
reactions of persons we trust in social situations, feeling the displeasure of others when 
we make a social blunder, etc.  This is why the estimation is cogitative: it is the product 
of a “coalition of ideas,” a reserve of discursive wisdom that has become interwoven 
with the objects of our experience.  It is not the product of conditioning, which takes 
place in the absence of any appeal to reason, yet it operates immediately and without 
intellectual effort, as if by conditioning.  Often, it is the reactions that issue from our 
cogitative estimations that get mistaken for “instinct.”   
As I will argue at length in Chapters IV and V, the habituation of the cogitative 
estimation is perhaps the single most powerful component of addiction and the addictive 
experience.  The reader might pause, however, to consider what such an argument might 
require.  Take the quite simple case of our ability to “sense” the lack of tact at a dinner 
party.  How would we detail the means by which the cogitative estimation is habituated 
in this matter?  We could only appeal to a complex arrangement of cultural patterns, 
historical developments, more or less universal psychological needs and reactions, and 
so on.  Because the cogitative estimation is formed by a “coalition of ideas,” and this 
rarely through straightforward instruction, syllogistic argument, or rhetorical persuasion, 
any attempt to investigate its informants will necessarily be somewhat general and ideal. 
In trying to describe how we cannot understand human existence abstracted from its 
cultural context, Sean Desmond Healy claims, “It is rather as if nature, in denying us 
exact instincts, gave us, or made us able to develop, social systems as a substitute 
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instinctual exoskeleton to protect us against the pressure of infinite possibility.”108  This 
is not all that “nature” provides, according to Aquinas, for we are also provided with 
habits, which “protect us against the pressure of infinite possibility” by instilling 
tendencies and inclinations.  But Healy is fundamentally right, for we cannot begin to 
understand many of these habits, and especially those of the imagination and cogitative 
estimation, except by probing the “exoskeletons” that subtly implant their rationality so 
deeply into the self as to seem almost instinctual.  The reader should be warned, then, 
that the arguments of the next two chapters are formally quite different than those of the 
first two, ranging widely into what might be considered philosophy of culture, 
philosophical sociology, and philosophical psychology.  The transition is somewhat 
inevitable given the thesis I am trying to defend. 
 Returning to the investigation of the habituations of specific powers, we move 
finally to the memorative power, which works in conjunction with the imagination and 
the estimative power to enable the re-presentation of sensible forms and intentions.  
Were it not for the memorative power, the accretions to the powers of imagination and 
the cogitative estimation would be of little significance to human action, for it is through 
the memorative power that past accomplishments of the imagination and cogitative 
estimation are brought to bear on present action.  But the habituation of memory is 
essentially derivative of the habituations of imagination and cogitative estimation.  
Because a person comes to “see” his or her world a certain way, his or her memory 
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records the world a certain way and represents it to the agent as informed by the agent’s 
habituated imagination.  “Selective memory” is a function of “selective imagination.”   
 Before making some brief forays into the relationship between habit, loss of control, 
and relapse, we must summarize one more general point about habit, namely how habits 
are formed and unformed, how they grow and diminish.  Aquinas treats these matters in 
Questions 51 and 52 of the Prima Secundae.  In Question 51, we are told that habits are 
formed by acts.  In rare cases, one act is sufficient to form a habit.  This is true, we are 
told, “if the active principle is of great power” (1-2.51.3).  It does seem possible that one 
drink of alcohol or one hit of heroin may be a sufficiently powerful active principle to 
instantiate a habit.  However, cases such as this are probably more rare than we are 
sometimes led to suppose.  The Big Book of A.A. states that “though there is no way of 
proving it, we believe that early in our drinking careers most of us could have stopped 
drinking.  But the difficulty is that few alcoholics have enough desire to stop while there 
is yet time” (AA 32).109 
 Most habits are caused by the repetition of such acts as would be produced by the 
habit were the agent in possession of it.  For instance, the habit of temperance is 
produced when a person who is not yet temperate nevertheless performs actions similar 
to those that would be performed by a temperate person.  We cannot say that the 
intemperate person must perform the same actions as would be performed by a 
temperate person; this is impossible since the intemperate person does not yet possess 
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the desires that make the temperate person’s actions what they are.  Nevertheless, if acts 
that are similar in outward form to those of the temperate person’s “be multiplied a 
certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is 
called a habit” (1-2.51.2).  If you want to become a skilled basketball player, you must 
repeatedly do as skilled basketball players do, even though, since you are not skilled, 
you will not be able to perform the actions with the same success, consistency, and ease 
that a skilled player does.  Over time, however, the repetition of such acts instills skill in 
the agent, permitting him or her to act as a skilled basketball player. 
 It is sometimes thought that mere repetition is sufficient for the production of habits, 
but this is not so for Aquinas.  In addition to the outward multiplication of like acts, there 
must also be an inward “intensity” of intent and focus.  Alongside the repetition of 
external acts, we must also attend to the interior quality of acts.  This is because a habit 
does not merely name the ability to perform external actions, but also some sort of 
continuity between an agent’s actions and his or her intentions and desires.  Without 
attention to the interior quality of acts, we can at best become conditioned, but not 
habituated.  The formation and growth of habits depends on this interior “intensity” of 
intent and desire.110  “So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow.  If, however, the act 
falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that 
habit, but rather to a lessening thereof” (1-2.52.3).  Habituation, therefore, occurs 
through external and internal exertion.  “The same acts need to be repeated many times 
                                                 
110 As we begin to form a certain habit, we are often capable of merely second-order desires, i.e. wanting 
to want in a certain way.  But these second-order desires are indispensable to the formation of right first-
order desires. 
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for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory,” but also, “meditation strengthens 
memory” (1.51.3).   
 
Habit, Loss of Control, and Relapse 
 We are at last in a position to begin to explore the connections between habit and 
addictive behavior.  What my analysis thus far has shown, I hope, is that human action is 
primarily the domain of habit.  Not only how we respond, but even the way in which we 
see the situations we confront and the alternatives open to us are thoroughly drenched in 
habit.  Although the language is slightly overstated, we begin to see how John Dewey 
could claim, 
Concrete habits are the means of knowledge and thought…Concrete habits do all 
the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and 
reasoning that is done.  “Consciousness,” whether as a stream or as special 
sensations and images, expresses functions of habits, phenomena of their 
formation, operation, their interruption and reorganization.111 
 
Human action is often the confluence point of passion and rational judgment.  
Incontinence is possible at this point because of the cunning of passion; passion puts 
itself under the nose of the deliberating agent, distracting the agent from connecting up 
the right universal judgment with the right particular judgment.  In cases of 
psychological craving, passion can be so intense or so unremitting that it does not merely 
momentarily distract the agent from prudential deliberation but veritably clogs the 
agent’s mind with intrusive thoughts.  In the case of such craving for alcohol, for 
example, the agent must battle constantly and seemingly eternally with the thought of an 
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alcoholic beverage—its taste, its texture, the sound of the ice clinking in the glass, the 
ambient noise of the bar, the camaraderie of drinking buddies, and so on, seemingly ad 
infinitum.   
But even in the absence of vehement or resilient passion, an agent is not secure from 
the threat of incontinence, for human action is also the confluence point of rational 
judgment and habit.  Indeed, before deliberation begins, habits of imagination, cogitative 
estimation, appetite, and intellect are already operative, constituting the means by which 
the agent discerns his or her situation, including the various possibilities for action that it 
brings with it.  Often, rational deliberation is only necessary when there is some conflict 
between these habits.  Under normal circumstances, the habits of the agent enable the 
agent to act well or ill with ease, success, and consistency.  But when there is a conflict 
between habits, the habits do not thereby vanish.  Rather, they vie for precedence as the 
agent struggles to navigate his or her situation.   
Because the territory of continence and incontinence is presented by Aristotle and 
Aquinas as the territory between the habits of vice and virtue, there is a propensity to 
envision the territory of continence and incontinence as a sort of habit-free zone in 
which the primary contenders are pure reason and brute appetites, but this is not so.  The 
territory of continence and incontinence is rather the territory in which habits collide, 
negotiating and adjudicating their own increase and decrease, their making and 
unmaking.  Since habits are the embodiment of knowledge, reserve “pockets of 
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thought”112 that fund human activity, the territory of incontinence is therefore the 
territory in which knowledges collide: the knowledges of deliberation confront the 
embodied knowledges of habit.  This is why incontinence is possible in the absence of 
vehement or resilient passion.   
Although “simple incontinence” may at times be the consequence of the collision of 
habit, this is preeminently so for the “particularized incontinence” that we associated 
with addiction in Chapter II.  We recall that Aristotle mentions a unique type of 
incontinence—“incontinence in respect of some particular bodily pleasure”—and says 
that this type of incontinence is “blamed not only as a fault but as a kind of vice” 
(1148a3-5).  We are now in a position to see the profundity of this claim, which is said 
in passing without further development.  For the consistent failure of the addict can only 
be explained with reference to the role that habits play in the formation and execution of 
moral agency.  Simple incontinence most often has to do with the cunning and power of 
passion, but the particularized incontinence of addiction is, although sometimes an effect 
of passion, characteristically the result of the sway of habit.  The territory of 
particularized incontinence is, therefore, the territory of transitory virtue and vice.  As 
Aquinas saw, “continence is not a virtue but a mixture, inasmuch as it has something of 
virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue” (2-2.155.3). Indeed, the guiding premise of 
Chapter V will be that addiction is best understood as a simulacra of virtue, and that it is 
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deliberations, or introspections do.   
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precisely because addiction takes the form of a virtue—the most potent, persistent, and 
complex type of habit available to human agents—that recovery is such a daunting 
challenge. 
It is my contention that the most baffling phenomenon of the particularized 
incontinence of addictive experience, namely loss of control, can be illuminated as we 
come to understand the ways in which embodied knowledges—certain kinds of habits—
exercise far-reaching and colossal power over human action.  In particular, habits of 
imagination and the cogitative estimation play a decisive role in cases of incontinence 
that cannot be explained with reference to passion.  As outlined in Chapter II, these cases 
of incontinence often occur even though the agent possesses the conclusion of the right 
practical syllogism that can lead to continent action.  We described in that chapter how 
this is possible because of a lack of integration of the knowledge derived through 
practical reasoning into action.  Aquinas puts the point like this in his Commentary on 
the Nicomachean Ethics: 
To understand, it is necessary that those things that a man hears become, as it 
were, connatural to him in order that they may be impressed perfectly on his 
mind.  For this a man needs time in which his intellect may be confirmed in what 
it has received, by much meditation.  This is true also of the incontinent man, for 
even if he says: it is not good for me now to pursue such a pleasure, nevertheless, 
in his heart he does not think this way.113 
 
Insofar as right action depends at some point on the integration of deliberative 
knowledge into action, right action meets definite resistance wherever deliberation 
arrives at conclusions that conflict with knowledges already integrated into human action 
as habit.  Thus, in the most perplexing cases of incontinence, we are confronted, not with 
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reason struggling against appetite or emotion, but rather with free-floating reason 
struggling against reason as rooted in habits of the imagination and the cogitative 
estimation.  It will take all of Chapters IV and V to show just how deeply such types of 
reason can be rooted, and such a development is necessary to show how the extreme 
form of incontinence that is called “loss of control” is possible.  The purpose of this 
chapter has been to provide the theoretical underpinning for the efforts of the subsequent 
chapters. 
Before moving on, one more important fruit of this discussion of habit should be 
articulated.  In addition to the phenomena of craving and loss of control, the third major 
“strut” of addiction is the phenomenon of relapse.  Any adequate account of addiction 
must explain how relapse is possible.  How can it be that, after days, weeks, months, or 
even years of sobriety, a former addict can suddenly resume addictive behavior?  My 
contention is that Aquinas’s account of how habits are formed and destroyed, increased 
and decreased provides the insight needed to sketch a theory of relapse.   
Aquinas says that habits are formed whenever two conditions are met.  First, the 
external act must be repeated.  Second, there must be appropriate attention to the interior 
quality of the acts.  Aquinas calls this inward attention “intensity,” and he warns that 
even though repeated acts tend to cause the development of habits, if “the act falls short 
of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but 
rather to a lessening thereof” (1-2.52.3).  Given this understanding of the generation and 
destruction of habits, if we conceive of the life of recovery as the development of new 
habits of imagination, cogitative estimation, appetite, and intellect, it is entirely possible 
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for someone to be engaging in the external acts that are necessary to the development of 
such habits without thereby developing or maintaining those habits.  Because the 
repetition of external acts is not sufficient to the forming or maintenance of habits, the 
habits necessary for the life of recovery can be degenerating all the while that an agent 
carries on like a person in recovery.114  As Robert Brennan puts it, “In the matter of 
habit, as in the matter of perfection, if we are not progressing, we are deteriorating.”115  
Thus the A.A. adage: “If you’re coasting in recovery, you’re going downhill.”116  This is 
why many of the “steps” of A.A. require inward or “spiritual” work, and, furthermore, 
why A.A. insists that the life of recovery entails the willingness to “work the steps” as a 
way of life.117   
It is easy to let up on the spiritual program of action and rest on our laurels.  We 
are headed for trouble if we do, for alcohol is a subtle foe.  We are not cured of 
alcoholism.  What we really have is a daily reprieve contingent on the 
maintenance of our spiritual condition (AA 85). 
 
                                                 
114 This is the basic process that underlies Olav Gjelsvik’s explanation of nicotine relapse in “Addiction, 
Weakness of Will, and Relapse,” in Getting Hooked: Rationality and Addiction, edd. Jon Elster and Ole-
Jorgen Skog (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 58: “The active smoker knows his craving 
and thus takes all these additional measures to serve his long-term interest.  To do this requires time and 
preparation, training, and conditioning.  Nonetheless, the smoker might succeed in quitting.  Facing an 
unexpected craving, brought on by some situation later on, he might not have time to assemble these 
resources, and he might have lost much of the ability if this ability required training or conditioning that 
would fade after a while…It will therefore be possible to relapse even if the craving is far from being as 
strong as at the time of quitting.” 
115 Thomistic Psychology, 269.  The key distinction for Aristotle on this matter is between “endurance” 
and “continence” proper.  “Endurance consists in resisting, while continence consists in conquering, and 
resisting and conquering are different, as not being beaten is different from winning” (115034-36).   
116 William Cope Moyers with Katherine Ketcham, Broken: My Story of Addiction and Redemption (New 
York: Viking, 2006), 205. 
117 In James B. Nelson, Thirst: God and the Alcoholic Experience (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2004), 201 n.41, Nelson notes that the Twelve Steps alternate between calls to inward acceptance and 
appropriation of certain truths and calls to outward action.  “There is the repeated recognition that 
willingness must precede our actual decision (willing) to take the steps that will open us to the gift of 
sobriety.” 
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Failure to continue to work the steps is referred to as “two-stepping” and is seen to be 
the primary threat to a recovering addict’s continued sobriety.  Because recovery as 
conceived by A.A. is a technology of habit reformation, it demands this vigilant 
attention to both the external and internal dimensions of sober action.  Relapse is 
possible because the life of recovery is a life of re-habituation rather than merely a life of 
re-enactment. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MODERN ADDICTION 
 
 In Chapter III, we investigated several powers of human agents taken singly in order 
to discover which of them were subject to habit.  The investigation uncovered what may 
be called simple habits, habits involving one habit and one power.  In concrete human 
activity, however, powers and their habits rarely act in isolation from one another.  
Indeed, the fact that human powers do not ordinarily work separately but rather in 
cooperation with one another created the main obstacle to isolating simple habits.  The 
elucidation of simple habits, therefore, can only be preliminary to a fuller elaboration of 
the ways in which simple habits combine and cohere to form habit groups, which 
involve two or more powers and the habits that belong to them. 
 
Habit Groups 
 The virtue of temperance might be helpfully offered here as an example of the way 
in which intelligible human action most often involves the combination of a number of 
simple habits into a coordinated habit group.  Temperance is properly a qualification of 
the sensory appetite, but although temperance substantially resides in the sensory 
appetite it requires the ordered cooperation of several habits of the different powers of a 
person.  As a modification of the sensory appetite, temperance has to do with the 
achievement of a consistent and appropriate mode of tendency toward sensible goods.  
Temperance, therefore, requires habituation of the passions.  Temperance has to do not 
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simply with right action toward sensible goods, but especially with right desire toward 
sensible goods.118  Temperance implies not only right outward activity but also right 
feeling.  The virtue of temperance entails that the agent neither overreacts nor 
underreacts to available sensible goods; it entails a proportionate or rightly measured 
reaction to such goods, both in terms of desire and outward action.  But how is this 
proportionate response to be discovered?  Temperance does not consist in eating a set 
amount of food each day, but rather in eating a suitable amount of food, taking into 
consideration the individual and his or her circumstances.  As Aristotle reminds us, the 
temperate amount of food for the wrestler Milo will be excessive for the beginner in 
athletic exercises (1106b4-5).  So something in addition to a well-habituated appetite is 
required for the practice of the virtue of temperance, namely the habituation of intellect 
that makes possible the formal determination of the suitable amount of food for the 
agent.  Furthermore, once the suitable measure is determined by the intellect this 
measure cannot be simply imposed on the sensory appetite directly, except by doing 
violence to the person’s agency.  The link between intellectual determination of the 
suitable measure and the sensory appetite’s right desire for that measure, the link which 
consists in the estimation of the suitable measure as good, must be established through 
habituation of the cogitative estimation.  Temperance, therefore, is already seen to 
require the coordination of habits of sensory appetite, intellect, and cogitative estimation.  
The habit group of temperance is substantially in the power of sensory appetite, formally 
                                                 
118 For the clearest account of the double-barreled habituation of action and passion that is constitutive of 
most of the moral virtues see L.A. Kosman, “Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle’s 
Ethics,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty.   
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in the intellectual power including the power of the cogitative estimation.  We could 
continue the trajectory and show how habituation of the imagination and memory must 
also be integrated into the habit group of temperance. 
 As we have noted, Aquinas says that habits are necessary because “in disposing the 
subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur, 
capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its 
form or to its operation” (1-2.49.4).  Having noted the complexity of the habit group 
required to make temperate action consistent and successful, we are again in a position 
to appreciate the force of this observation.  The person who wishes to act temperately 
but lacks any of the numerous simple habits that coordinate to form the habit group of 
temperance is like the would-be painter who has developed his or her skills of the palette 
without bothering to learn the basic laws of perspective that are required to “see” the 
world in such a way that it can be rendered vividly and effectively.  Such a person is not 
an artist at all, but merely one who may reproduce the work of other artists.   
 The complexity of habit groups is enhanced when we observe that most habit 
groups consist of at least two types of habits, those that could be called mastery habits 
and those that could be called automatism habits.119  Mastery habits are those habits that 
can be acquired and performed only through the exercise of rational consciousness or 
volition.  Habits of intellect (prudence, science, wisdom, understanding) and habits of 
will (justice) are the most obvious mastery habits.  Automatism habits are those of which 
it would make sense to say that they could be acquired or exercised in the absence of 
                                                 
119 Klubertanz, Habits and Virtues, 95. 
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rational consciousness or volition.  Habits of the imagination (including motor habits) 
and cogitative estimation are the most obvious candidates for automatism habits.  To call 
such habits automatism habits is not to say that they require an absence of consciousness 
or volition for their exercise but only that such would be possible.   
 Grasping this distinction enables us to understand two important claims made by 
Aristotle and echoed in a qualified sense by Aquinas.  First, we can see in a different 
light why Aristotle is inclined to say that incontinent action happens contrary to an 
agent’s choice, whereas virtuous action is always the result of choice.  For, although 
temperance requires the conscious exercise of habits of intellect (which need not imply 
deliberation), incontinent action need not.  It is enough for incontinent action that an 
automatism habit disrupt and derail the cooperation and coordination of habits, both 
automatism and mastery, that would be required for the performance of temperate 
actions.  It would not make sense, for Aristotle, to explain an incontinent action with 
respect to sensible goods as the product of coordinated habits of the appetites, cogitative 
estimation, and intellect, for if such coordination were present the action would thereby 
qualify as viciously intemperate.  Incontinent action is, if not directly a result of passion 
(impetuous akrasia), always a result of the absence of coordination between the powers 
of an agent that must enter into the performance of any virtuous action (weak akrasia). 
 Second, the distinction between mastery and automatism habits puts us in a position 
to understand the following analogy, offered by Aristotle and cited by Aquinas, of 
reason’s rule over the sensory powers.   
“The reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and 
concupiscible powers, not, indeed, by a despotic sovereignty, as a slave is moved 
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by his master, but by a royal and politic sovereignty, as free men are ruled by 
their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands.  Hence both 
irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly 
nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times (1-2.9.2).120 
 
Since some habits may function independently of rational consciousness or volition, it 
becomes possible to imagine a situation in which an agent acts voluntarily (and is 
therefore not compelled) but does not act in accordance with his or her rationally 
deliberated desire or volition.  With respect to each action taken singly, the agent is 
always in a position to override automatism habits, but this does violence to agency and 
depletes the limited power of an embodied will.  If the agent relents, the automatism 
habit does not.  It acts “freely” against the orders given by deliberated judgment just as a 
free person can at times act in opposition to the demands of his or her political 
sovereign.   
We find that our sensory powers…act like free men in a democracy; they can be 
“persuaded” but not commanded.  Here will-and-intellect controls the sensory 
appetites only very indirectly, by gradually altering the judgment of the 
discursive [cogitative] estimation and thus modifying the complex image which 
is eliciting the response of the sensory appetites.121  
 
 The non-despotic control of reason over the sensory appetites leads Aristotle to 
emphasize again the way in which actions that flow from automatism habits are 
                                                 
120 Citing Aristotle in Politics 1.2.  This metaphor of the relationship between rational and sensible 
appetites is strikingly confirmed by much contemporary neurological research.  For instance, William 
Irvine, On Desire, 95, states: “We do not have one inner self; we have several, and they are capable of 
making contrary choices…Cases like [those of alien hand syndrome] suggest that our brains have not one 
center of control, not one part that wills, but multiple decision-making centers that independently come to 
decisions about what we should be doing with ourselves.  They are like army generals who each has his 
own idea about what the battle plan should be.  In most armies, a supreme commander listens to his 
generals’ ideas and decides what should be done, thereby coordinating their behavior.  But if a general is 
unable to communicate with the supreme commander, he might initiate a combat action on his own—an 
action that might be at odds with the actions of the other generals and with the battle plan set forth by the 
supreme commander.” 
121 Klubertanz, Habits and Virtues, 108.   
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nevertheless voluntary.  We have direct control only over our immediate actions, but 
because habits of action and passion follow in the wake of the repetition of certain 
actions, we can be held responsible for the actions elicited from these habits.   
Actions and states of character are not voluntary in the same way; for we are 
masters of our actions from the beginning right to the end, if we know the 
particular facts, but though we control the beginning of our states of character the 
gradual progress is not obvious, any more than it is in illnesses; because it was in 
our power, however, to act in this way or not in this way, therefore the states are 
voluntary (1114b30-1115a3). 
 
If we utilize Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s conception of habit to understand the 
phenomenon of addiction, and particularly that of loss of control, we put ourselves in a 
position to understand how it could simultaneously be true that an addict loses direct 
control over his or her choices and yet nevertheless remains in some sense able to 
respond to that loss of direct control.  We put ourselves in a position to understand the 
nature of the addictive paradox.   
 It is the aim of this and the next chapter to demonstrate that addiction should be 
understood as an extreme exemplification of the power that habit may exercise over 
human action.  So powerful is the habit of addiction that we may rightfully say that 
certain addicts have lost immediate control over their own action with respect to the 
addictive object.  The argument will proceed in three stages.  First, I explore what may 
seem to be the most obvious way to give an account of addiction as habit, namely by 
assimilating addiction to intemperance.  I argue that such an assimilation ultimately fails.  
Second, I inquire into the relationship between habits, in particular those habits called 
virtues, and the pursuit of the good life.  I suggest that Aristotle’s account of this 
relationship presupposes a social context in which a set of social roles, practices, and 
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expectations govern and dictate an internal ordering of the virtues, and that the social 
context of contemporary Western culture lacks a similarly ordering set of roles, 
practices, and expectations.  I attempt to show that addiction, because it provides such a 
powerful ordering energy, is a habit that supplies a peculiarly modern lack.  Third, in 
Chapter V, I contend that there is a lacuna in Aristotle’s account of the relationship 
between the virtues and the good life that arises due to Aristotle’s failure to demonstrate 
how practical reason and the exercise of moral virtue is to be integrated with the more 
transcendent possibilities of human life, especially the possibility of theoria, the life of 
contemplation.  I argue that the theological ethics of Thomas Aquinas removes this 
lacuna by postulating the theological virtues, especially the theological virtue of charity, 
and I propose that, understood as an analogue to the theological virtue of charity, 
addiction is a habit that fulfills with stunning, although ultimately disastrous, efficacy 
this want for an integration of the practical and transcendent possibilities in human life.  
Addiction, therefore, can be illuminated by being analyzed as a kind of analogue to the 
virtue-habit of charity.  
 
Addiction and Intemperance 
The question I would like to address in this section is whether or not addiction can 
be adequately understood as a failure of the virtue of temperance, particularly as an 
expression of the vice of intemperance.  What is temperance?  “Temperance,” Aristotle 
tells us, “is a mean with regard to pleasures” (1117b24).  Temperance is not concerned 
with pleasure in general, but rather with pleasures of the body.  Those who take 
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excessive delight in pleasures of the soul, “such as love of honour and love of learning,” 
are neither called intemperate nor self-indulgent (1117b27-32).  Furthermore, 
temperance is not concerned with every pleasure of the body, but only with some.  “For 
those who delight in objects of vision, such as colours and shapes and painting, are 
called neither temperate nor self-indulgent,” even though it is possible to delight in these 
things to an excessive or deficient degree (1118a3-7).  Temperance is finally concerned 
with the pleasures that human beings share in with animals, namely those of touch and 
taste, but it is especially concerned with these pleasures as they are enjoyed “in the case 
of food and in that of drink and in that of sexual intercourse” (1118a31-33). 
 Temperance is, therefore, the virtue that enables a person to achieve proportionate 
desire and activity with respect to food, drink—particularly intoxicants—and sex.  As 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the virtue of temperance resides substantially 
in the concupiscible sense appetite and formally in the intellectual power.  Temperance 
is a virtue necessary for the good life because the sensible appetite is not in itself 
rational.  But insofar as human persons are rational creatures and the good life is a life in 
accordance with reason, the sensible appetites must be made to conform with reason.  
Aquinas explains: “Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those 
pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason.  From such 
pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to 
reason” (2-2.141.1).  Temperance names the virtue that achieves this conforming of 
sense appetite to reason.   
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There are three species of temperance, which correspond to the three objects of 
temperance: food, intoxicating drink, and sex.  Abstinence is the name of the specific 
virtue of temperance that denotes right moderation with respect to food; sobriety with 
respect to intoxicating drink; and chastity with respect to sex.  A person can lack these 
virtues by either excessively or deficiently desiring and pursuing each of these sensible 
goods.  Both extremes count as vice, although deficient desire with respect to any of 
these sensible goods is sufficiently rare that it does not bear a recognizable name.  
Aristotle says that the person who deficiently desires and pursues food, drink, or sex is 
“insensible.”122  Frigidity about sex would probably represent the most common form of 
insensibility.  But, as Aristotle says, “people who fall short with regard to pleasures and 
delight in them less than they should are hardly found; for such insensibility is not 
human” (1119a5-7).  The extreme of excess is the commoner vice, so common indeed 
that it has an accepted name with respect to each of the objects of sensory desire.  
Excessive desire and pursuit of food is called gluttony; of intoxicating drink, 
drunkenness, and of sex, lust.   
Interestingly, although intemperance is a violation of reason, its possibility depends 
on reason.  Animals, for Aristotle and Aquinas, are not capable of intemperance.  A 
simple argument is sufficient to establish this point: if intemperance names the pursuit of 
pleasurable goods beyond the bounds ordained by reason, then only a creature that could 
establish such bounds by the exercise of reason would stand in a position to exceed those 
                                                 
122 According to Aquinas, “If a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting nature 
grievously, he would not be free from sin” (2-2.150.1).  Professor Stanley Hauerwas has mentioned to me 
on this point the saying of the rabbis that God will not hold him guiltless who has not enjoyed every 
legitimate pleasure. 
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bounds.  Aquinas, drawing on Aristotle, develops this point by distinguishing between 
what he calls natural concupiscence and cupidity.   
Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways.  First, because it is suitable to the nature 
of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such 
pleasurable things is said to be natural.—Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because 
it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends something as 
good and suitable, and consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of 
such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont to be called 
cupidity (1-2.30.3).123 
    It does not happen very often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for 
nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring 
this…There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and these 
are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity (2-2.142.2). 
 
Reason is, therefore, not only that which can make a person temperate.  Reason is also 
that which may make a person intemperate.  
 We are now in a position to narrow our scope of inquiry.  If addiction is to be 
assimilated to the vice of intemperance, it will most likely be in virtue of a substantial 
correlation between addiction and the vice of drunkenness.  The vice of drunkenness can 
be understood as habitually excessive desire and pursuit of the sensible pleasures 
associated with intoxicants, which pleasures are overvalued as being suitable to the good 
life.  For addiction to fit this bill, we should be able to describe addiction as habitually 
excessive desire and pursuit of the sensible pleasures associated with certain objects, 
which pleasures are overvalued as being suitable to the good life.  Does this description 
do justice to the phenomenon of addiction? 
 In pursuing this question we must recognize the extreme contestability of every 
available response.  For at the heart of this question is a question about the conceptual 
                                                 
123 Natural concupiscence, Aquinas tells us, may also be referred to as common, necessary, or rational 
concupiscence, and cupidity as peculiar, acquired, or irrational concupiscence. 
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status of “addiction.”  The central question can be put as follows: is “addiction” a natural 
kind or a historico-cultural construction?  Put differently, did the advent of the 
contemporary use of the word “addiction” merely give full expression to a type of 
experience that had always been or did it rather construct and elicit a type of experience 
previously nonexistent?  Of course, underlying this way of putting the question is a 
fundamental set of questions about the nature of reality and our ways of knowing reality, 
and there is no reason to expect that we shall be able to give an answer to the first 
question that is any more definite than answers we might give to this more fundamental 
set of questions.  Nevertheless, before moving toward a comparison between the vice of 
drunkenness and the habit of addiction, we must try to orient ourselves with respect to 
this important genealogical question. 
 The word “addiction” is an old English word, rooted in Roman law, denoting “a 
formal giving over or delivery by sentence of court.  Hence, a surrender, or dedication, 
of any one to a master.”  Although purely passive in its legal usage, the word came also 
to denote “the state of being (self-) addicted or given to a habit or pursuit; devotion.”124 
In the 1611 Authorized Version (King James Version) of the Bible, we read that the 
members of the house of Stephanus “have addicted themselves to the ministry of the 
saints” (2 Cor. 16.15).  In that time, there seemed to be few limitations on what persons 
might be addicted to.  We are told of peoples’ “addiction to hearing” (1641); of a man’s 
                                                 
124 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
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“own proper Industry and Addiction to Books” (1675); of “their addiction to agricultural 
pursuits” (1858); as well as of “his addiction to tobacco” (1779).125   
In the colonial period, drunkards were occasionally described as addicted to 
drunkenness or intemperance, but it was drunkenness generally, and not the addiction to 
it, that was considered problematic.126  Although politicians and clergymen alike decried 
the earthly and eternal suffering to which drunkards were subject, the label of addiction 
to drunkenness did not pick out any inner experience or condition of the drunkard that 
was distinct from that experienced by anyone else who was “addicted” to various 
pursuits.  Notably absent from attributions of addiction, which were not in any case 
particularly common, was any notion that the drunkard was one who had lost control 
over his or her decisions to drink liquor.   
 The contemporary concept of addiction was developed and refined in the crucible of 
the 19th century Temperance Movement.  In the face of increased social stigma 
surrounding drunkenness and the corresponding social pressure to abstain from alcohol, 
a number of Americans began to report that they experienced overwhelming desires for 
liquor.  The modern conception of addiction was worked out as a response both to these 
                                                 
125 Ibid. 
126 Levine, “The Discovery of Addiction,” 146.  Levine’s article is the seminal text for the comparatively 
tiny segment of addiction studies that seeks to historically problematize the regnant paradigm of addiction 
research.  Most addiction experts see this as the text that must be rebutted and overcome in order to 
prevent the relativizing of the concept of addiction that they see as endemic to any genealogical inquiry 
into addiction.  It is rarely noted, however, that Levine claims to have located the “discovery” and not the 
“invention” of the contemporary addiction concept.  On the whole, Levine tries to balance historical 
constructivism and realism.  For a defense of Levine along these lines, see Peter Ferentzy, “From Sin to 
Disease: Differences and Similarities Between Past and Current Conceptions of Chronic Drunkenness,” 
Contemporary Drug Problems 28 (2001): 363-389.  For a fair critique of Levine see Jessica Warner, 
“Resolv’d to Drink No More: Addiction as a Preindustrial Construct,” Journal of Studies on Alcohol 55 
(1994): 685-691. 
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testimonies and to the exigencies of the burgeoning Temperance Movement.127  By and 
large, physicians carried out the development, and it is in the work of Dr. Benjamin 
Rush that we find the first clear expression of what might be considered the modern 
addiction concept.  Rush’s early 19th century contribution to the debate surrounding 
drunkenness was fourfold.128  First, he located the source of addiction in alcohol itself.  
Second, he described the addicted drunkard’s condition as one of loss of control over 
drinking behavior.  Third, he diagnosed addiction to drink as a disease, a claim that 
would be practically canonized 150 years later by E.M. Jellinek’s The Disease Concept 
of Alcoholism (1960).  And fourth, he claimed that total abstinence from drink was the 
only viable cure for the disease.  With the exception of the first claim, which has been 
replaced by the assertion that the source of addiction lies within the addicted person him- 
or herself (whether because of personality tendencies, environmental risk factors, or 
genetic predispositions), Rush’s elucidation of alcohol addiction has been affirmed and 
extended to cover an ever-growing catalogue of addictions over the course of the 
ensuing 200 years.   
The transformation of the concept of addiction that took place within the wider 
Temperance Movement and under the leadership of Benjamin Rush has been well 
summarized by Harry Levine. 
                                                 
127 As has been amply noted, the Temperance Movement was wrongly named.  Temperance, or 
moderation with respect to alcohol, in fact, was not only not the aim of the Movement but was attacked by 
the Movement as the inevitable gateway to drunkenness.  One Good Templar tract, for example, 
astonishingly asserted, “And if there be any difference in the degrees of guilt between moderate drinkers 
and drunkards, the moderate drinker is worse than the drunkard,” quoted in Levine, “The Discovery of 
Addiction,” 159. 
128 Benjamin Rush, “An Inquiry Into the Effects of Ardent Spirits Upon the Human Body and Mind with 
an Account of the Means of Preventing and of the Remedies for Curing Them,” reprinted in Quarterly 
Journal of Studies on Alcohol 4 (1943-1944): 325-341.   
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What was new in the 19th century was the legitimacy of a particular way of 
interpreting the experience and behavior of drunkards.  In colonial society there 
may have been isolated individuals who felt “overwhelmed” by their desires for 
drink, but there was no socially legitimate vocabulary for organizing the 
experience and for talking about it; it remained an inchoate and extremely private 
experience.  In the 19th century the drunkard’s experience was so familiar it 
became stereotyped.129 
 
 What are we to make of the results of this cursory genealogical inquiry into the 
concept of addiction?130  Three conclusions seem to me to be justified.  First, alcoholic 
drinking patterns are probably as old as alcohol itself.  Although the way in which 
alcoholics can conceive and represent their experience depends to a significant degree on 
the language available to them, there is little reason to think that, in colonial America for 
example, habitual drunkards were much less bound by their habit or any more hopeful of 
reform.  The great Puritan preacher, Increase Mather, was familiar enough with the 
actual conditions of the inveterate drunkard to call habitual drunkenness “a Sin that is 
rarely truly repented of, and turned from.”131  Second, there is reason to expect that the 
prevalence of such patterns might vary widely depending on a vast number of factors 
that we might call “culture.”  This fact has been firmly established by inquiries into the 
sociology of addiction,132 and so it should be expected to find similar variations across 
                                                 
129 Levine, “The Discovery of Addiction,” 154 n.12.   
130 For further genealogical ventures, see especially Christopher Cook, Alcohol, Addiction, and Christian 
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 5; Peter Ferentzy, “Foucault and Addiction,” 
Telos 125 (2002): 167-192; Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American 
Temperance Movement, 2d. ed. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Stanton Peele, The Diseasing 
of America: How We Allowed Recovery Zealots and the Treatment Industry to Convince Us We Are Out of 
Control (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1989), ch. 2; David Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social 
Order and Disorder in the New Republic, Revised ed. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2002); and Mariana 
Valverde, Diseases of the Will.  
131 Quoted in Levine, “The Discovery of Addiction,” 148. 
132 The remarkable divergence among the alcoholism rates of various ethnicities has been widely 
documented.  For example, there is a high rate of alcoholism among Irish and a low rate among Jews.  For 
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time.  Indeed, one of the central arguments of this and the next chapter is that the 
prevalence and acuteness of addiction in the contemporary context has to do in large part 
with the radical distance between modern Western culture and the cultural milieu that 
informs the moral philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas.  Third and finally, the question 
of whether and to what extent addictive experience is constructed historically cannot be 
separated from a philosophical inquiry into the character of such experience as currently 
undergone and represented.  As the enormous influence of the work of Benjamin Rush 
makes clear, ideas matter, and the attempt to clarify the conditions of possibility of 
certain kinds of experience may itself become a factor in the subtle transformation of 
how those kinds of experiences are had and interpreted.  We inherit concepts from an 
array of traditions that are by no means in mutual harmony, and it is part of the work of 
philosophy to subject our descriptions of the world we indwell to the rigor of analysis in 
order to see in what ways our tangled inheritance leads us to sometimes rightly describe 
and other times misdescribe the character of our lives and the reality we inhabit.  There 
is therefore as little reason to insist on the absolute universality and rigidity of certain 
types of experience as there is to insist on their limitless relativity and malleability.   
 We return, then, to the question of whether addiction as currently experienced can 
be assimilated to the vice of intemperance.  I submit that it cannot.  Intemperance is the 
state of character according to which an agent inordinately loves the object of his or her 
desire whereas addiction is the state of character according to which an agent may come, 
paradoxically, to dislike or even hate the object of his or her desire yet nevertheless 
                                                                                                                                                
helpful summary of much of the sociological data and an attempt to enter the debate provoked by such 
data, see Goodwin, Alcoholism, ch. 13.  
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persist in pursuit of it.  There is a deep ambivalence in the affections of the addict about 
his or her object of desire, an ambivalence that does not seem typical of intemperance.133  
We can characterize this difference by utilizing the language of first- and second-order 
desires made prominent by the work of Harry Frankfurt.  First-order desires “are simply 
desires to do or not to do one thing or another.”  Second-order desires have to do with 
wanting “to have or not to have a certain desire of the first order.”134  The intemperate 
person is one whose first- and second-order desires correspond: the intemperate person 
desires the pleasure of sensible goods and approves of the desire, i.e. desires to so desire.  
There may come a time at which a conflict emerges between the two levels of desire in a 
formerly intemperate person.  The person may continue to desire the pleasure of certain 
sensible goods, but wish that he or she did not so desire.  Such an agent would be 
considered either continent or incontinent depending on his or her response to this 
conflict.  The conflict between first- and second-order desire is also prevalent among 
those who are in the grips of addiction, although this conflict may not be forthcoming 
until the agent acknowledges the peril of his or her situation.  But what seems unique to 
the case of addiction is that, in addition to the conflict between first- and second-order 
desires, many addicts experience an intense conflict at the level of first-order desire.  At 
the level of first-order desire, the addict may simultaneously desire and detest the object 
of addiction, while also having second-order desires not to desire the object of addiction.  
In Chapter II, we witnessed the testimony of one alcoholic who found herself in just 
such a situation, and struggled to describe the confounding nature of her experience.   
                                                 
133 Jon Elster claims that “ambivalence is a hallmark of serious addiction in humans,” Strong Feelings, 74. 
134 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 323-324. 
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I knew I would start working on the half gallon again, despite the fact that I was 
still very ill from the night before.  I also knew that I did not want to drink.  
Sitting on that sofa, I realized that the old “I could stop if I wanted to, I just don’t 
want to” didn’t apply here, because I did not want to drink.  I watched myself get 
up off the sofa and pour myself a drink (AA 324). 
 
Similar reports are common in the memoirs of other addicts.  These testimonies cut to 
the core of the experience of addiction.  They could not be made by intemperate drinkers 
who simply love drink too much.  These sorts of statements can only begin to be made 
intelligible once we have recognized the fact that incontinent addicts are persons 
characterized both by conflicts between first- and second-order desires and by conflicts 
at the level of first-order desire.  The phenomenon of the “divided will” that is at its most 
severe in these sorts of reports is made possible by the addict’s identification of his or 
her second-order desires not to desire to drink with his or her first-order desires not to 
drink.  As Frankfurt explains, 
The unwilling [incontinent] addict identifies himself…through the formation of a 
second-order volition, with one rather than with the other of his conflicting first-
order desires.  He makes one of them more truly his own and, in so doing, he 
withdraws himself from the other.  It is in virtue of this identification and 
withdrawal, accomplished through the formation of a second-order volition, that 
the unwilling addict may meaningfully make the analytically puzzling statements 
that the force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own, and that 
it is not of his own free will but rather against his will that this force moves him 
to take it.135 
 
 How is it possible for a person to simultaneously desire and detest one and the same 
object?  Offering a response to this question will enable us to see from a different angle 
the difference between intemperance and addiction.  Aquinas says: “The appetite is 
twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective which is called the will, the object of 
                                                 
135 Ibid., 329. 
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each is the good, but in different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good 
apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite or will is good 
under the universal aspect of good, according as it can be apprehended by the intellect” 
(1.80.2).  We recall that intemperance is a habit substantially of the sensitive appetite.  
Therefore, if addiction is to be successfully assimilated to the habit of intemperance, we 
should find that it has primarily to do with an inordinate desire for certain sensory 
pleasures associated with addictive objects.  But, although many addictions find their 
infancies in the enjoyment of sensory pleasures associated with the addictive object, 
advanced addiction is rarely concerned with sense pleasures.   
A group of colleagues had piled into a car to drive somewhere for lunch.  I was 
last and sat squeezed in among several others on the back seat.  An acquaintance 
had lit a cigarette which was beginning to upset my stomach.  I started to ask him 
to roll down the window.  But he immediately opened it and threw out the 
cigarette.  I said something like, “I’m sorry to spoil your pleasure.”  He replied 
decisively, “It’s not pleasure, it’s smoking.”136 
 
Certainly drinking was no longer fun.  It had long ago ceased to be fun.  A few 
glasses of wine with a friend after work could still feel reassuring and familiar, 
but drinking was so need driven by the end, so visceral and compulsive, that the 
pleasure was almost accidental.  Pleasure just wasn’t the point.137 
 
When we listen to accounts of addicts, it seems much more likely that the goods 
they pursue through the practice of their addictions are better understood as “objects of 
the intellective appetite or will,” goods “under the universal aspect of good.”  Nowhere 
is this claim more indisputably evident than in the frequent testimonies of addicts who 
formed an addiction, not through the gateway of sensory pleasure, but in fact in spite of 
the manifest sensory misery occasioned by their earliest acquaintance with the addictive 
                                                 
136 Wilshire, Wild Hunger, 145. 
137 Knapp, Drinking, 210. 
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object.  Listen to the following testimonies of three addicts, which can only sound 
grotesquely bizarre to those who have not experienced the power of major addiction. 
I don’t remember how many drinks I had, and my recollections of the actual 
events of the rest of the night are fuzzy, but I do remember this much: When I 
was drinking, I was okay.  I understood.  Everything made sense.  I could dance, 
talk, and enjoy being in my own skin.  It was as if I had been an unfinished 
jigsaw puzzle with one piece missing; as soon as I took a drink, the last piece 
instantly and effortlessly snapped into place…The insanity of the disease had 
already manifested itself.  I recall thinking, as I knelt retching in the stall, that 
this was fantastic.  Life was great; I had finally found the answer—alcohol! (AA 
320). 
 
Everything changed with my first drink at the age of sixteen.  All the fear, 
shyness, and disease evaporated with the first burning swallow of bourbon 
straight from the bottle during a liquor cabinet raid at a slumber party.  I got 
drunk, blacked out, threw up, had dry heaves, and was sick to death the next day, 
and I knew I would do it again.  For the first time, I felt part of a group without 
having to be perfect to get approval (AA 328). 
 
I took to dope from the start, but many people who later become junkies will tell 
you that the first time, or two times, or even every time they got high, they threw 
up.  Would you order an entrée again if you threw up the first time you ate it?  
Would you go out on cold nights to dubious streets to buy it?  Risk arrest?138 
 
Loss of memory, black outs, throwing up, dry heaves, and being deathly ill are not 
normally considered sensory pleasures, and certainly not pleasures of taste and touch.  
But neither is understanding, the ability to communicate, being at ease with oneself, 
being unafraid, and being part of a community.  These latter would seem more like 
objects of the intellective rather than the sensitive appetite.  Serious addiction, therefore, 
simply does not fit the bill of intemperance, which has to do with the pursuit of sensory 
pleasures of taste and touch.  Put simply, intemperance may be understood as a form of 
                                                 
138 Ann Marlowe, How To Stop Time: Heroin from A to Z (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 145 
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hedonism, whereas addiction cannot.  On the contrary, the life of the addict would seem 
appalling to one who was set on maximizing immediate sensory gratification.139   
 It is because addiction is not concerned with sensory pleasures, but rather with 
intellective goods, that the addict may form contradictory first-order desires with respect 
to his or her object of addiction.  The contradiction is made possible by the abstract 
nature of intellective goods.  The alcoholic can think of a beer as good in one way, bad 
in another: good for drowning loneliness, good for summoning courage, and so on; bad 
for spiritual well-being, bad for relationship to spouse, and so on.  But the intemperate 
drinker thinks of a beer only in terms of pleasure, which, as a concrete good, is not 
susceptible to contrary interpretations.  The beer is a source of sensory pleasure, plain 
and simple, and although at the level of second-order desire the intemperate drinker may 
wish he or she was not the kind of person that ranked sensory pleasure over, say, the 
good of sober conversation, the conflict is only between first- and second-order desires 
and not between competing first-order desires.  In fact, if a person, formerly intemperate, 
were to find him- or herself experiencing a conflict at the level of first-order desire, this 
would signal that the object of desire had taken on a significance beyond the realm of 
sensory pleasure.  The person may be addicted.140 
 There are other important dissimilarities between addiction and intemperance, but 
we might note here one more stark difference having to do with the role played by 
                                                 
139 Interestingly, the experienced intemperate drinker will moderate his or her alcohol consumption, 
although the “mean” he or she seeks is one determined by a kind of sensory pleasure calculus rather than, 
as in the case of a temperate drinker, reason.  This is because the effects of alcohol on mood follow a 
roller-coaster pattern.  “Anxiety and depression occur not only with hangovers but intermittently during 
the drinking period itself, if the drinking is heavy and continuous,” Goodwin, Alcoholism, 38. 
140 Of course, there are sources other than addiction for this conflict at the level of first-order desires.  My 
point is that intemperance, because it is the pursuit of concrete, sensory goods, is not such a source. 
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shame and guilt in addiction as compared to intemperance.  Aquinas counts 
“shamefacedness” as one of the two integral “secondary virtues” or sub-virtues of the 
virtue of temperance, along with honestas, a sense of moral beauty or decorum the 
violation of which provokes the response of shamefacedness (2-2.143.1).  
Shamefacedness “is the fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful” (2-
2.144.1).  Aquinas believes that intemperance will be held in check exactly to the extent 
than an agent feels ashamed of his or her intemperate behavior.  There is, then, an 
inverse relationship between shame and intemperance: the more pronounced the 
experience of shame, the less pronounced the temptation to intemperate action.  But, in 
the case of addiction, we see precisely the opposite relationship between shame and the 
behavior that provokes it.  For addicts, shame is not a check on addictive behavior but 
rather an impetus to it.  Describing the self-defeating character of an addict’s shame and 
guilt, William Cope Moyers writes:  
Shame and guilt grew.  My self-esteem disappeared.  Cocaine and beer tempered 
these emotions.  I began feeling shame.  I had no self-esteem…I turned to the 
only help I thought there was—beer and cocaine.141  
 
Because, unlike in the case of intemperance, the pain and dissatisfaction underlying 
addictive behavior is greater than the pain provoked by shame and guilt, rather than 
counteracting the original addictive response to pain, the pain of shame and guilt merely 
compounds that original pain.  William Pryor explains: 
It is progressive because addiction feeds on itself, because the precursor pain has 
been subsumed into the pain of addiction, and the greater that pain, the greater 
the quantity of stuff needs to be taken, causing greater pain.142 
                                                 
141 Moyers, Broken, 147. 
142 Pryor, Survival of the Coolest, 213. 
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The more an addict uses, the more shame and guilt he or she feels.  The original pain is 
compounded by pain of shame and guilt, and the addict uses more to numb him- or 
herself to the pain. 
If addiction is not to be assimilated to the vice of intemperance, this is because 
addiction does not seem to be essentially concerned with those goods with which the 
virtue of temperance is concerned, nor is it a response to the same kind of dissatisfaction 
that motivates intemperate action.  But the testimonies of addicts make plain that 
addiction is powerfully rooted in the pursuit of certain goods, goods that appear to 
addicts to be uniquely accessible through the practice of their addiction.  Addictions are 
like virtues and vices in this respect, since virtues and vices are habits that empower 
persons to pursue consistently, successfully, and with ease various moral and intellectual 
goods.  Put simply, virtues and vices are those habits through the practice of which 
human beings aim at the good life, the life of happiness, or, in Aristotle’s terminology, 
the life of eudaimonia.  Vices differ from virtues not in light of the subjective role they 
play in the lives of moral agents but simply in light of whether or not they enable a 
person to achieve a life of genuine eudaimonia.  In other words, the virtuous person 
differs from the vicious person, not because one aims at eudaimonia and the other does 
not, but because one in fact advances into the life of eudaimonia and the other does not.  
As Aquinas helpfully puts it, vicious persons are those who “turn from that in which 
their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end, 
which intention they mistakenly seek in other things” (1-2.1.7).  Wherever we have 
habits of passion and action that connect with an agent’s intention of the good life for 
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human beings, therefore, we are in the realm of the habits of virtue and vice.  And, as the 
excerpts above make patently clear, addictions are the locus of just such a connection.  It 
therefore behooves us, as we try to articulate the type of habit (and habit group) that 
addiction is, to inquire more carefully into the connection between habits of virtue and 
the good life for human beings. 
 
Aristotle on Habit and Happiness 
 According to Aristotle, “human good turns out to be an activity of soul in 
accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best 
and most complete” (1098a17-19).  Again, Aristotle says that “happiness 
[eudaimonia]143 is an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue” (1102a5-6).  
Given these claims, one would expect to learn from the Nicomachean Ethics just what 
this “perfect” and “best and most complete” virtue is, but an incontrovertible answer is 
not forthcoming.   
The issue of Aristotle’s answer to this question has been one of the most prominent 
in Aristotle scholarship.  The debate takes off from the fact that Aristotle seems to assert 
two quite different answers to the question, answers that seem to be mutually 
contradictory.  For most of the Ethics, Aristotle seems to be developing an account 
according to which the good life for human beings has to do with good action—i.e., the 
right practice of practical reasoning—but in Book 10 purely contemplative activity is 
                                                 
143 Much has been written on how eudaimonia should be translated.  Ross’s translation, “happiness,” is 
probably not the best because it could be associated with a kind of “whatever makes you happy” mentality, 
which was certainly not Aristotle’s view.  Aristotle thought you might be enjoying yourself and yet failing 
to grow in eudaimonia.  It is probably better translated by “the worthwhile life,” “the life of flourishing,” 
“the best possible life,” etc., but I use these as well as “happiness” interchangeably. 
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said to constitute the pinnacle of eudaimonia.  Although it is not clear from Book 10 
that, more than being simply the crowning achievement of a life of eudaimonia, the life 
of contemplation exhausts the fullness of eudaimonia, a number of scholars have 
suggested that just such a claim is being made in a lesser known passage from the 
Eudemian Ethics, in which, it is claimed, Aristotle says that all other virtue is merely 
instrumental to and in no way constitutive of the life of eudaimonia. 
Therefore whatever mode of choosing and of acquiring things good by nature—
whether goods of body or wealth or friends or the other goods—will best 
promote the contemplation of God, that is the best mode, and that standard is the 
finest; and any mode of choice and acquisition that either through deficiency or 
excess hinders us from serving and from contemplating God—that is a bad one.  
This is how it is for the soul, and this is the soul’s best standard—to be as far as 
possible unconscious of the irrational part of the soul, as such.144 
 
On the other hand, and in seeming antithesis to this passage, Aristotle elsewhere speaks 
as though the moral virtues, with which he is so deeply concerned throughout the first 
nine books of the Nicomachean Ethics, are partially constitutive of, and not merely 
instrumental to, the life of eudaimonia.    
Now such a thing happiness [eudaimonia], above all else, is held to be; for this 
we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honour, 
pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if 
nothing resulted from them we should still choose them), but we choose them 
                                                 
144 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, in Aristotle: Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, 
Virtues and Vices (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1980), 1249b17-14.  J.L. Ackrill, in 
“Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty, 30, rightly notes that in 
this passage, Aristotle is not addressing himself to the question of what makes virtues and actions good but 
rather by what standard we decide what “things” are good.  The passage is, according to Ackrill, therefore 
not in contradiction with what he takes to be Aristotle’s considered position that both theoria and the 
practice of the moral virtues are intrinsically good, ends in themselves.  It seems to me, then, that this 
passage from the Eudemian Ethics is best understood as an elaboration of Aristotle’s claim in the 
Nicomachean Ethics that “he is happy who is active in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently 
equipped with external goods” (1101a14-16).  The passage from the Eudemian Ethics is about how we 
determine the “sufficiency” of external goods and not about how we determine whether and how some 
virtue is a component of “complete virtue.”   
 138 
also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy 
(1097a37-1097b5). 
 
J.L. Ackrill contends that this passage contradicts the standard reading of the passage 
from the Eudemian Ethics.  “That the primary ingredients of eudaimonia are for the sake 
of eudaimonia is not incompatible with there being ends in themselves; for eudaimonia 
is constituted by activities that are ends in themselves.”145  Not only are the moral virtues 
here spoken of as both goods in themselves and constitutive of happiness, but the life of 
contemplation, theoria, is not even mentioned!  It is not obvious to me that the two 
passages contradict, but scholars tend to read the first passage as implying that the goods 
pursued by those “modes of choosing” that are most instrumental to the practice of 
theoria are thereby merely instrumental goods.  In any event, we do seem to have in 
these two passages two quite different pictures of what constitutes the good life for 
human beings.  The first has been termed a “dominant view,” according to which there is 
a monolithic end—theoria—an end consisting of just one type of activity, and it is the 
practice of this one activity that is constitutive of the life of eudaimonia.  The second has 
been called an “inclusive view,” according to which there are not one but several 
activities—practice of the moral virtues as well as theoria—that are constitutive of the 
life of eudaimonia.146 
 Whatever we are to make of this debate, we can distill from it two important 
questions which, although they are inextricably interrelated, can be treated separately.  
The first question: If, as J.L. Ackrill contends, the moral virtues are in some way 
                                                 
145 Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” 19. 
146 See Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” 17, for this characterization of the competing positions.  As 
Ackrill acknowledges, each of these “views” is susceptible to considerable qualification and nuance. 
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constitutive of the life of eudaimonia, how are they to be internally ordered? This 
question will drive the remainder of the present chapter.  The second question: If theoria 
is a component of the life of eudaimonia, how is this more transcendent aspect of the 
good life to be integrated with the practical exercise of the moral virtues?  This question 
will be addressed in Chapter V. 
If the moral virtues are in some way constitutive of the life of eudaimonia, how are 
they to be internally ordered? Although this question is intensified by the further 
question of how the moral virtues are to be ordered toward and integrated with the life of 
theoria, the question stands on its own apart from the introduction of the problem of 
theoria.  In fact, modern commentators who are not particularly interested in the 
detached, cerebral existence that they see in Aristotle’s account of the life of 
contemplation claim that, even without the further complications introduced by the 
recommendation of theoria, Aristotle fails to address the basic question of how the 
virtues are to be internally ordered in the practical pursuit of eudaimonia.   
There seem to be two ways in which this failure can be viewed.  On the one hand, 
some modern commentators think that, since he recommends the life of eudaimonia, 
Aristotle owes us a principle or rule according to which we could rank various 
candidates for the good life and by which we could determine in any given situation 
which of the moral virtues is to have precedence over the others.  Such a principle or 
rule would be needed, the critique runs, to enable us to decide, e.g., which between the 
life of the statesmen and the life of the philosopher, both vocations that Aristotle 
commends in Book 10, is really the supremely good life for a human being.  On the 
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other hand, some modern commentators locate Aristotle’s error, not in his failure to 
provide a principle or rule by which we could discover the good life for human beings, 
but rather in his seemingly naïve supposition that there could even be such a thing as the 
supreme good.  Thus, for instance, John Rawls argues that “human good is 
heterogeneous because the aims of the self are heterogeneous,” and that therefore the 
idea that our lives should be ordered with reference to something called the good is a 
fiction.147 
Alasdair MacIntyre, however, suspects that both of these criticisms tell us more 
about the state of modern moral philosophy than about any oversight or confusion on the 
part of Aristotle.  MacIntyre provides a different explanation of Aristotle’s apparent 
omission of any explicit account of how the moral virtues should be internally ordered.  
According to MacIntyre, Aristotle does not provide an explicit answer to the question of 
the appropriate ordering of goods and virtues within a scheme of life, not because he was 
at a loss about how to do so, but simply because he was operating in a context in which 
the right ordering of goods and virtues was already assumed and displayed, namely the 
Greek polis.  MacIntyre suggests that Aristotle does not respond to the question of what 
principle or rule should order the virtues because the question itself is a modern question 
and one that would have seemed strange to Aristotle.  The question assumes that 
Aristotle writes from a neutral position, confronting a wide array of ways of life from a 
standpoint external to them all.  Given this assumption, Aristotle appears to suffer from 
the same problem that confronts those who write modern moral philosophy, namely the 
                                                 
147 Quoted in Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988), 337.
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apparent absence of any uniquely rational way of ordering goods within a scheme of life.  
But, MacIntyre argues, such a neutral position would have seemed absurd to Aristotle, 
because Aristotle is operating in a social context in which the variety of social roles and 
ways of life available to an agent are quite circumscribed.  The political life of the Greek 
city-state is tightly ordered around a shared conception of what such a political 
community must achieve in order to make accessible to its citizens the goods 
constitutive of a worthwhile way of life.  And the polis is organized in such a way that 
these goods and the right ordering of them can be attained and achieved by excellence 
within a number of specific social roles and ways of life.  Given a person’s age, social 
class, educational background, and such, there is widespread and collective agreement 
on the social role that a person should be pursuing or fulfilling, whether that be the life 
of artisan, military serviceman, statesman, or philosopher.  The citizens can recognize 
failure or success both at the level of political arrangement and at the level of individual 
endeavor because they share a substantive conception of what sorts of practices and 
relationships are necessarily constitutive of such a worthwhile life. The ethical 
investigations that Aristotle carries out in the Nicomachean and Eudemian ethics take as 
their starting point this shared conception, attempting not to establish from scratch a 
standard or principle of ordering that could radically question and reform this shared 
conception, but rather seeking to unearth and state the philosophical assumptions about 
the nature of the good and the life suitable to human beings that this shared conception 
already concretely embodies.  Thus, for instance, when Aristotle frequently poses the 
question in the Nicomachean Ethics, “What do we say on such a topic?” he is not 
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invoking the royal we as a polite form of rhetoric, as in all likelihood it can only be 
invoked in this dissertation.  Rather, Aristotle asks, “What do we say?” instead of “What 
do I say?” because he  
takes himself not to be inventing an account of the virtues, but to be articulating 
an account that is implicit in the thought, utterance and action of an educated 
Athenian.  He seeks to be the rational voice of the best citizens of the best city-
state; for he holds that the city-state is the unique political form in which alone 
the virtues of human life can be genuinely and fully exhibited.  Thus a 
philosophical theory of the virtues is a theory whose subject-matter is that pre-
philosophical theory already implicit in and presupposed by the best 
contemporary practice of the virtues.148 
 
If, as MacIntyre contends, one of the characteristics of modernity is the absence of 
any necessary social context in which human beings already find themselves partaking 
of a shared way of life and a set of social roles configured around a relatively shared 
account of the life of eudaimonia, then the question of the right ordering of the activities 
and other goods of life is a question that becomes explicit and intensified mainly in the 
modern context.  Just to the extent that modern persons see themselves as moral agents 
confronting a variety of mutually exclusive yet incommensurable ways of life, we should 
expect the crisis of right ordering of the good life to become more urgent and sharpened.  
We should expect, that is, that modern persons will be strongly drawn to the sorts of 
habits that impose an order on their own lives and enable them to achieve a certain rank-
ordering of the goods of their lives.149 
                                                 
148 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
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149 If, as I will argue, the lure of addiction increases to the extent that we lack other intelligible means of 
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there is the greatest discrepancy between traditional ways of conceiving and ordering life and the 
contemporary possibilities open to those cultures or sub-cultures.  Thus, we should not be surprised to find 
that, in America, e.g., addiction is disproportionately prevalent on Indian reservations where few of the 
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Modern Addiction 
 Let us now direct the focus of this inquiry into the connection between the virtues 
and the life of eudaimonia back onto the matter of addiction.  The thesis that I would 
like to defend is that addiction can be made more intelligible against the backdrop 
provided by this exploration of the relationship between the good life and the virtues in 
Aristotle and of the strangeness of his account from the modern point of view.  Gerald 
May, in his fine book, Addiction and Grace, makes the bold claim that “major addiction 
is the sacred disease of our time.”150  Excepting the language of “disease,” and putting 
off until the next chapter the “sacred” dimension of addiction, I think May is profoundly 
right, although he arrives at his conclusion on very different grounds than those that I am 
working from.  Major addiction, I would say, is the definitive habit of our time.   
What is the relationship between addiction and “the modern”?  I want to suggest 
that addiction in its contemporary guise is the foment of a sort of perfect storm in which 
the gale forces of modernity collide with the abiding and perennial flow—though not 
without its peculiarly “modern” or “post-Christian” current—of the human quest for 
transcendence.  In the remainder of this chapter, I unpack the implications of the first 
element of the perfect storm by showing the radical distance between the context for 
Aristotle’s inquiry into the good life, namely the polis, and the contemporary climate of 
moral inquiry, offering throughout that addiction supplies a type of response to the 
dizzying lack of any such similar context.  The basic argument, which will be all-too-
                                                                                                                                                
traditional modes of understanding and ordering the moral life remain and the possibilities that are on offer 
are in total discontinuity from these traditional ways.  See Jonathan Lear, Radical Hope: Ethics in the 
Face of Cultural Devastation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
150 Addiction and Grace, viii. 
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brief, is an attempt to articulate the connection between certain interrelated features of 
modern life—arbitrariness, boredom, fragmentation, and loneliness—and the prevalence 
of major addiction in modern life.  Then, in Chapter V, I explore the impact of the 
second element of the perfect storm by showing how addiction acts as a sort of analogue 
to the Thomistic virtue of charity because it makes possible an integration of the 
practical with the transcendent in human life, an integration that Aristotle fails to 
achieve.  The two arguments are meant to reinforce one another, for it seems to me that 
addiction has both historically relative and more universal aspects, neither of which 
taken alone are sufficient to the phenomenon in all its complexity and potency.  Both 
lines of engagement are attempts to display the ways in which and the force with which 
addiction recommends itself to the cogitative estimation of human persons.  
 Whatever contemporary Western society may be, it is not the Greek polis.  Some 
critics of modernity bemoan this fact, and champions celebrate it, but on this point, at 
least, both are agreed.  How to assess “the modern” is a problem of monumental 
complexity, and, just as there is not one “Enlightenment,” neither is there one 
“modernity.”  We may nevertheless essay a generalization about modern life upon which 
there is broad unanimity,151 whether the movement from the ancient to the modern is 
                                                 
151 This is as good a place as any to insert a proviso about my argument in this chapter.  This is not a 
dissertation in history, and, although I have done my best to state what I take to be important differences 
between the ancient and modern context, it is inevitable that my account is greatly simplified.  I am aware, 
e.g. that the ancient context was in practice probably not as harmonious as Aristotle theorized (and he 
seemed aware of this, too, as I mention in the Conclusion) and that the modern context in practice is 
probably not as fragmented as some of its critics suggest (and as some of its champions, like Rawls, 
celebrate).  See Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005) 
for an excellent effort to contest the polarization that characterizes the discussion of the “virtue tradition” 
and “liberalism.”  Nevertheless, an Athenian reading Aristotle would have found him familiar even if 
ideal, just as Rawls seems to be describing more or less “our world.”  There is a radical difference between 
the two, and I think we have much to learn by stating the differences in stark terms. 
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interpreted as an advance or a decline. Whereas the Greek polis was organized around a 
shared vision of the good life for human beings and a relatively rigid and hierarchical set 
of social roles into which persons were born or trained, modern culture is characterized 
by the proliferation of visions of the good life for human beings and a consequent 
landscape in which human persons find themselves arbitrarily free to “realize” 
themselves in pursuit of one or several of an assortment of disparate “ways of life.”  
And, therefore, whereas the Greek polis was premised on the priority of the common 
good, modern culture is premised on the priority of the individual good.  
In Aristotelian practical reasoning it is the individual qua citizen who reasons; in 
Thomistic practical reasoning it is the individual qua enquirer into his or her 
good152 and the good of his or her community…but in the practical reasoning of 
liberal modernity it is the individual qua individual who reasons.153 
 
The shift that MacIntyre alleges is not the effect of a sort of “top-down” philosophical 
decision to prioritize the individual over the communal.  It is not as though someone 
suddenly decided that the individual should be determinative of the community rather 
than the other way around.  Rather, the shift is the product of the disintegration over 
several centuries of any widespread certainty about the nature of human beings and their 
place in the world.  The cast of characters in this historical drama is large, and the 
attempt to name one protagonist (or antagonist, depending on one’s assessment) 
probably misguided.  Columbus, Luther, Copernicus, Descartes, and Kant are certainly 
among the major players.  But the progression (or regression, again, depending on one’s 
assessment) is not strictly or even primarily an intellectual one.  Throughout Europe and, 
                                                 
152 We might add, specifically, his or her supernatural good as taught by the Church. 
153 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 339. 
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later, in America, doubt took hold and festered at every level of society.  What was in 
doubt, among other things, was the ultimate defensibility of any claim about the telos of 
human existence.  The diminishment of widespread agreement on the matter was at first 
decried and later celebrated, but what was quite clear was that the meaning of the 
common good was being greatly attenuated.  The decline of the community is correlative 
with the decline of what may be held in common, and so modern individualism is merely 
what comes in the wake of this cultural drama.  Undoubtedly, this development has 
brought with it significant possibilities, but it is also the case that it has made fertile 
ground for the realization and amplification of habits of addiction. 
 In her philosophically insightful addiction memoir, How to Stop Time, Ann 
Marlowe makes this intriguing claim about addiction to heroin. 
The biggest, darkest secret about heroin is that it isn’t that wonderful: it’s a 
substance some of us agree to pursue as though it were wonderful, because it’s 
easier to do that than to figure out what is worth pursuing.  Heroin is a stand-in, a 
stop-gap, a mask, for what we believe is missing.  Like the “objects” seen by 
Plato’s man in a cave, dope is the shadow cast by cultural movements we can’t 
see directly.154 
 
It is precisely these cultural movements, so integral to who we are that we are unable to 
see them directly, that I am gesturing toward with the clumsy label of “modernity.”  It 
seems to me that Marlowe does not put the point quite as strongly as she could.  For it is 
not merely that modern people find it difficult to “figure out what is worth pursuing.”  
Rather, modern people are plagued by an axiomatic skepticism as to whether such a 
thing could ever be “figured out” at all, regardless of the effort expended.  It is not that 
we cannot recognize viable ways of life; rather, we recognize a proliferating and 
                                                 
154 How to Stop Time, 155. 
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mutually incompatible number of such options alongside the conviction that there are no 
rational grounds for choice among them.  With the failure of the Enlightenment project 
to establish a purely rational and therefore universally accessible and defensible basis for 
determining the normative structure of human life, modern people inherit fragments of 
past traditions’ conceptions of the telos of human life without possessing an established 
way of deciding between these various visions.  Ours, then, is a culture in which the 
decision to pursue one way of life at the expense of others can only be understood as an 
arbitrary choice, an existential assertion of the self in the absence of any ultimate 
rationale.  Modern persons no longer know what to do because they know all too well 
how many things they could do.  One astute addict perceived a connection between his 
addiction and the threat of modern indecision: 
I realized suddenly that I had two diseases—the disease of addiction and the 
disease of Too Many Options…What if I made the wrong choice?...I had always 
been afraid to make the wrong choice.  I’d look at the two forks in the road and 
stand there for the longest time, worrying that one or both would lead me down 
the wrong path.  Alcohol and cocaine helped me overcome the anxiety of 
indecision and the courage to move forward, even if it meant rushing headlong 
down a crooked path and right over a cliff.155 
 
According to Sean Desmond Healy, modern people, because of the tyranny of 
possibility, “lack a sense of purpose and drift around in a state of psychic doldrums 
waiting for a wind to come up to give them propulsion toward a destination that they 
themselves cannot identify.”156  Healy contends that there is no such wind and that, 
therefore, modern persons are determined, like Vladimir and Estragon in Beckett’s 
                                                 
155 Moyers, Broken, 184-185. 
156 Boredom, Self, and Culture, 74. 
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Waiting for Godot,157 to wait interminably, but this is not altogether so.  Addiction is 
such a propelling wind, though it is more like a hurricane.  Addictive objects stand in for 
a rationally determinable telos because they are able to demand by other means—by 
means of addiction—a kind of absolute allegiance to a way of life that moderns cannot 
attain through the exercise of rational inquiry into the best life for human persons.   
 No one has charted the paralyzing loss of teleology that is endemic to modernity 
more proficiently and astutely than Alasdair MacIntyre, who sees in Soren 
Kierkegaard’s Either/Or the fullest expression of the modern dilemma.  What Either/Or 
isolated as the distinctively modern point of view was that which envisioned moral and 
political debate in terms of a conflict between mutually incompatible and 
incommensurable visions of the life most worthy of pursuit.  In Either/Or, the conflict is 
between the life of the aesthete and the life of ethical commitment, but the variety of 
possible standpoints is by no means limited to these two.  What becomes characteristic 
of all such standpoints in Kierkegaard’s modern estimation is the absence of any 
common criterion that could arbitrate definitively between various contenders for the 
worthwhile life.  Thus, for Kierkegaard, choice is dislodged from the order of objective 
rationality and inserted into the order of subjective self-assertion.  Given a person’s age, 
social class, educational background, and so on, we still know nothing that could help 
determine for the agent the life that he or she should be pursuing.  Whatever form of life 
is finally pursued cannot be made intelligible as rational choice, but only as a 
Kierkegaardian “leap of faith.”  
                                                 
157 Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot (New York: Grove Press, 1954). 
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If MacIntyre is right, then it is particularly interesting that Hubert Dreyfus and Jane 
Rubin have turned to the person and work of Soren Kierkegaard for insight into the 
nature of contemporary addiction.  Dreyfus and Rubin paint the distinction between 
ancient and modern culture as one between non-nihilistic and nihilistic cultures, and they 
claim that, “for Kierkegaard, the difference between a nihilistic and a non-nihilistic 
culture is that in a nihilistic culture there are no distinctions between what is important 
and what is unimportant but in a non-nihilistic culture there are.”158  The arbitrariness of 
every distinction between what is and is not important implies the ultimate breakdown of 
every distinction, rendering any commitment or decision a kind of unconditioned leap.  
Dreyfus and Rubin contend that the power of addiction lies precisely in its ability to 
wrest from an agent a sort of absolute devotion in the face of modern indecision. 
Identifying oneself as an addict may well be an attempt to obtain the meaning 
once, but no longer, provided by the authentic commitments made possible by a 
traditional culture…When someone says, ‘My name is Joe and I am an 
alcoholic,’ he is acknowledging an identity—that of an addict…We believe that 
the reason that addiction has become the preferred mode of psychological and 
social understanding for so many people in our culture is that it removes their 
identity from the realm of arbitrary choice and establishes it as an 
incontrovertible given…Addictions have become substitutes for commitments in 
our culture.159 
 
As heroin addict William Pryor noticed, “Somehow being an addict answered my needs, 
my pain, my lack of definition.”160 
                                                 
158 Hubert Dreyfus and Jane Rubin, “Kierkegaard on the Nihilism of the Present Age: The Case of 
Commitment as Addiction,” Synthese 98 (1994): 9.  What Dreyfus and Rubin fail to mention, strangely, is 
Kierkegaard’s own role in the historical development of “nihilistic cultures.”  I am not convinced there are 
genuinely nihilistic cultures, but cynical cultures there are, and these are characterized by the descriptions 
offered by Kierkegaard. 
159 Ibid., 6. 
160 Survival of the Coolest, 3, my emphasis. 
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This analysis may also explain why any authentic commitment in modern, 
“nihilistic” society looks suspiciously like an addiction.  Precisely because we doubt that 
anyone could have grounds sufficiently rationally compelling to justify an unwavering 
commitment to a project or way of life, we can only interpret such commitments as 
disguised addictions.  Since reason cannot compel, addiction is left as the best 
explanation. As Eve Sedgwick notes, 
Like exercise, the other activities newly pathologized under the searching rays of 
this new addiction attribution are the very ones that late capitalism presents as 
the ultimate emblems of control, personal discretion, freedom itself: beyond the 
finding of a custom-made telos in work (“workaholism”) there is the telos of 
making ostentatiously discretionary consumer choices (“shopaholism”); of 
enjoying sexual variety (“being sexually compulsive”); or even of being in a 
sustained relationship (“codependency” or “relationship addiction”).  As each 
assertion of will has made voluntarity itself appear problematical in a new area, 
the assertion of will itself has come to appear addictive.161 
 
As Sedgwick’s analysis contends, ours is a contradictory culture in which the deep 
ambiguity about the possibility of justified commitment is matched in intensity only by 
the ideologies of opportunity, self-realization, and self-control.  As one alcoholic recalls, 
“the ambition to succeed was instilled in me by my Scandinavian parents who came to 
this country where opportunities were so great.  ‘Keep busy; always have something 
constructive to do’” (AA 348).  Addiction names the point of impact between these 
contradictory impulses since it facilitates a single-minded pursuit of fulfillment in the 
absence of a rationale.  Addiction, like Existentialism,162 the philosophical impulse 
                                                 
161 Eve Sedgwick, “Epidemics of the Will,” in Tendencies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 
132-133. 
162 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, also identified as a precursor to the Existentialist movement, depicts brilliantly 
the paralysis that confronts modern persons in his novel, Notes from Underground, trans. Andrew R. 
MacAndrew (New York: Penguin, 1980).  “Obviously, in order to act, one must be fully satisfied and free 
of all misgivings beforehand.  But take me: how can I ever be sure?  Where will I find the primary reason 
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bequeathed by Kierkegaard, is produced by a culture in which we are at one and the 
same time told to “Be all that you can be,” and to “Have it your way.”  The collision of 
an ethos of self-realization with the philosophy of freedom as arbitrary fiat of will results 
in the wreck that is modern addiction.   
 Sedgwick contends that this problematic is specific to “late capitalism,” which 
raises another obvious difference between the ethos of “modernity” and that of the Greek 
polis, namely the encroachment of capitalist economics into every aspect of modern life.  
Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the virtue of temperance in particular is threatened 
by this development.163  In modern capitalist society, there is little conception of a 
substantive set of goods or virtues that are necessary constituents of a worthwhile life, 
and therefore the means to such a life can only be understood instrumentally, with 
capital mediating as the great arbiter of “value.”  Thus, insofar as the intemperate 
behavior of some is productive of such “value,” in the form of capital, for others, it is 
useful to these others that persons should be intemperate.  Their own acquisitiveness, 
justified in terms of the “value” taken to be instrumental to any worthwhile way of life, 
makes the vice of intemperance in others amenable to their purposes.  It no longer makes 
sense, as MacIntyre thinks it would have in the polis, to question whether the vices of 
other citizens corrupt and damage the common good that is a necessary prerequisite for 
attainment, on the part of any individual, of the good life. 
                                                                                                                                                
for action, the justification for it?  Where am I to look for it?...You know, ladies and gentlemen, probably 
the only reason why I think I’m an intelligent man is that in all of my life I’ve never managed to start or 
finish anything,” pp. 103-104. 
163 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1999), 88. 
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It does seem to me that addiction can be partially understood as a function of late 
capitalism, but not in the direct way in which intemperance might be.  There are two 
kinds of response to the “waiting” for a compelling purpose that, we recall, Healy (and 
Beckett) claimed to be characteristic of modern culture.  I have already claimed that 
addiction is one kind of response.  But the dominant response of our culture is simply to 
ignore the crisis by means of distraction.  Consumerism is an expression of a wish to be 
distracted from the terrifying prospect that we don’t know who we are or what we’re for.  
The pursuit of constant titillation that is the pulse of consumerism is the enthronement of 
the immediate over the teleological.  Intemperance is one form of such distraction from 
the teleological, the attempt to make do with contingent sensory gratification in the 
absence of necessary purpose.  But whereas intemperance can be understood as the 
expression of a certain kind of consumerist pursuit of immediate pleasure, addiction 
consists of a backlash against the notion of a self who consumes by arbitrary fiat of the 
will whatever seems to provide immediate gratification.  Addiction is a sort of rejection 
of consumerism’s enthronement of the immediate over the teleological, of the contingent 
over the necessary.   
It is certainly true that many addictions find their beginnings in the pursuit of 
immediate gratification and in the desire to be distracted from a crisis of meaning.  But 
addiction is addicting rather than merely distracting exactly because it provides the kind 
of propelling and purposive force the absence of which was the cause of the original 
pursuit of distraction.  Intemperate people consume to distract themselves from a lack of 
purpose, but addicts find purpose at precisely the moment in which they recognize that, 
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rather than consuming their objects of choice, they are in fact consumed by those 
objects.  Addiction provides what consumers do not believe exists: necessity.  
Intemperance is to addiction what the immediate is to the teleological, what contingency 
is to necessity.  Major addiction is, therefore, both a response to the absence of teleology 
in modern culture and a kind of embodied critique of the late capitalist consumerism that 
is both an expression of and a condition of this absence.   
We have been speaking of the need for distraction from a crisis of meaning.  But to 
put the modern predicament in terms of a crisis of meaning, though true as a matter of 
fact, might lend the wrong impression that modern persons are vigilant in their 
expectations for a resolution of the crisis.  But that is not necessarily the case.  For 
modern persons are not only plagued by the absence of a teleology, but also by the belief 
that a resolution to the crisis is not forthcoming since the only imaginable sources of 
such a resolution—Aquinas’s Faith, Kant’s Reason, Hegel’s History—are the very 
things that modernity has called into irremediable doubt.  Modern persons, therefore, are 
not so much desperate as bored. 
Ironically, with the recession of any widely held conception of the common good 
and the consequent transformation of the social sphere into an arena for individual 
projects of enjoyment and achievement, boredom ensued.  It was Kierkegaard, too, who 
remarked that the root of what ails modern society is boredom.  
Boredom is the root of all evil.  Strange that boredom, in itself so staid and stolid, 
should have such power to set in motion.  The influence it exerts is altogether 
magical, except that it is not the influence of attraction, but of repulsion…What 
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wonder, then, that the world goes from bad to worse, and that its evils increase 
more and more, as boredom increases, and boredom is the root of all evil.164   
 
Lest it be supposed that boredom is a uniquely modern problem, we should 
remember that the early Christian Church Father, Origen, speculated that boredom 
caused the Fall.  But there is something specific to modern boredom.  The material 
payoff of capitalism, of course, has meant that many modern people are sufficiently 
distanced from the mere necessities of survival that they have the problem of “spare 
time.”  Boredom, in this sense of not knowing how to occupy spare time, is the privilege 
of the bourgeoisie, who, because their energies are not expended on staying alive, must 
confront what to do with their time.  As Aristotle remarked, “the noble employment of 
leisure is the highest aim which a man can pursue.”165  It is therefore of interest that 
Rozanne Faulkner characterizes addiction as a “leisure malfunction,” and proposes that 
training in how to spend leisure time well is fundamental to the process of recovery.166 
But, although capitalism has perhaps produced a larger class of people with the 
“problem” of leisure time than any other social arrangement, the problem of leisure time 
is not unique to the modern context, as is clear from Aristotle’s concern with how it 
should be well spent.  The problem seems to run deeper, then, than the mere fact that 
modern people have spare time.  The problem, in fact, is that the idea that one should 
spend one’s leisure time in a “noble” way is itself odd to modern people.  Modern 
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bourgeois persons have leisure, yet they lack the ability to determine what would count 
for the noble employment of it, since they lack the ability to determine the kind of 
people they should be and the kind of lives they should lead.  Thus, leisure time is 
thought to be a time for hobbies or, more tellingly, “diversions.”  How strange, then, to 
the modern ear that Aristotle answers his own question, “What ought we to do when at 
leisure?” with the response: “Clearly we ought not be amusing ourselves, for then 
amusement would be the end of life.”167  For Aristotle, we only know how to spend our 
leisure time if we know what our lives are for and the end to which our lives are to be 
directed.  Because modern persons lack such a conception of what their lives are for, 
their leisurely pursuits can only be efforts that may distract from the crisis occasioned by 
such a lack.  That is to say, modern leisure can only instantiate rather than assuage the 
deep boredom of modern existence.  It is for this reason that I am wary of Faulkner’s 
suggestion that people get addicted because they don’t have sufficient hobbies.  One 
alcoholic, who offers a self-description in order to confound those who think that 
addiction only occurs on skid row, describes himself as “father, husband, taxpayer, home 
owner…clubman, athlete, artist, musician, author, editor, aircraft pilot, and world 
traveler.”  He seems to have no shortage of interesting hobbies, socially acceptable ways 
to fill his leisure time.  But, he recounts, “There would be times when the life of 
respectability and achievement seemed insufferably dull—I had to break out” (AA 382). 
                                                 
167 Politics, 1337b35-36. 
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This deep boredom—what Healy calls “hyperboredom”168—is uniquely modern.  It 
is quite other than the boredom of earlier ages, which was characterized, according to 
Healy, by a disenchantment with one’s particular place in the social schema.  This 
“standard” boredom is seen as remediable to the extent that society as a whole is still 
believed to carry within itself the resources for constructing a worthwhile and 
meaningful life.  But in the case of modern “hyperboredom,” society itself is “under 
indictment for failing to provide meaning.”169   
The mental state of the sick alcoholic is beyond description.  I had no 
resentments against individuals—the whole world was all wrong.  My thoughts 
went round and round with, What’s it all about anyhow?  People have wars and 
kill each other; they struggle and cut each other’s throats for success, and what 
does anyone get out of it?  Haven’t I been successful, haven’t I accomplished 
extraordinary things in business?  What do I get out of it?  Everything’s all 
wrong and the hell with it.  For the last two years of my drinking, I prayed during 
every drunk that I wouldn’t wake up again (AA 225). 
 
The absence of every shared or ultimately justifiable telos makes modern persons 
uniquely bored.  Because one can do anything, there is nothing to do.  It is not only, as in 
the case of standard boredom, that a particular way of life seems pointless; the search 
itself seems pointless, and therefore boring.  “Hyperboredom” names the paralysis 
effected by modernity’s inability to justify one commitment over against others.  
According to William Burroughs, “You become a narcotics addict because you do 
not have strong motivation in any other direction.  Junk wins by default.  I tried it as a 
matter of curiosity.”170  But this does not quite get to the heart of the matter, for one 
could read Burroughs to be saying that “junk” is one among many possible “diversions” 
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that could have won “by default,” as though some people who are bored take up golf and 
others take up “junk.”  There is a reason that junk wins by default, and it is the reason 
that major addiction is the definitive habit of our time.  Addictions provide strong 
motivation in a definite direction in a way that is otherwise inaccessible to the modern 
person who can find no final criterion to justify activity in a definite direction and for 
whom any such movement can only be a provisional and conditional sally.  Unless, that 
is, it is a movement that contains within itself its own propulsive impetus and energy—
unless it is an addiction.  Burroughs gets much closer to the heart of the matter when he 
says, contrary to what we are lead to believe about addiction, “the point of junk to a user 
is that it forms the habit.”171  If there is a uniquely modern disease, it is the dis-ease of 
modern boredom, for which addiction is one of the rare proven antidotes.172 
Modern boredom is not merely a bourgeois privilege.  What is unique to the 
bourgeois is the way in which modern boredom is pressed upon it in the crisis of leisure 
time.  But modern boredom presses on those who are not so “burdened” with leisure 
time as well.173  These, too, live their lives under modernity’s shadow, and, although 
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172 There is a well-known line in the Big Book that reads, “Our liquor was but a symptom” (AA 64).  It 
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their lives are filled with the daily grind of survival, these struggles are accompanied by 
the constant question, what is it all for?  As portrayed in Charlie Chaplin’s classic film, 
Modern Times, modern working-persons find themselves caught up in vast institutions 
and bureaucracies that use them like cogs in a machine.  From the factory employee to 
the middle manager, modern workers are placed in roles that demand that they perform 
“act-fragments,”174 insofar as the agent often has no conception of what the ultimate 
outcomes of his or her act might be, let alone any investment in the worth or meaning of 
those outcomes.  As John Dewey saw, “We live in a world in which there is an immense 
amount of organization, but it is an external organization, not one of the ordering of a 
growing experience, one that involves…the whole of the live creature, toward a 
fulfilling conclusion.”175  The modern worker is busy, but lacks purpose. 
As the lives of modern persons are increasingly fragmented by the partitioning off 
of work from leisure, of the public from the private, of the religious from the secular, of 
the young from the old, of the local from the national, and so on, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to imagine how the activities and commitments of an individual life can amount 
to an ordered whole.  For modern persons who are “spread thin” by their disparate and 
disconnected responsibilities, there is a deep desire for some unifying principle—as 
evidenced by modern philosophy’s criticism of Aristotle—that can supply integrity in 
the place of compartmentalization.  If the modern person, and in particular the modern 
working-person, is “the kind of person to whom it appears normal that a variety of goods 
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174 Wilshire, Wild Hunger, 13. 
175 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Perigree Books, 1981), 81. 
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should be pursued, each appropriate to its own sphere, with no overall good supplying 
any overall unity to life,”176 the modern addict is a person for whom such heterogeneous 
goods can only appear burdensome because devoid of any connective thread.  In the 
absence of such a thread, addiction tempts, offering a release from the welter of 
responsibilities that lack a unifying rationale.  It is not at its heart a release sought out of 
sloth, however, but out of discontent.  Thus, when Bruce Wilshire contends that addicts 
are people who “demand the rewards without doing the work,”177 there is a sense in 
which he puts the matter backwards.  It is true that addiction in many ways stunts 
emotional growth, and that therefore addicts in recovery must learn again or for the first 
time the discipline required to weather the inevitable challenges that every life, whether 
ancient or modern, must face.  But modern addiction is only derivatively a demand for 
rewards without work, for it is rooted more fundamentally in the suspicion that modern 
work is without rewards.     
If some modern persons suffer because they cannot find good reasons to become 
entangled in the business of life, others suffer from a kind of entanglement that is 
nevertheless rootless and without meaning.  Addiction provides a response to both kinds 
of suffering.  Addiction provides a response to the underwhelming life of boredom that 
plagues the bourgeois in its leisure time by making one thing matter.  And addiction 
provides a response to the overwhelming life of boredom that plagues the working class 
with fragmented and compartmentalized striving by making one thing matter.  For those 
who are bored with nothing to do, addiction stimulates by entangling and consuming; for 
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177 Wild Hunger, 234. 
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those who are bored with too much to do, addiction disburdens by simplifying and 
clarifying. 
We mention one final connection between modern life and modern addiction, 
namely loneliness.  The alienation and loneliness endemic to modern individualism has 
been theorized and documented by intellectuals and social critics in every field of 
inquiry imaginable.  One thinks here of the devastating analyses of the young Karl Marx 
in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844,178 or, more recently and 
popularly, of the sociological inquiry into American loneliness carried out in David 
Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd.179  Charles Taylor contends that modern loneliness is the 
product of “industrialization, the break-up of earlier primary communities, the separation 
of work from home life, and the growth of a capitalist, mobile, large-scale, bureaucratic 
world, which largely deserves the epithet ‘heartless.’”180   
Whatever the complex origin of modern loneliness, one thing is clear: lonely people 
make good addicts.  As Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions so simply puts it, 
Almost without exception, alcoholics are tortured by loneliness.  Even before our 
drinking got bad and people began to cut us off, nearly all of us suffered the 
feeling that we didn’t quite belong.  Either we were shy, and dared not draw near 
others, or we were apt to be noisy good fellows craving attention and 
companionship, but never getting it—at least to our way of thinking.  There was 
always that mysterious barrier we could neither surmount nor understand.  It was 
as if we were actors on a stage, suddenly realizing that we did not know a single 
line of our parts.  That’s one reason we loved alcohol too well.  It did let us act 
extemporaneously (TT 57).   
 
                                                 
178 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2d ed., ed. 
Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978). 
179 David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1965). 
180 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 292. 
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The connection between loneliness and alcohol addiction is illustrated almost ad 
nauseum in the “Personal Testimonies” of A.A.’s Big Book.  It is by far the most 
common theme.  We have already heard from some.  Here is a sampling of several more. 
I had never been inside a bar until one evening some fellow students persuaded 
me to go with them to a local cocktail lounge.  I was fascinated...It was pure 
sophistication…But more important than anything else that night, I belonged.  I 
was at home in the universe; I was comfortable with people…Not only was I 
completely at ease, but I actually loved all the strangers around me and they 
loved me in return, I thought, all because of this magic potion, alcohol.  What a 
discovery!  What a revelation! (AA 447). 
 
Whatever the problem, I soon found what appeared to be the solution to 
everything…A stop at a local bar began the evening.  I ordered a beer from the 
waitress and as I took the first sip, something was immediately different.  I 
looked around me, at the people drinking and dancing, smiling and laughing, all 
of whom were much older than I.  Suddenly, I somehow felt I belonged (AA 
282). 
  
Although I wasn’t too thrilled with the taste, I loved the effects.  Alcohol helped 
me to hide my fears; the ability to converse was an almost miraculous gift to a 
shy and lonely individual (AA 359). 
 
In her biography of the co-founder of Alcoholics Anonymous, Bill W., Susan Cheever 
reports that Bill W.’s own addiction to alcohol was fueled by this thirst for 
companionship.  “He never forgot the warmth of the tavern and the way the men there 
seemed to melt together into one person—a person immune to loneliness.”181 
 Ironically, the search for belonging that finds its answer for so many alcoholics in 
the fellowship of the bar eventuates in near-total isolation.  Alcohol, once the elixir of 
conviviality and camaraderie, is a jealous friend.  “From that first night at the bar a year 
earlier, I had made a profound decision that was to direct my life for many years to 
come: Alcohol was my friend and I would follow it to the ends of the earth…Now 
                                                 
181 My Name is Bill, 39. 
 162 
alcohol had become the only friend I had” (AA 447).  Solitary drinking or use becomes 
the pinnacle of major addiction.   
Peter Ferentzy, in an article on the difference between the preindustrial experience 
of “chronic drunkenness” and that of contemporary alcohol addiction makes the 
fascinating observation that before the turn of the 18th century solitary drunkenness was 
rare.182  Yet this alarming fact can begin to be made intelligible if we understand that the 
modern rejection of teleology and with it the loss of a shared conception of the good life 
for human beings had to entail a transformation of the nature of friendship.  For, as is so 
clear in the Nicomachean Ethics, friendship was for Aristotle a basically moral 
undertaking, with the relationship of true friendship defined primarily in terms of 
common goals, a shared pursuit of certain specified goods.  For Aristotle, the primary 
benefit of friendship is not affection but growth in virtue. 
This Aristotelian view of friendship disappeared along with the disappearance of a 
common good.  It no longer seems justified to expect that friends would need to agree 
with one another about the more substantive matters of life.  Friendship comes to be 
primarily an expression of affection—what Aristotle would have called a friendship of 
pleasure—or an exercise of career positioning and posturing, of “networking” and 
“schmoozing”—what Aristotle would have called a friendship of utility (1157b37-
1158a3).  For Aristotle, neither of these forms of friendship are true friendship because 
                                                 
182 Ferentzy, “From Sin to Disease,” 382.  Philippe Aries writes: “The historians taught us long ago that 
the King was never left alone.  But in fact, until the end of the 17th century, nobody was ever left alone.  
The density of social life made isolation virtually impossible, and people who managed to shut themselves 
up in a room for some time were regarded as exceptional characters.”  Quoted in Taylor, Sources of the 
Self, 291. 
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they lack any necessary connection to a person’s growth in virtue and attainment of a life 
worthy of human beings. 
Addiction offers a two-fold response to the modern transformation of friendship.  
On the one hand, to the extent that affection and “social capital” mediate modern 
friendships, addictive substances lubricate this mediation, as many of the testimonies 
above have shown.  Indeed, probably more than any other factor, it is the capacity of 
addictive substances to evoke strong affections or repress strong disaffections that 
represents their most immediate appeal.  Under the influence of addictive substances, 
many people feel more free to express affection and more confident that they are 
receiving it. 
On the other hand, precisely because, as we have already shown, addiction is able to 
supply an animating and necessary purpose otherwise inaccessible to thoroughly modern 
persons, addicts do in a sense share with one another an unqualified and unconditional 
allegiance to a common goal.  Addicts often find it hard to develop meaningful 
relationships with non-addicts, and in this respect they are more Aristotelian than 
modern.  Similarly, addicts are more Aristotelian than modern in that they are willing to 
terminate friendships whenever those friendships are no longer conducive to or, worse, 
are preventive of their singular pursuit.  But there is one definite sense in which 
addictive friendship is unlike Aristotelian friendship.  Aristotle thought it impossible to 
exercise virtue and therefore live a worthwhile life without friends, but addicts, at least 
before it becomes clear that the game is up, are convinced that they can, if need be, go it 
alone.   
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Alcohol or other addictive objects are, therefore, partners in fundamental 
relationships and, to the extent that they do, addicts commune with one another because 
they share, not so much a common goal, but a common friend.  Ann Marlowe brilliantly 
expresses this aspect of addiction in her memoir of heroin addiction. 
Like travel to faraway places, heroin served as a way of rendering my solitude 
beside the point.  Doing it alone added no opprobrium; that was the least of my 
worries.  And it made sense; the drug was a companion…Being high allowed me 
to enjoy being alone without loneliness…When I stopped getting high, what 
bothered me most was my relapse into loneliness, or into the awareness of 
it…Dope made it easier for me to stay at home; dope was a home, a psychic 
space that filled the essential functions of the physical construct, providing a 
predictable comfort and security.  Heroin became the place where, when you 
showed up, they had to let you in.183 
 
To the extent that A.A. is one of the few places in contemporary society where, quite 
literally, when you show up they have to let you in, we begin to understand why 
intentional communities like A.A. are among the few modern remedies to modern 
addiction. 
 There is much more that should be said about the relationship between friendship, 
addiction, and recovery, but we shall save some of this for the Conclusion.  To complete 
this chapter I want to state briefly the intent of the foregoing analysis of modern 
addiction.  My intent is not primarily to indict modernity by showing its horrible effects, 
although this must have seemed at times what I was up to.  I do not think the movement 
from the ancient through the medieval to the modern is in any unqualified sense a 
movement of decline.  I am quite aware that the ancient and medieval worlds were rife 
with pain and unhappiness as has been and will be the case with any age.  And I am 
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more than willing to acknowledge the ways in which modernity represents a cultural 
advance.  My point has been to make intelligible the simple fact that addiction is by all 
accounts rampant in the modern age to a degree unparalleled in any other.  I have had, 
therefore, in order to make this argument, to concentrate on those aspects of modernity 
that give rise to the deep discontent to which modern addiction is a response.  For it is 
only by showing how addiction constitutes a profound response to our deepest needs as 
modern persons that we begin to grasp the force with which addiction recommends itself 
to a cogitative estimation the purpose of which is to ascertain the suitability of certain 
objects of pursuit to the needs of an agent in a particular set of circumstances.  It may 
very well be that, on the whole, things are better today than they have ever been.  I have 
no idea how we could make that sort of judgment, and that is not an argument I am 
interested in pursuing.  If my argument were put in the service of a larger argument 
against modernity per se, the only conclusion for which I could be held accountable is 
that the datum of major addiction would have to be entered into the equation on the 
“cons” side of modernity, not as an historical accident but as one of its necessary bitter 
fruits. 
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CHAPTER V 
ADDICTION AND CHARITY 
 
In the last chapter, we raised a question about Aristotle’s ethics that will lead us, in 
this chapter, into a discussion of the more universal, less peculiarly “modern,” aspects of 
addiction: If theoria is a component of the life of eudaimonia, how is this more 
transcendent aspect of the good life to be integrated with the practical exercise of the 
moral virtues?  The relationship of the practical to the transcendent in Aristotle’s account 
of the good life presents a difficulty because it is not clear what one has to do with the 
other.  If we take the life of theoria to be the peculiar ergon of man, we are left with an 
unfortunate inference, aptly drawn by Thomas Nagel.  If practical reason and the moral 
virtues serve only “to support the individual for an activity that completely transcends 
these worldly concerns,” then it follows that  
the purest employment of reason has nothing to do with daily life.  Aristotle 
believes, in short, that human life is not important enough for humans to spend 
their lives on.  A person should seek to transcend not only his individual practical 
concerns but also those of society or humanity as a whole.184   
 
The problem is one of integration and, as Kathleen Wilkes suggests, the lack of 
integration eventuates in a picture of the good life for human beings that can only lead to 
frustration. 
[Aristotle’s] psychology tells us that man is hybrid—caught in a constant tug-of-
war between the claims of his divine and his hylomorphic nature; his theology 
tells us that the divine element is not commensurable with the hylomorphic (see 
1154b20ff.).  The contemplative life is fully attainable only insofar as man can 
become god-like, and the constant and irremovable block to this is that he is 
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biologically an animal.  But the mixture of the divine and the animal is not a 
stable one; there could be no compromise effected between such disparate 
elements.  No man may attain full divinity, but once he has tasted it in part he is, 
as it were, foredoomed to try for the impossible.  Frustration is then evidently a 
permanent fact.185 
 
Given Aristotle’s psychology and theology, his account of the good life, it appears, can 
only involve a fitful vacillation between the exercise of practical rationality and the 
exercise of theoria.  There is, then, a certain lacuna in Aristotle’s account of the 
relationship between the virtues and the good life, which consists in a failure to describe 
how the life of practical action is to be integrated with the pursuit of theoria, how the 
practical virtues are related to the virtue of sophia. 
This lacuna in Aristotle’s account of the life of eudaimonia finds a quite definite 
resolution in the thought of Thomas Aquinas.  For it is Aquinas who provides a thick 
account both of the ways in which the life of practical activity is integrated with the 
human pursuit of the divine and of the means by which the various goods of human life 
may be rightly ordered to achieve this integration.  The account that Aquinas gives is 
rooted in his postulation of the theological virtues, particularly his treatment of the 
theological virtue of caritas, or charity, which is the supernaturally infused virtue that 
capacitates human beings for participation in the life of God and thereby orders each of 
the other virtues to God.   
The question I am after in the chapter is this: What is it supposed to be about charity 
that befits charity to play this integrating and ordering role?  The question I am not after 
is whether or not such a habit as charity actually exists or is accessible to persons.  The 
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latter is an important question in and of itself, but its answer does not bear directly on the 
argument of this chapter.  For the argument of this chapter is that, however we answer 
this question of whether there really exists a habit befitted to achieve this tall order, there 
is at least one quite undeniably existent habit that appears befitted: addiction. 
 
Aquinas on Charity 
 Charity, Aquinas tells us, is friendship between human beings and God.  It is a 
friendship based on God’s communication of his happiness to human beings.  More 
specifically, charity is “the love that is based on this communication” (2-2.23.1).  The 
possibility of charity, for Aquinas, is grounded preeminently in God’s movement toward 
persons rather than in persons’ striving after God.  Charity “is not founded principally on 
the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God.”  It is therefore an “infused virtue,” one 
for which human beings do not have a “natural” capacity (2-2.24.2).  By an act of 
supernatural grace, God creates in the human soul the love that draws human persons 
toward God.  Thus, charity is a “supernatural virtue.”  It is the strongest and most intense 
of all virtues, including the other supernatural virtues of faith and hope.  “No virtue has 
such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform its act with 
so great pleasure” (2-2.23.2). 
 How, for Aquinas, does the virtue of charity make possible an integration and 
ordering of the good life?  We may answer this question by noting how the virtue of 
charity differs from the virtue of sophia, that virtue through which theoria is practiced.  
We recall that, due to the Aristotelian psychology and theology, the life of theoria could 
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not be integrated with the life of practical reason because of the incommensurability 
between the knowledge attained through contemplation and the practical knowledge 
through which the agent navigates his or her practical affairs.  The life of theoria is 
purely intellective, and, therefore, is the locus both of a separation between the finite 
knowledge of the knower and the infinite object of knowledge and of the separation 
between knowledge of the divine and the knowledges of the senses.   
Charity, on the other hand, is not in the intellective faculty—this is faith—but rather 
in the appetitive faculty.  And the appetitive faculty differs, for Aquinas, in a very 
important respect from the intellectual faculty: the appetitive faculty is infinite.  Aquinas 
puts it tersely: “Rational concupiscence is infinite” (1-2.30.4).  There is, in each of us, a 
longing186 that, according to Aquinas, cannot be sated by any finite thing.  Paul Wadell 
explains the significance of Aquinas’s position. 
If grace comes from God’s side, desire comes from ours.  Thomas grants that if 
we were finite in every way God could not be our joy, for we cannot “reach out 
to more good” than we can hold.  But there is, he contends, one way we are not 
finite: we have unlimited desire.  We are limited in every way but one—we have 
unlimited desire, unlimited longing.  Our desire is the one thing about us that is 
not restricted and we know this.  We feel the ongoing hunger for something 
infinitely good, we are stalked by the longing for something perfectly blessed and 
precious.  Though we are limited, we want unlimited good, though we are 
restricted, we want to love unrestrictedly…This is why Thomas says we “can 
reach out to the infinite” (ST I-II, 2,8).  We seek the infinite through the openness 
of desire, and only something indefectibly good will satisfy this desire.187 
 
                                                 
186 In Love in the Ruins (New York: Avon Books, 1971), 148, the Catholic novelist Walker Percy has his 
middle-aged and depressed protagonist report: “Forty five.  It is strange how little one changes.  The 
psychologists are all wrong about puberty.  Puberty changes nothing.  This morning I woke with exactly 
the same cosmic sexual-religious longing I woke with when I was ten years old.  Nothing changes but 
accidentals: your toes rotate, showing more skin.  Every molecule in your body has been replaced but you 
are exactly the same.” 
187 Paul J. Wadell, C.P., The Primacy of Love, 61. 
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Charity makes possible, therefore, an actual union with or participation with God that 
could not be attained in this world through knowledge.  Because the act of the 
intellectual power “is completed by the thing known being in the knower,” theoria is not 
able to participate fully in God.  This is the “frustration” which Kathleen Wilkes claimed 
to be endemic to Aristotle’s psychology and theology.  But “the act of an appetitive 
power consists in the appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself,” and since the 
rational appetite of human beings is infinite, charity makes possible a genuine union 
with an infinite God in this life (2-2.27.4). 
 Moreover, the union with God made possible by charity flows outward into a love 
of other things.  “We must assert that to love which is an act of the appetitive power, 
even in this state of life, tends to God first, and flows on from Him to other things, and 
in this sense charity loves God immediately, and other things through God” (2-2.27.4).  
As Aquinas explains, “God is the principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved 
out of charity for God’s sake” (2-2.23.5).  The life of charity does not therefore involve a 
separation between the transcendent and the imminent but rather institutes a link 
between the two.  The movement toward God that is constitutive of charity does not 
imply a movement away from the this-worldly but rather a more sufficient movement 
toward the goods of this world as well.  Moreover, as we love the things of this world 
out of charity, our activity transforms us into the love we seek to be.  For Aquinas, it is 
not just that, loving God rightly, we love all other things rightly; it is also that, as we 
rightly love other things, these most ordinary activities transfigure our desires, making 
us ever more open and submissive to the love that God graces us with.  
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 It is because charity makes this integration possible that charity also constitutes a 
principle of order that is otherwise lacking amongst the moral virtues.  Aquinas states 
straightforwardly that “no order is assigned to the other virtues” (2-2.26.1), a worry that 
we found being expressed especially by modern commentators on Aristotle’s ethics.  
Aquinas believes that the virtues may be acquired to some extent independently of one 
another, and that, with respect to the natural virtues, it would be possible for a person to 
possess one or another of the virtues in markedly greater degree than others.  For 
Aquinas, however, charity remedies this potential unevenness among the natural virtues 
and removes the worry about a lack of an ordering principle.  Charity achieves this 
because charity informs and orders every other virtue.  Without charity, for Aquinas, the 
virtues lack the specific kind of directedness that they require, but charity provides 
precisely this directedness by being the efficient cause of all of the other virtues.188   
Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their 
essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on 
all, in the aforesaid manner…Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so 
far as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom… 
Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to 
its own end.  And since a mother is one who conceives within herself and by 
another, charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because, by 
commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the 
last end (2-2.23.8). 
 
Aquinas does not give many detailed examples of the way in which charity orders the 
other virtues.  We are told that “the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is 
God, since what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God” (2-2.25.1); 
                                                 
188 For a lucid account of what is entailed in Aquinas’s claim that charity is the efficient cause of the 
virtues, and of the resultant relationship between charity and knowledge in human action for Aquinas, see 
Michael Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), especially ch. 5. 
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and that “we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we regard them as the good 
things that we desire for others, in so far, to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to 
God’s honor and man’s use” (2-2.25.3).  Charity makes us to love ordinately God, our 
neighbor, ourselves, our enemies, our bodies, and irrational creatures (2-2.25).  
Importantly, charity does not operate as some abstract principle by the application of 
which we speculate about the right ordering of the life of practical virtue.  Rather, the 
supernatural virtue of charity comes with this ordering implicit, as it were.  As we 
increase in charity and our love of God becomes more intense, Aquinas claims, the right 
ordering of all other loves follows naturally.  Charity thus profoundly simplifies the 
moral life, not by making the practice of moral virtue irrelevant to the life of 
eudaimonia, but rather by habituating us to rightly order those practices as well as to 
rightly determine the significance of the goods of this life that we pursue. 
 
Addiction and Charity 
I want now to turn to what I take to be the less historicist, more universal aspect of 
addiction by arguing that addiction is in important respects analogous to the habit of 
charity as conceived in Aquinas’s theological ethics.  So that this claim be not merely 
speculation, I would like to try to display what I take to be the salient similarities 
between the two.   
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I am by no means the first to remark a connection between addiction and humanity’s 
quest for the transcendent.189  The eminent Swiss psychologist, Carl Jung, who played a 
significant though unintentional role in the formation of Alcoholic’s Anonymous,190 
judged that addictive “craving for alcohol was the equivalent, on a low level, of the 
spiritual thirst of our being for wholeness; expressed in medieval language: the union 
with God.”191  Jung found it significant that the Latin term for “alcohol” is spiritus.  
“You use the same word for the highest religious experience as well as for the most 
depraving poison.  The helpful formula [for recovery] therefore is: spiritus contra 
spiritum (spirit against spirit).”192  We might attempt to expand Jung’s insightful though 
cryptic claim by displaying the similarities between the theological virtue-habit of 
charity and the habit of addiction. 
 First.  Aquinas claims that charity is friendship, the energy that flows from 
relationship between a lover and the beloved.  Contrary to Aquinas’s claim that “it 
would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse” (2-2.23.1),193 it is 
                                                 
189 Peter Ferentzy claims, “Essentially, craving is modernity’s substitute for spirits, demons, or other 
mystical constructs,” “Foucault and Addiction,” 169.  I am not sure what to make of this claim, but it 
offers a potential connection between the last chapter and this one. 
190 There is a line of descent from one of Jung’s patients, a man named Roland H., through Roland’s friend 
Edwin T., and on to Edwin T.’s drinking buddy, Bill W., the founder of Alcoholic’s Anonymous.  What 
was reported to Bill W. by way of Edwin T. was Jung’s statement to Roland H. that there was for him, as 
for other chronic alcoholics, no hope of recovery excepting the rare possibility that Roland “become the 
subject of a spiritual or religious experience—in short, a genuine conversion.”  In a letter to Jung, which 
can be found along with Jung’s response in The Language of the Heart: Bill W.’s Grapevine Writings 
(New York: The A.A. Grapevine, 1988), 276-281, Bill W. claims that it was the severity of this counsel 
that prodded him toward his own conversion and the eventual formulation of the First Step of Alcoholic’s 
Anonymous.  See also Cheever, My Name is Bill, ch. 15.  The two “grandfathers” of A.A. are therefore 
William James and Carl Jung. 
191 Quoted in Seeburger, Addiction and Responsibility, 105. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Aquinas follows Aristotle here in denying that one could be friends with wine because friendship 
implies wishing well for the friend: “for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes 
anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself” (1155b29-31). 
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remarkable that the language that addicts find most transparent to their own experience 
of addiction is the language of relationship, friendship, and love affairs.  Caroline 
Knapp, for example, has written a poignant memoir of her own struggle with addiction 
entitled, simply, Drinking: A Love Story.194  And one A.A. member puts tersely what so 
many others testify when he recounts his addiction in terms of his relationship with “my 
best friend, alcohol” (AA 329). 
When you’re drinking, liquor occupies the role of a lover or a constant 
companion.  It sits there on its refrigerator shelves or on the counter or in the 
cabinet like a real person, as present and reliable as a best friend.195  
 
The bottle was my friend, my companion, a portable vacation.  Whenever life 
was too intense, alcohol would take the edge off or obliterate the problem 
altogether for a time (AA 309). 
 
I was never lonely when I was using, even when I was separated from the people 
I loved most in the world, because my best friends were always with me.  
Cocaine was my running buddy, my soul mate, my faithful lover, my reliable 
colleague, my fun-loving playmate who tagged along everywhere I went.  
Alcohol and cocaine were always there for me, they never let me down.196 
 
Second.  Charity is an infused virtue.  As Aquinas explains with his oft-repeated 
principle that “grace perfects nature” (1.1.8), to say that charity is infused is not to say 
that it does violence to the natural capacities of human persons.  Rather, charity is the 
supplementation of our natural powers, expressed through acquired habits, with a habit 
that empowers us to achieve a type of activity that is beyond natural human capacity.  
Although charity does not destroy our acquired habits, neither does it merely utilize 
those other habits as vehicles for its own ends.   
                                                 
194 Tragically, Caroline Knapp died from lung cancer in 2002, six years after writing what, in my opinion, 
is the most insightful and honest alcoholism memoir and, alongside Ann Marlowe’s How to Stop Time, 
one of the best addiction memoirs to date.  She was 42. 
195 Knapp, Drinking, 96. 
196 Moyers, Broken, 185. 
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It seems to me that this arrangement is importantly analogous to the habit of 
addiction.  In what sense might we say that addiction is an “infused” habit?  At the 
superficial level we observe that addiction is often in part a function of ingesting a 
foreign substance into a person’s body, much as the love of God that is charity is said to 
be “poured forth in our hearts” by God (2-2.24.2).  But, more saliently, we have noticed, 
particularly in several of the “drunkalogues” from Chapter IV, that addiction may take 
hold as the result of one intense experience.  Does this not call into question the claim 
that addiction is a habit since habits are developed over time?  Not so for Aquinas: “If an 
act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit” (1-2.51.3).  Addiction may 
at times be like certain religious conversions, in this respect, that the experience is one of 
being overcome and encountered by some power external to the self.  Similar to the 
memories that many converts have of the exact place and time of their conversions, one 
alcoholic observed, “I don’t think most moderate, social drinkers remember so clearly 
the night they had their first drink” (AA 370).  Just as the habit of charity may be poured 
forth instantaneously in a moment of conversion (although this is not the only way 
charity is claimed to be poured forth), so the habit of addiction may take hold 
instantaneously as if coming from some power external to the agent (although this is not 
the only way addiction is generated).  
Third.  Aquinas says that charity orders the moral life because it is the form of every 
virtue.  He says that “charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their 
exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause” (2-2.23.8).  How 
might one virtue be the efficient cause of another?  Aquinas offers a hint when he 
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explains that “since charity has for its object the last end of human life, viz., everlasting 
happiness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man’s whole life, by commanding 
them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue” (2-2.23.4).  The distinction between 
efficient cause and formal cause parallels this distinction between commanding and 
eliciting.  For if charity were really the formal cause of every virtue, then every virtue 
would simply be charity (as Augustine seemed to think), and ipso facto charity would 
elicit all acts of virtue.  But Aquinas does not think that charity is the formal cause of all 
the virtues, but rather their efficient cause.197  Charity therefore commands the acts of all 
the other virtues.  Aquinas explains how one virtue can command another: “Nothing 
hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue being commanded by another virtue as 
commanding it and directing it to this other virtue’s end” (2-2.32.1).  And, Aquinas 
contends, this is what Aristotle has in mind when he says that “if one man commits 
adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while another does so at the 
bidding of appetite though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter would be 
held to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the former is unjust, but not self-
indulgent (1-2.18.6; 1130a23-28).  In the former case, we should say that the vice of 
avarice commands the vice of lust to elicit the action of adultery whereas in the latter 
case we should say that the vice of lust commands the vice of prodigality to elicit the 
action of financial carelessness.  In parallel fashion, therefore, charity commands the 
                                                 
197 Michael Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love, 193, explains that Aquinas continued to use the 
language of “form” even after he rejected the thesis that charity is the formal cause or exemplar cause of 
the virtues, primarily to maintain continuity with Peter Abelard’s widely accepted dictum that charity 
“informs all the virtues.”  However, Sherwin explains that “in his mature presentation of this traditional 
doctrine, although he retains the language of form, he deeply modifies its meaning.  He continues to 
describe charity as the form of the virtues, but denies that charity acts on the virtues as a formal or 
exemplar cause.  Instead, he now proclaims that charity is solely the efficient cause of the virtues,” p. 202. 
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other virtues to act as being directed to the end that charity seeks.  Charity commands 
acts of justice, temperance, courage, etc. for the sake of the realization of charity’s end, 
friendship with God.  In this way, charity orders all virtue because it supplies the specific 
directedness toward a unified substantial end which the virtues otherwise lack because 
they are at best directed to an abstract end (happiness or eudaimonia) which is always 
open to alternative specifications.   
Addictions exert enormous control over human persons because they supply this 
need for an ordering principle.  I want to argue that, like Thomistic charity, addiction is a 
habit that commands all other activities of persons and directs each of those activities to 
a unified and substantial end.  The person in the grips of major addiction finds that he or 
she operates in a profoundly simplified moral terrain, in which every activity, every 
relationship, every object of value is reinterpreted and invested with meaning only as it 
relates to the end of the practice of the addiction.  Listen, for example, to the following 
testimonies of addicts. 
It was frightening that drink was being substituted for more and more of the 
things I really enjoyed doing.  Golf, hunting, fishing were now merely excuses to 
drink excessively…Never having enough, always craving more, the obsession for 
alcohol gradually began to dominate all my activities, particularly while 
traveling.  Drink planning became more important than other plans (AA 349). 
 
I had entered the drinking life.  Drinking was part of being a man.  Drinking was 
an integral part of sexuality, easing entrance to its dark and mysterious treasure 
chambers.  Drinking was the sacramental binder of friendships.  Drinking was 
the reward for work, fuel for celebration, the consolation for death or defeat.198 
 
To me, taking a bath was just being in a place with a bottle where I could drink in 
privacy (AA 297). 
 
                                                 
198 Pete Hammill, A Drinking Life: A Memoir (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), 146-147.  
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Even today I vividly remember what it was like to organize my whole life around 
smoking.  When things went well, I reached for a cigarette.  When things went 
badly, I did the same.  I smoked before breakfast, after a meal, when I had a 
drink, before doing something difficult, and after doing something difficult.  I 
always had an excuse for smoking.  Smoking became a ritual that served to 
highlight salient aspects of experience and to impose structure on what would 
otherwise have been a confusing morass of events.  Smoking provided the 
commas, semicolons, question marks, exclamation marks, and full stops of 
experience.  It helped me to achieve a feeling of mastery, a feeling that I was in 
charge of events rather than submitting to them.  This craving for cigarettes 
amounts to a desire for order and control, not for nicotine.199 
 
As each of these testimonies displays, addiction simplifies and orders life by narrowing 
the focus of the addict onto one object, one “final end.”  This phenomenon is sometimes 
overlooked because of the contemporary definition of addiction in terms of “loss of 
control.”  But what each of these testimonies, and especially the last, make plains is that 
the lure of addiction lies precisely in its ability to give the addict a sense of being in 
control of his or her life and of being able to assess and evaluate every possible course of 
action in terms of one definite end that eclipses every other contender for absolute 
allegiance.  Paradoxically, the addict loses control over his or her addiction exactly to 
the extent that this ordering and controlling power of addiction insinuates itself into the 
agent’s view of the world by converting the agent’s cogitative estimation.  This is 
another source of the deep ambivalence characteristic of major addiction.  Through 
rational deliberation and persuasion, the agent may come to believe that his or her 
addiction has destroyed his or her life by wresting control from the agent him- or herself.  
But the cogitative estimation is not easily convinced, for it is precisely because of its 
ordering and controlling power that the object of desire has become an addicting object.  
                                                 
199 Elster, Strong Feelings, 64. 
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When William Burroughs describes the life of the heroin addict as being “measured out 
in eyedroppers of morphine solution,”200 we are likely to recoil in disgust.  We fail to 
recognize, however, that the strength of the addiction resides, not primarily in the heroin 
on in the sensory pleasures that it provides, but rather in this simplicity and beauty of 
having one’s life measured by one standard, harmonized with one melody, directed to 
one end. 
 Addictive objects are addictive because they enable a person to regulate his or her 
life.  This is why, among the various classes of mind-altering substances, very few 
persons are addicted to hallucinogens like LSD or mescaline.  Hallucinogens are 
unpredictable in their effects, such that the user can never know what type of “trip” to 
expect.  Because hallucinogens cannot provide a regular experience, they cannot regulate 
the rest of experience.  They lack the sameness and singularity of experience in light of 
which an addict might come to understand and interpret the worth of the rest of his or 
her activity.  It is because hallucinogens cannot provide the “artificial sameness,” which, 
according to Stanton Peele “is the keynote of addictive experience,” that they so rarely 
trigger the ordering habit of addiction.201   
 Understanding the power of addiction to enable an addict to gain a sense of control 
over his or her life and order the activities of that life to one substantial end puts us in a 
position to understand the sorts of lame “excuses” that alcoholics and other addicts find 
                                                 
200 Burroughs, Junky, xvi. 
201 Stanton Peele and Archie Brodsky, Love and Addiction (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 
1975), 52.  Given my thesis that addiction is an analogue to charity, Peele and Brodsky’s book is 
interesting.  However, whereas I am arguing that addiction can be illuminated by Aquinas’s account of 
charity, they are arguing that much of what we call “love” is really a counterfeit of addiction.  This raises 
the important question of how addiction differs from genuine love, to which we shall turn in the last 
section of this chapter. 
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for engaging in addictive behavior, what Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions calls “the 
invention of alibis.” 
We had made the invention of alibis a fine art.  We had to drink because times 
were hard or times were good.  We had to drink because at home we were 
smothered with love or got none at all.  We had to drink because at work we 
were great successes or dismal failures.  We had to drink because our nation had 
won a war or lost a peace.  And so it went, ad infinitum” (TT 47). 
 
If anything can count as an excuse to use, then nothing seems like a legitimate one.  But 
there is more going on here than the mere invention of alibis.  The fact that anything can 
count as an excuse to use is a function of the power that addiction has to incorporate 
every aspect of an addict’s life into its own rhythms and rationales.  It really is the case 
for the alcoholic that the “good times” are vacuous without alcohol, that the hard times 
are unbearable without alcohol, that loneliness doesn’t feel lonely with alcohol, that 
loving relationships are mediated by alcohol, that success can only be celebrated with 
alcohol, that only alcohol can insulate from the rejection of failure, and so on.  To be an 
alcoholic is to enter into such a relationship with alcohol that everything else in life 
makes sense only if it is accompanied by alcohol.  Like Thomistic charity, addiction 
transfigures the most ordinary activities into meaningful transactions.   
Aristotle claimed that the practice of theoria was the best of all human activities 
because, among other reasons, “it is the most continuous, since we can contemplate truth 
more continuously than we can do anything” (1177a22-24).  But even if it is the most 
continuous form of activity for Aristotle, it is nevertheless not altogether continuous.  It 
is disrupted by our having to “do” things, and, even if it were possible to continue to 
contemplate while “doing” things, we have shown that for Aristotle the one would have 
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no bearing on the other, and this is the source of another, deeper discontinuity.  
Thomistic charity resolves these discontinuities because, when infused with charity, the 
“doings” of an agent are not merely instrumental to some separate activity of charity but 
rather are partly constitutive of charity in that doing things out of charity is both an 
expression of and a maturation of the agent’s friendship with God.  Even though 
Aristotle praises theoria as the “most continuous” activity available to human beings, he 
would have found it odd and irresponsible to advise anyone to “contemplate 
continually,” for even the most virtuous person has to survive and the things required for 
survival cannot count as contemplation.  But given that practical activities can be 
performed in charity, Aquinas does not find it odd or irresponsible when St. Paul advises 
the faithful to “pray without ceasing” (I Thess. 5.17, AV).   
If the informing nature of charity makes possible Paul’s otherwise impossible 
admonition to “pray continually,” the informing nature of addiction makes possible what 
alcoholics call “thinking drinking”—the amazing capacity of the alcoholic to orient all 
of his or her thoughts and activities around the governing center of addiction. 
My friend Gail, who’s a professional chef, used to get up at five A.M. and stand 
in her shower obsessing about what she’d drink that night, and when she’d be 
able to drink, and how and how much and with whom.  She did this daily, 
obsessing in the shower about booze every morning at five A.M.202 
 
I had lived my entire life under the influence of mood and mind-altering 
substances.  It wasn’t that I was high on drugs every minute of the day—I was 
sometimes clean for several days at a time—but my obsession with drugs altered 
my perspective and my feelings about everything else, including my love for 
Mary, my relationship with my parents and siblings, my job, my soul, even my 
God.  I hadn’t just become addicted—addiction had become me.203 
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Addiction exploits “the instinctual need for one-pointedness; it distils the complexity of 
human experience into something essentially simple; it channels all needs into one.”204  
This is the mark of addiction sometimes called obsession. 
 A fourth and final analogy between charity and addiction.  Aquinas contends that 
charity is conditioned on the infinitude of human desire.  Because “rational 
concupiscence is infinite,” only charity, communion with the Infinite, can satisfy our 
hunger for wholeness.  “We seek something so lovely that in possessing it we want no 
more.”205  And charity is supposed to provide this satisfaction because it offers a good 
that exceeds the natural human capacity for happiness.  In what sense is addiction a 
quest for this completion and, furthermore, an expression of the conviction that such 
completion lies in a very real sense beyond our natural human limitations? 
 We have already noted Jung’s opinion on this matter: he believed that addiction was 
in fact a function of “the spiritual thirst of our being for wholeness; expressed in 
medieval language: the union with God.”  One could quote the testimonies of addicts 
interminably on this point. 
Most alcoholics I know experience that hunger long before they pick up the first 
drink, that yearning for something, something outside the self that will provide 
relief and solace and well being.206 
 
[Addictive desires] have more to do with the soul than the brain.  They illuminate 
the yearning for wholeness, for perfection, for making everything feel good and 
right again.  They’re about the deepest human hunger and thirst to experience 
rapture, joy, heaven.207 
 
                                                 
204 Pryor, Survival of the Coolest, 132. 
205 Wadell, The Primacy of Love, 39. 
206 Knapp, Drinking, 55. 
207 Moyers, Broken, 207. 
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Addicts are persons who seem unable to deny that “rational concupiscence is infinite.”  
The deep yearning for completion that is characteristic of addiction manifests itself in 
various ways, each of which parallels closely features of Thomistic charity.  We shall 
look briefly at the extremism of addiction, the perfectionism of addiction, and addictive 
pursuit of ecstasy.   
 In a question on “Whether in Loving God We Ought to Observe Any Mode?” 
Aquinas states an important difference between charity and the acquired moral virtues.   
The end of all human actions and affections is the love of God, whereby 
principally we attain to our last end, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 6), wherefore the 
mode in the love of God, must not be taken as in a thing measured where we find 
too much or too little, but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, 
and where the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love 
God the better our love is (2-2.27.6). 
 
Unlike our other appetites, appetites for food, drink, sex, human friendship, pleasure, 
wealth, health, and so on, Aquinas contends that our appetite for God need not, indeed 
should not, be subjected to any measure.  Temperance is to love the sensory pleasures of 
taste and touch with measure.  Justice is to love the good for another with measure.  
Courage is to love the goods of life and honor with measure.  But charity is to love God 
without measure.  In fact, the measureless love of God that is charity, since it rightly 
orders all other acts to its own end, has the quality of imposing measure on every other 
habit.  If we love God without limit, Aquinas thinks, we will find that we love every 
other good proportionately, according to the right measure.  Charity, therefore, directs us 
toward an object that we are to pursue without restraint, and charity promises us that 
extremism in this one direction will translate into right action in every other direction. 
Furthermore, it is precisely because the object that charity seeks after surpasses all 
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natural human capacity in terms of its truth, goodness, and beauty that charity can be an 
unbounded virtue.  The extremism of charity, according to Aquinas, is an expression of 
the surpassing goodness of its object, God.  
 Addiction is, almost by definition, a habit of extremism.  It is, in this sense, like any 
other vice, which, as we recall from Aristotle, is the extreme on either side of the mean 
that is virtue.  But addiction is a totalizing extreme in a way that vices are not, as 
evidenced by its own power to capture and redirect any other virtue or vice to its own 
end.  Addicts simply cannot get enough of that to which they are addicted.  There is no 
such thing as the addictive “mean” or “moderate addiction.”   
Enough?  That’s a foreign word to an alcoholic, absolutely unknown.  There is 
never enough, no such thing…More is always better to an alcoholic; more is 
necessary.  Why have two drinks if you can have three?  Three if you can have 
four?  Why stop?208 
 
Is the extremism of addiction a function of some surpassing or exceeding quality of the 
end it pursues?  What, exactly, are addicts seeking when they engage in addictive 
behavior?  Part of the purpose of this and the previous chapter has been to demonstrate 
that addicts are in search of a kind of order and integrity that seems to elude them in 
their day-to-day lives, whether because of the arbitrariness of modern culture or because 
of some deeper, more universal human longing.  What seems clear is that the addictive 
search is a search for something beyond the quotidian, the mundane, the little pleasures 
of the daily grind.  Francis Seeburger argues, 
An addict is a person who wants more.  Not ‘more of the same,’ more of the 
daily round of gains and losses, of goods and services that suffice for most of us 
most of the time, but ‘more’ in the sense of something altogether different, 
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something no longer measurable by such everyday standards—something ‘more 
than all that.’”209 
 
 We might say that addicts are persons who are unsatisfied with the eudaimonia that 
is countenanced by Aristotle, and which is ultimately rejected by Aquinas as a merely 
proximate form of happiness.  Addictive desire is not for any proximate good but rather 
against every merely proximate good and for a good that is beyond the proximate.  
Addicts seek a perfection of happiness, rather than an approximation or measure.  
Addicts are, as the Big Book describes them, “all or nothing people” (TT 161).  They 
seek comprehensive happiness, nothing less than perfect contentment.  This is why 
abstinence seems to be the only really successful response to addiction.  Addicts are 
simply not capable of imagining a life in which they pursue their ends moderately, in 
which the goods of addictive behavior are watered downed and interspersed with more 
mundane pleasures in an attempt to provide a manageable way of life.   
To me, the idea that a budding alcoholic can learn to drink moderately sounds 
like a contradiction in terms.  (I rarely, if ever, drank moderately, even at the 
beginning.)  It also seems to ignore the more deeply-rooted, compulsive pulls a 
drinker feels toward alcohol; these are needs that don’t respond well to the 
concept of moderation.210 
 
If addiction does not secure perfect contentment—as it manifestly does not—then, the 
addictive mind tends to think, perfect happiness must be discovered through some other 
extreme pursuit.  Abstinence may be the expression of addictive perfectionism.  It is 
precisely because addicts are characterized by a relentless perfectionism that the 
literature of A.A. frequently reminds the recovering alcoholic that a slip along the path 
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of recovery does not license full relapse.  “We claim spiritual progress rather than 
spiritual perfection” (AA 60), recovering addicts are told.  But this is a piece of advice 
that goes against the fundamental picture of the addict with which A.A. and other 
abstinence recovery models work.  It is because A.A. believes that addicts are inveterate 
extremists and perfectionists that they so adamantly reject recovery models that 
champion methods of “harm reduction” by helping addicts learn to moderate their 
drinking rather than requiring complete abstinence of the recovering addict.211 
 The addictive pursuit of a something “more than all that,” a something beyond the 
limitations of the self, is ultimately a pursuit of ecstasy.  Charity, and the theological 
virtues in general, are supposed to be ecstatic virtues in that the agent who possesses 
these habits is at one and the same time the subject and the object of the habit.  Charity, 
for example, inheres in the soul of an agent, but the action that is made possible through 
the habit of charity is really a derivative action, one that derives from a more 
fundamental activity on the part of God.  Charity is possible only so long as God 
continues to pour forth his eternally self-sufficient love into the soul of the one whom he 
has befriended.  Charity is therefore a habit that one suffers fundamentally and enacts 
derivatively.212  Whereas the moral virtues entrench and solidify the agency of the one 
who possesses them, charity displaces the agency of the one in whom it is “poured forth” 
                                                 
211 For a fascinating account of the warring factions in the recovery movement, and a thorough attempt to 
assess the merits of the several distinct recovery philosophies, see Lonnie Shavelson, Hooked: Five 
Addicts Challenge Our Misguided Drug Rehab System (New York: The New Press, 2001). 
212 Paul Wadell says, “The more charity grows in us, the harder God is to resist, because if we grow in 
such passionate love for God we cannot help but suffer God’s love more completely,” The Primacy of 
Love, 91. 
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by taking possession of the agent.213  Whereas the moral virtues direct the gaze of the 
agent to his or her own sufficiency, charity redirects the gaze of the agent to a 
sufficiency external to him- or herself.  Charity is, therefore, the realization of ecstasy, 
the movement beyond the confines of the self to a reality that comprehends the self but 
is not contained by the self.  This is why Aquinas speaks of charity as a habit of 
“participation” (2-2.24.5).  And this is why, for Aquinas, the saint differs so profoundly 
from the hero.  For the saint recognizes that he or she is not at the center of the story 
whereas the hero is the one upon whom the story depends.  The saint, to the extent that 
he or she exhibits the virtue of charity, becomes not more but less visible, both to him- 
or herself and to others whereas the hero becomes more visible to him- or herself and to 
others.214  Charity is a habit of ecstasy, whereas natural courage, 215 for example, is a 
habit of self-realization and self-control. 
 Addiction, like charity, is a habit of ecstasy.  Bruce Wilshire contends that 
“addictions are acts of violence directed at our own insignificance.”216  If Wilshire is 
right about this, then the designation “drug abuse” is a euphemism; some form of “self 
                                                 
213 Ralph Waldo Emerson: “The one thing we seek with insatiable desire is to forget ourselves…to do 
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abuse” is at stake.  But, although Wilshire argues that the way to move beyond addiction 
is by coming to grips with our own significance, one could read this differently.  For it 
may be that we are, relatively speaking, insignificant.  And, further, we may believe that 
the contentment for which we yearn does indeed lie outside of ourselves, only to be 
realized through some ecstatic movement.  This was the position of the Christian 
theologian Augustine, and the way in which he expresses his view is of particular 
interest to our inquiry.  Augustine prays: 
You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for 
yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you…Who will enable me to 
find rest in you?  Who will grant me that you come to my heart and intoxicate it, 
so that I forget my evils and embrace my one and only good, yourself?217 
 
Addiction, then, might be understood as the quest for this ecstatic intoxication.  The 
addict, recognizing his or her own insignificance and his or her own insufficiency to 
realize perfect happiness, seeks to be taken up into a consuming experience, seeks to be 
the object rather than the subject of experience, craves to suffer happiness rather than 
make it.218  There is, then, a striking parallel between the would-be saint and the addict.  
As Francis Seeburger claims,  
the genuine opposite of the addict is not the saint, but the lukewarm, complacent, 
comfortably ‘decent’ person represented by the rich young man of the 
Gospel….The alcoholic or other addict stands in the shadow of the saint.  In 
                                                 
217 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), I.i (1), v (5), 
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218 When a friend of mine who is an EMT heard about my dissertation, he told me about his first run-in 
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contrast, those who have never been addicted only because they lack enough 
passion for it are not even in sainthood’s vicinity.219 
 
The pull of addiction is this pull toward ecstasy, the expression of a deep discontent with 
the life of “just so” happiness, and the pursuit of an all-consuming love.220  Addictions 
are addicting just to the extent that they tempt us with the promise of such a perfect 
happiness, and they are enslaving just to the extent that they mimic and give intimations 
of this perfection. As Ann Marlowe puts it, “addiction isn’t just a possible outcome, it’s 
a partial motivation for drug use.  Putting it another way, if heroin were nonaddictive, it 
wouldn’t be a good enough metaphor for anyone to want to try it.”221 
 
The Habit of Addiction 
 It may be helpful at this point to clarify what is and is not being argued.  I am not 
attempting to provide a straightforward causal account of why people engage in any 
number of addictive activities.  The reader who is looking for this will certainly be 
struck by the abstract and ideal nature of my arguments about the connections between 
modernity and addiction and between charity and addiction.  Isn’t it much simpler than 
all that?  Don’t alcoholics drink because they hurt and drink takes away the pain?  Don’t 
crack addicts smoke because they lead lives of squalor and misery and crack offers an 
escape?  Don’t cocaine addicts use because they can’t take the pressure that their lives 
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impose upon them and cocaine makes them feel capable, sufficient?  The answer to all 
of these questions is yes although in concrete cases each of these explanations would be 
too general.  People use drugs and engage in addictive behavior because of rejection, the 
loss of a child, family neglect, sexual abuse, divorce, getting fired, ridicule and 
humiliation by peers, depression, the pressure of living up to a parent’s expectations, 
anger at an overbearing authority, and on and on.   
 Rather than offering an account of why people engage in addictive behaviors, I am 
attempting to offer an account of why they become addicted to those behaviors, why it 
is, that is, that addiction takes on a life of its own, has its own rationality and rhythm, 
and persists regardless of change in more immediate circumstances.  I am trying to 
articulate, not the power of alcohol or crack or heroin or pornography or shopping, but 
the power of addiction.  My argument has been that addiction is a habit informed, as all 
habits are, by rationality, and I have been trying to probe the structure of this rationality.  
I suggested in Chapter III that addiction is substantially a habit of what Aquinas calls the 
cogitative estimation, and in Chapter IV and this chapter I have been trying to display 
how addiction insinuates itself into the cogitative estimation by supplying an order and 
integrity to an addict’s life, order and integrity that we as human beings, and particularly 
as modern human beings, crave.  This is why I have paid much attention to the 
constructive and positive potential of addiction and said relatively little of the 
destruction and havoc it wreaks.  Addiction is mysteriously powerful, but if we fail to 
ask in what that power consists, then we make it not only mysterious but also foreign.  I 
hope my arguments in the last two chapters have made addiction less foreign, giving us 
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ways to think about the pull that addiction has on all of our lives.  That is, I hope the last 
two chapters have shown how near, rather than how far, each of us is to the major addict. 
 I should also like to reassert the status of my arguments connecting addiction to 
charity.  It is not my intention to turn addiction into a backhanded apologetic for a 
Thomistic theological ethics, or to insist that addiction can only be supplanted by 
charity.222  Rather, the point of the argument is to demonstrate how addiction operates as 
a moral strategy, fulfilling a particular function in the moral life.  Aquinas, of course, 
offered a philosophical and theological account of charity because he had to make sense 
of what scripture meant by saying that the love of God is poured forth into the hearts of 
the faithful.  But I have tried to show that it is also true that charity fills a lacuna in the 
thought of Aristotle.  Aquinas’s account of charity is of interest because it is offers a 
detailed account of what a habit would need to empower us to do if it were to fill that 
lacuna.   
 In Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions, one reads: “Our sponsors declared that we 
were the victims of a mental obsession so subtly powerful that no amount of human 
willpower could break it” (TT 22).  How, more specifically, does addiction so subtly yet 
powerfully enlist the allegiance of rationality and thereby become a “mental obsession”?  
And, if we can answer this, how does this put us in a position to understand the 
recalcitrance of addiction to “human willpower”?  Whatever means it employs, addiction 
                                                 
222 Although wary of natural theologies that start from something called “the human condition,” I must 
admit that Reinhold Neibuhr’s contention that the doctrine of original sin is the one Christian doctrine for 
which we have indisputable evidence has recurred in my thinking throughout this project.  Trying to 
account for the pain that he believes is behind all addiction, William Pryor, who is not a Christian, writes: 
“But what of that original pain?  This is something mysterious.  We all have a pain at the root of us.  It has 
been called original sin.  It’s the burden of being here,” Survival of the Coolest, 213.   
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does not insinuate itself through rational deliberation.  It is not as though the addict, 
when confronted by the choice whether or not to act on his or her addiction, determines 
through deliberation that, all things considered, acting on the addiction is in his or her 
best interest.  Indeed, the paradox of addictive action is that it so often is performed in 
the face of rational deliberation to the contrary.  At any rate, addictive behavior is rarely 
preceded by calm deliberation: “The truth, strange to say, is usually that [the alcoholic] 
has no more idea why he took that first drink than you have” (AA 23).  The behavior of 
the addict becomes baffling, frighteningly so, precisely because it seems disconnected 
from the control that agents exert through deliberation.  This is why addicts often speak 
of ‘watching themselves’ pour another drink or take another hit.  It is the essence of the 
“loss of control” phenomena, and it is why addiction is experienced as a kind of 
enslavement or bondage, as a depletion rather than an enhancement of agency.  Rational 
deliberation is powerless in the face of it.  Caroline Knapp describes her own deluded 
and failed attempt to subject her alcoholism to the searching rays of discursive thought.   
Child of an analyst that I am, I’d add insight to the list of remedies [I tried]—and 
I did, all the way to rehab.  Tease out the reasons you drink—the hidden rages 
and fears, the psychological roots—and the problem will resolve itself.  Think 
your way to mental health; turn it over to the psychiatric couch.223   
 
But addiction takes on a rationality of its own, a life that cannot be taken hostage simply 
by retracing the deliberations that precede addictive action.  
 Interestingly, though, Knapp does not conclude from this failure of the discursive 
searchlight that addiction is without its reasons or that addiction is fundamentally 
irrational.  On the contrary, she claims that addiction is the enactment of a certain 
                                                 
223 Knapp, Drinking, 117. 
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knowledge.  “Over time, over many, many drinks, that knowledge is incorporated, the 
lessons folded into the soul: Liquor eases.  Liquor soothes and protects, a psychic 
balm.”224  This knowledge seems unhelpfully vague, but Knapp insists that any attempt 
to move beyond this level and to describe some more particular knowledge that 
addiction enacts can only be dishonest.   
There is no simple answer.  Trying to describe the process of becoming an 
alcoholic is like trying to describe air.  It’s too big and mysterious and pervasive 
to be defined.  Alcohol is everywhere in your life, omnipresent, and you’re both 
aware and unaware of it almost all the time; all you know is you’d die without it, 
and there is no simple reason why this happens, no single moment, no 
physiological event that pushes a heavy drinker across a concrete line into 
alcoholism.  It’s a slow, gradual, insidious becoming.225 
 
The condition of being both “aware and unaware of [the object of addiction] almost all 
the time” sounds at first like an admission of self-deception or denial.  Knapp speaks 
candidly about denial, and we shall have something to say in the last section of this 
chapter about the centrality of self-deception to addiction, but self-deception is not the 
only way to interpret this phenomenon of being simultaneously aware and unaware.  We 
might also think about the difference between rationality at the level of deliberation and 
rationality at the level of habit.  We have already described how addiction, as it 
entrenches itself in the cogitative estimation of an addict, takes on an ordering function 
in the life of the addict, such that every other activity and good is rendered in terms of 
the calculus of addiction.  But rarely is this ordering function spelled out at the level of 
                                                 
224 Ibid., 59. 
225 Ibid., 9. 
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explicit consciousness.226  Addiction may play this informing role without entering in as 
a term of syllogistic reasoning, without, that is, factoring into an agent’s deliberative 
reasoning.  In a remarkably insightful chapter entitled “In Vodka Veritas,” Knapp tries to 
convey the way in which alcohol can become a mental obsession so subtle that we don’t 
notice its becoming.227  
      It’s the equation we all lived by, every single alcoholic I know: 
   Discomfort + Drink = No Discomfort (61) 
   Fear + Drink = Bravery (66) 
   Repression + Drink = Openness (69) 
   Pain + Drink = Self-Obliteration (70) 
The mathematics of self-transformation (61).  At heart alcoholism feels like the 
accumulation of dozens of such connections, dozens of tiny fears and hungers 
and rages, dozens of experiences and memories that collect in the bottom of your 
soul, coalescing over many many drinks into a single liquid solution (69).  
 
We might add to the equations:  
Fragmentation + Addiction = Identity 
Arbitrariness + Addiction = Consuming Purpose 
Boredom + Drink = Stimulation 
Vacuity + Addiction = Meaning 
   Finitude + Addiction = Ecstasy 
 
These are the equations, the reasons, that habituate the cogitative estimation.  It is not the 
“many many drinks” so much as these “connections” made and “equations” solved over 
the course of many drinks that make up the “acts” that, with much repetition, habituate 
the cogitative estimation.   
For the normal drinker, a drink is a drink.  For the alcoholic, a drink is a life.  
Addiction is not something that an addict has, like a cough or a fever or even a disease.  
                                                 
226 The notion of “explicit consciousness” as a “spelling out” is the centerpiece of Herbert Fingarette’s 
analysis of self-deception, which we shall explore in depth shortly.  Fingarette, Self-Deception (London: 
Routledge, 1969), 38-39. 
227 I have drawn from several parts of this chapter to assemble a concentrated version of the case that she 
makes in narrative prose.  The page number for each line or lines is in parentheses. 
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Addiction is a way of life.  It is the habit of seeing the world a certain way and of being 
in the world a certain way.  It is a habituation of perception, passion, and imagination: 
the way that an addict perceives, feels, imagines—all of this is mediated by the meaning 
that his or her addiction has taken on in the cogitative estimation.  Addiction, like most 
habits, instills intelligence in the emotions and imagination.228  Every act, even the most 
menial act, that a practicing addict performs carries within itself this intelligence, this 
far-reaching and fundamental rationality of addicted being-in-the-world.  “The life of an 
addict constitutes a vocation.”229  Addiction is a “whole philosophy of life” (TT 25). 
 Neurologically, this means that addiction is not primarily about the relationship 
between those specific neurons to which addictive substances may attach thereby 
mimicking or blocking other “natural” neurotransmitters.  These chemical reactions 
account for the processes of tolerance and withdrawal, but, as was shown in the 
Introduction, tolerance and withdrawal are at most results of addiction.  Neurologically, 
addiction entails the interrelation and interdependence of vast systems of cells that have 
to do with comfort, confidence, identity, meaning, purpose—in short, the terms of all of 
those “equations” performed, corroborated, and recorded by the addict’s cogitative 
estimation. 
A person who becomes temporarily addicted to narcotic painkillers in the 
hospital may be able to withdraw from the drug more quickly and with much 
greater serenity than another person can withdraw from the loss of a job or a 
loved one.  The first person’s addiction, although chemically intense, involves 
perhaps only a few million cells directly.  It has not had time to influence such 
larger systems of cells as those having to do with the meaning of life, self-image, 
                                                 
228 As Professor John J. McDermott has put it to me in conversation, for the alcoholic alcohol is a 
pedagogue. 
229 Peele and Brodsky, Love and Addiction, 58. 
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and basic security…It is not so difficult to understand how our addictions can 
come to rule our lives.  Each of our major addictions consists not only of the 
primary attachment itself; it also includes the involvement of multiple other 
systems that have been affected by it.  To put it quite simply, addictions are never 
single problems.  As soon as we try to break a real addiction, we discover that in 
many respects it has become a way of life.230 
 
The subtlety and the power of addiction now come into focus as twin aspects of its 
nature as a habit group substantially in the cogitative estimation but implicating the 
imagination and memory, and often the “vegetative soul.”  It is subtle because it 
pervades every aspect of the addict’s being such that he or she cannot step away from it, 
as it were, to locate it in one chain of reasoning or in one facet of consciousness.  And it 
is powerful because, whenever the addict focuses his or her power of deliberation on the 
object of addiction, in an effort to overcome addiction by thinking his or her way out it, 
the object elicits a world of meaning, a whole inchoate and inarticulate “philosophy of 
life” that overflows and eludes straightforward practical reasoning.  It is the nature of 
habit in general to be recalcitrant, to a greater or lesser degree, to the immediate and 
fleeting deliverances of deliberate reason, but this is especially true of habits of the 
cogitative estimation.  For habits of the cogitative estimation can operate as automatism 
habits, to draw on a distinction that was made in Chapter III, and thus they can operate 
quite apart from the conscious mental efforts of an agent, often in spite of those efforts.  
 Addiction, become an automatism habit of the cogitative estimation, incorporates 
the object of addiction into a way of life so pervasively and seamlessly that the very 
effort to excise it often merely confirms and strengthens it.  The first step of A.A.—“we 
admitted we were powerless over alcohol”—is an acknowledgment of this paradox of 
                                                 
230 May, Addiction and Grace, 84-85, my emphasis. 
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addicted agency.  The alcoholic in recovery must come to recognize that, precisely in 
attempting to exert control over his or her addiction, he or she solidifies and entrenches 
the addiction.  The harder he or she tries to straightforwardly will not to drink, the more 
certain becomes his or her failure, because in focusing on the object of addiction he or 
she incites a watertight weltanschauung that can only be entered through the practice of 
the addiction.  John Dewey recognized this paradoxical relationship between the habit of 
addiction and the strivings of rational deliberation, though he does not put it in those 
terms.    
The hard drinker who keeps thinking of not drinking is doing what he can to 
initiate the acts which lead to drinking.  He is starting with the stimulus to his 
habit.  To succeed he must find some positive interest or line of action which will 
inhibit the drinking series and which by instituting another course of action will 
bring him to his desired end…The discovery of this other series is at once his 
means and his end.  Until one takes intermediate acts seriously enough to treat 
them as ends, one wastes one’s time in any effort at change of habits.231 
 
One of the great insights of A.A. and of the twelve-step recovery model in general is 
the recognition of the addictive habit’s recalcitrance to direct deliberation and willpower.  
It is for this reason, for example, that only one of the twelve steps—the first—even 
mentions alcohol.  The other eleven steps can be understood as exhortations to “find 
some positive interest or line of action which will inhibit the drinking series and which 
by instituting another course of action will bring [the addict] to his desired end.”  That is 
to say, the wisdom of the twelve-step programs is in the recognition that the habit of 
addiction can only be supplanted through the development of another habit that is as 
pervasive and compelling as the habit of addiction.  One way of life can only be 
                                                 
231 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 28. 
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supplanted by another, and for this reason A.A. is rightly understood by its members to 
be a way of life.  “The program is a plan for a lifetime of daily living” (AA 317).  
Working the steps is not some magic formula that prevents the alcoholic from drinking 
while leaving him or her otherwise the same.232  Rather, working the steps is about 
becoming the kind of person who does not perceive the world as an addict.  This is at the 
heart of the A.A. adage that the Fellowship is not mainly about teaching you how to quit 
drinking but about teaching you how to live sober.  The addict who thinks of the steps 
strictly as means to an end will almost inevitably relapse.  Becoming the kind of person 
who can work the steps as a way of life must be for the recovering addict an end in itself.  
The method is one of indirection.  The addict takes on responsibility for aspects of his or 
her life that may be under more immediate control, that may not trigger the automatism 
of addiction, and, in so doing, finds that he or she has indirectly responded to the 
addiction.   
 
Is Charity an Addiction? 
 We have been investigating addiction without first offering a definition of it.  We 
have focused instead on several prominent “marks” of addiction—tolerance, withdrawal, 
craving, loss of control, relapse, obsession—in an attempt to state philosophically how 
these marks can be illuminated by the conception of addiction as a habit, as a peculiar 
possibility of human action.  But we have not tried to carefully circumscribe the domain 
of addiction, or to say what could and could not count as an addiction.  Can a person be 
                                                 
232 The drug Antabuse (Disulfuram), mentioned in the Introduction, is the attempt to provide such a magic 
formula, which is why it almost inevitably fails to accomplish lasting recovery. 
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addicted to caffeine, shopping, exercise, a cause, a religion?  Rather than delimit the 
boundaries of addiction, I have tried to focus instead on its center and to argue that 
addiction is a habit of the cogitative estimation according to which the object of 
addiction is invested with meaning that extends to every other aspect of an addict’s life.  
I have argued that addiction is a habit that, like charity, informs all other habits by 
determining the end toward which those habits are directed.  I have sometimes spoken of 
“major addiction” as a way of picking out this totalizing and pervading feature of the 
habit of addiction.  I think it unlikely, for example, that coffee could be the object of a 
major addiction.233  If we speak of an addiction to coffee, we tend to be focusing on 
tolerance and withdrawal as constitutive of addiction, a tendency that, as I suggested in 
the Introduction, distracts us from those aspects of addiction that give alcoholism or 
crack-cocaine addiction, for example, their frightening power and allure.  It is also 
possible, of course, for addictions to manifest some of the characteristics I have focused 
on and not others.  For instance, I am convinced that smoking plays an important 
ordering and integrating role in the life of the smoker, but I am doubtful that nicotine 
addiction has much to do with ecstasy.  I have tried to get at the center of what I take to 
be the most extreme and dominating addictions we know of, those in which “loss of 
control” seems the only way to describe the addictive behavior, in the hopes that other 
less severe addictions can nevertheless be illuminated by such a procedure.  As I 
suggested in Chapter III, most current attempts to define addiction are driven by 
                                                 
233 It is interesting to note, however, especially in light of our arguments in Chapter IV about the 
historically relative dimension of addiction, the description offered by one Victorian writer of the long-
term effects of coffee: “The sufferer is tremulous and loses his self-command; he is subject to fits of 
agitation and depression.  He has a haggard appearance.  As with other such agents, a renewed dose of the 
poison gives temporary relief, but at the cost of future misery,” quoted in Elster, Strong Feelings, 128. 
 200 
economic or political strategies directed toward the health-care industry’s responsibility 
to fund certain kinds of treatment programs, which is not in itself an illegitimate 
enterprise.  But that is not our interest here, and so I have avoided the urge to make 
definitive statements about what should and should not be counted as an addiction.   
 Although my own focus may call into question the status of certain addiction-
attributions such as caffeine addiction, in general the consequence of this focus will be a 
widening rather than narrowing of the domain of addiction.  For there is no reason to 
suppose that substances are the only objects of desire that could play a totalizing role in 
an agent’s life.  Substance addictions rightly receive the attention that they do because of 
their visible tragic effects, both on the lives of addicts and those who care about them, 
but in some ways substance addictions are the less insidious kinds of major addictions 
precisely because they grow harder and harder to ignore.  Other major addictions enslave 
quietly but are no less destructive of the humanity of those taken hostage.  What is the 
nature of this destruction, if it cannot be measured in concrete terms like the health of the 
human organism or the loss of family, job, or life?  I shall attempt to answer this 
question by way of answering another question, namely whether or not charity might be 
an addiction.  As it turns out, this question can be approached by asking yet another, not 
so strange, question: Is A.A. an addiction? 
 The charge that A.A. and other twelve-step programs simply substitute one 
addiction for another is not uncommon.   
The Minnesota Model, as the Hazelden method is now called, certainly does help 
addicts find less damaging lifestyles without any chemical support.  But they are 
still addicted lifestyles: AA meetings become the crutch—in rooms thick with 
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chain-smoked cigarette fumes, you have to go on and on describing yourself as a 
recovering addict or alcoholic.234 
 
I became as compulsive about A.A. as I had been about drinking, which was 
necessary because I had been told to spend as much time at meetings as I had 
drinking (AA 396). 
 
A.A. often becomes an alternative way of life, which is as intensely focused on 
abstinence as their former lives had been focused on alcohol.  This passionate 
and complete reorientation is not a unique phenomenon; it is rather like what 
critics of sects would call ideological re-education or a modest form of elective 
brainwashing.235 
 
These are suggestions of “substitution,” which raise the suspicion that A.A. is merely 
another “dependence.”  To the extent that “dependence” is synonymous with 
“addiction,” as it is in most addiction literature, these claims amount to accusations of 
“substitute addiction,” the phenomenon in which one addiction is merely replaced by 
another and the root problem of addiction itself is left unaddressed.236  In a sense, A.A. 
acknowledges that it is a “substitute” for addiction.  Responding to the hypothetical 
alcoholic’s question, “I know I must get along without liquor, but how can I?  Have you 
a sufficient substitute?” the Big Book responds: “Yes, there is a substitute and it is vastly 
more than that.  It is a fellowship in Alcoholics Anonymous” (AA 152).  In what sense is 
A.A. a “substitute” for addiction?  Is it a “substitute addiction”?  How could we tell?  
 Although I have not attempted to define addiction, I have certainly put one of the 
“marks” at the center of my account.  Major addictions, I have argued, are characterized 
by a totalizing obsession with the object of addiction that, through the habituation of the 
                                                 
234 Pryor, Survival of the Coolest, 198. 
235 Fingarette, Heavy Drinking, 88. 
236 “We realize that the word ‘dependence’ is as distasteful to many psychiatrists and psychologists as it is 
to alcoholics.  Like our professional friends, we, too, are aware that there are wrong forms of 
dependence…But dependence upon an A.A. group or upon a Higher Power hasn’t produced any baleful 
results” (TT 38). 
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cogitative estimation, pervades absolutely every aspect of an addict’s life.  If we take 
obsession as the constitutive mark of addiction, i.e. as both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the attribution of addiction, then we would be lead to the conclusion that 
the non-addictive life is the life that is obsession-free, a life of neutrality or detachment.  
This has indeed been the conclusion drawn in a large segment of the recovery 
movement, and it is often associated with Buddhist or other Eastern religions.  Francis 
Seeburger, for instance, argues that “the nonaddictive mind is a detached mind,” and 
“the nonaddictive mind is an abandoned mind.”237  Seeburger approvingly cites the 
thirteenth century German mystic, Meister Eckhart, who “praised detachment as the 
highest of all possible virtues, greater even than humility or love.”238 
 If we accept the claim that the nonaddictive mind is the detached mind, and its 
converse, that the attached, dependent, or obsessed mind is the addictive mind, then it 
becomes hard to imagine how A.A., which presents itself quite straightforwardly as a 
“way of life,” a substitute for addiction, and that upon which a recovering addict must 
“depend,” can be anything but a substitute addiction.  Harder still to imagine is how a 
life of charity, the pinnacle of Aquinas’s theological ethics, can appear as anything but 
another form of addiction, since it promises, not detachment, but on the contrary, ecstatic 
participation in the consuming fire of the divine love.239  If, as Paul Wadell claims, “to 
love God in charity means we lose control over our life precisely where the risk is 
                                                 
237 Seeburger, Addiction and Responsibility, 173. 
238 Ibid., 171. 
239 Josef Pieper, in Faith, Hope, Love, trans. Richard and Clara Winston and Mary Frances McCarthy, 
S.N.D. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997) cites Aquinas’s Commentary on Isaiah to the effect that 
“caritas, because it consumes everything and transforms everything into itself, [is called] a fire.”   
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greatest: we lose control over our self,”240 how is the saint really different than the addict 
who loses control over his or her life by submitting to the object of his or her addiction?  
I am convinced that, despite their similarities, there is an important difference 
between the active addict and the recovering addict, between the addict and the would-
be saint.  I am therefore lead to reject the view according to which addiction is equated 
with any all-consuming singularity of intent and purpose.  How might we distinguish 
between the life of addiction and the life of charity, or between the life of addiction and 
the life of A.A.? 
 We have explored to varying degrees most of the major “marks” of addiction, with 
one important exception.  We have said very little about denial, that mark of addiction 
that is sometimes, like obsession, taken to be in and of itself a sufficient condition for 
addiction.241  And, although I do not believe either obsession or denial alone are 
sufficient conditions for addiction, taken together they are constitutive of the essence of 
addiction.  How so?  
 Denial is a form, indeed the predominant form, of self-deception.  Like that of 
incontinence, the problem of self-deception presents a paradox to philosophers intent on 
representing it in a non-contradictory way.  In fact, the two paradoxes are intimately 
related, although the former has received the greater attention in the scholarly literature.  
Herbert Fingarette has written one of only two contemporary monographs on the subject, 
                                                 
240 Wadell, The Primacy of Love, 91. 
241 “You often hear in AA meetings that denial is the disease of alcoholism, not just its primary symptom,”  
Knapp, Drinking, 136. 
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and his analysis provides a helpful point of departure for our own inquiry into the 
relationship between addiction and the self-deception that is denial.242 
 After surveying an assortment of articles that attempt to provide an analysis of self-
deception, Fingarette concludes that previous efforts have failed to disentangle the 
paradoxical nature of self-deception because they have all characterized self-deception 
in terms of belief and knowledge, and, in turn, they have characterized belief and 
knowledge in terms of “perception” language such as “appear” and “see.”  Given this 
framework, consciousness is understood to be an essentially passive power.  Thus, A.R. 
White can claim that becoming conscious is “not something we do.  Despite what 
philosophers sometimes say, there is no such thing as an ‘act’ of awareness or 
consciousness.”243  Given this picture of consciousness, self-deception can only remain 
paradoxical, because this picture prevents us from grasping one of the central features of 
self-deception, namely purposiveness.  For if self-deception is characterized as an 
agent’s simultaneously holding two incompatible beliefs, and if belief is construed 
passively, as a “seeing” rather than a “looking,” then we are without resources for 
explaining how it makes sense to say that one agent simultaneously believes and 
disbelieves some proposition.  Furthermore the analysis breaks down, because the 
normative claims that accompany attributions of self-deception—“she believed such and 
such, but she should have known better”—are incompatible with the picture of believing 
and knowing as things that happen to agents rather than things that agents do.  If belief is 
                                                 
242 Fingarette, Self-Deception.  The other monograph on the subject is Alfred Mele’s Self-Deception 
Unmasked (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).  Disappointingly, Mele fails to mention 
Fingarette’s fine work, which only confirms the suspicion that Mele’s title may be over-ambitious. 
243 Fingarette, Self-Deception, 38. 
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always something that happens to us rather than something we do, how can we ever be 
culpable for it? 
 Fingarette asserts that we can only begin to make sense of self-deception by 
recognizing that “consciousness is not a ‘seeing’ but a ‘looking.’”244  He denies A.R. 
White’s contention that becoming explicitly conscious is not something we do, 
suggesting that White is mislead to this conclusion by the conventional association of 
consciousness-language with the language of vision.  Pointing out that the language of 
vision is metaphorical, Fingarette suggests that there might be a different metaphor in 
terms of which we could interpret consciousness, and that, furthermore, this different 
metaphor affords a satisfactory and insightful account of self-deception. 
The model I propose is one in which we are doers, active rather than passive.  To 
be specific, the model I suggest is that of a skill…To become explicitly 
conscious of something is to be exercising a certain skill…The specific skill I 
particularly have in mind as a model for becoming explicitly conscious of 
something is the skill of saying what we are doing or experiencing.  I propose, 
then, that we do not characterize consciousness as a kind of mental mirror, but as 
the exercise of the (learned) skill of “spelling-out” some feature of the world as 
we are engaged in it.245 
 
The affinity of Fingerette’s analysis to a philosophy of habit is startling, for “skill” is the 
language of habit.  Fingarette neither claims nor disclaims that an analysis of 
consciousness in terms of skill or habit is original with him, but that it is not should be 
plain from the exposition of Aristotle on incontinence carried out in Chapter II.  In fact, 
the difference between Fingarette and those contemporary philosophers who analyze 
self-deception in terms of the passive reception of belief and knowledge into 
                                                 
244 Ibid., 36. 
245 Ibid., 38-39. 
 206 
consciousness parallels closely the difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s treatment 
of the relationship between knowledge and incontinence.246  Aristotle’s ability to “save 
the appearances” of incontinent action is grounded in his account of knowledge as a type 
of skill or habit, and it is Plato’s inability to see a distinction between abstract and 
embodied knowledge that prevents him from acknowledging the reality of incontinent 
action.247 
 After specifying more fully what “spelling out” and “engagement in the world” 
amount to, Fingarette proposes that self-deception should be understood, not as the 
simultaneous maintenance of two mutually incompatible beliefs, but rather as an agent’s 
purposive avoidance of spelling-out some feature of the world in which he or she is 
engaged, when the agent is readily able to spell out that feature.  “In general, the person 
in self-deception is a person of whom it is a patent characteristic that even when 
normally appropriate he persistently avoids spelling-out some feature of his engagement 
in the world.”248  There is nothing particularly paradoxical about this, but it does lead to 
a further question, one that Fingarette thinks the standard accounts of self-deception, 
because they largely ignore its purposive element, rarely ask: Why would an agent 
intentionally and persistently avoid spelling-out some feature of his or her engagement 
with the world?  Fingarette has argued that “rather than taking explicit consciousness for 
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granted, we must come to take its absence for granted; we must see explicit 
consciousness as the further exercise of a specific skill for a special reason.”249  What 
reasons might an agent have for purposely not exercising the skill of spelling-out some 
feature of his or her experience? 
 The reasons that motivate self-deception, according to Fingarette, have to do with 
matters of personal identity.  Self-deception is the response of an agent who finds him- 
or herself engaged in the world in some way that he or she recognizes to be incompatible 
with the “person” or the “self” that the agent takes him- or herself to be.  “Self-deception 
turns upon the personal identity one accepts rather than the beliefs one has…In general, 
the self-deceiver is engaged in the world in some way, and yet he refuses to identify 
himself as one who is so engaged; he refuses to avow the engagement as his.”250  
Consciousness, therefore, is a selective activity correlative to the activity of constituting 
an identity, and self-deception is a function of this activity to the extent that the 
formation of identity entails the avowal and disavowal of certain of one’s engagements 
in the world.   
 Ironically, and contrary to our cherished intuitions, self-deception, rather than 
signaling lack of character or integrity, is parasitic on the quest for integrity.  “The less 
integrity, the less there is motive to enter into self-deception.  The greater the integrity of 
the person, and the more powerful the contrary inclination, the greater is the temptation 
to self-deception.”251  Furthermore, and relatedly, rather than signaling a lack of 
                                                 
249 Ibid., 42. 
250 Ibid., 67. 
251 Ibid., 140. 
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sincerity, self-deception is only intelligible as a consequence of an agent’s striving for 
sincerity and authenticity of self.  “We feel [the self-deceiver] is not a mere cheat.  We 
are moved to a certain comparison in which there is awareness of the self-deceiver’s 
authentic inner dignity as the motive of his self-betrayal.”252 
Generally, therefore, the problem of self-deception is not a function of lack of 
character but on the contrary, the manifestation of moral earnestness.  One of the great 
achievements of the propagation of the disease concept of addiction has been its ability 
to call into question the moral stigma attached to addiction, to counteract the prevailing 
assumption, especially heightened in the aftermath of the Temperance Movement, that 
addiction is an extreme form of moral depravity.  Surprisingly, however, if we take 
addiction as a kind of habit-group, and the skill or habit of denial as a constitutive habit 
of that habit group, we get the same result.  To the extent that addicts find reason to 
deceive themselves about their addictions, addiction cannot be characterized in terms of 
moral weakness.  It may represent a type of moral mistake or error, but addiction cannot 
be made intelligible as a kind of moral weakness.  This insight allows us to make sense 
of a fact that, on the model of addiction as choice out of a morally weak character, is 
utterly incomprehensible, namely the ability of numerous addicts to recover by 
practicing the Twelve Steps, which are nothing if not a fundamentally moral 
undertaking.  If the defining characteristic of the addict is moral weakness, how could 
the addict be expected to appreciate, let alone practice, the demands of honesty, 
humility, and selflessness that are determinative of the twelve-step program of recovery?  
                                                 
252 Ibid. 
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Paradoxically, to the extent that addicts are self-deceivers, they evidence a capacity for 
just this type of moral endeavor.  Self-deception signals the presence of genuine virtue.  
But when virtues are disordered toward an insufficient end, they become simulacra that 
damage the agent and others exactly to the extent that they harness the vital energy of 
genuine virtues. 
At the heart of addiction is a fundamental contradiction, and it is a contradiction that 
is ultimately its own undoing, holding out the hope of recovery.  The enslaving force of 
addiction, I have argued, resides in its perverse promise to empower a moral agent to 
integrate and order his or her life around one all-consuming end.  But the integration and 
resultant identity that addiction enables is unmasked as a lie insofar as the agent comes 
to recognize that his or her addiction demands that he or she disavow commitments and 
identifications that he or she knows must be included in any life that aspires to the total 
sufficiency of the life of eudaimonia.  Precisely because it provides a simulacrum of that 
in the name of which an agent must finally disavow his or her engagement with it, 
addiction is the most compelling lie there is and therefore the most insidious and 
aggressive motive of self-deception.  Self-deception is the red flag, the evidence that the 
totalizing obsession of addiction is a devastatingly deficient obsession because it cannot 
make good on its promise to incorporate those commitments that an agent already 
recognizes to be integral components of any legitimate claimant to a worthwhile way of 
life.  Addiction achieves integrity and internal order only by demanding the rejection of 
certain goods that the incontinent addict is ultimately unwilling to disavow.  In turn, the 
addiction, which has already through the power of its lie insinuated itself in the addict’s 
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cogitative estimation, must itself be disavowed.  Denial, therefore, testifies 
simultaneously to the power of addiction’s promise and the acknowledgement that the 
promise is a lie.  This is the wisdom behind the A.A. adage: “You are only as sick as 
your secrets.”253 
Those persons who are not already committed to the reality of certain nonaddictive 
goods as necessary constituents of any life that deserves the title of eudaimonia are 
therefore without hope for recovery.  They have no leverage against addiction.  But it is 
also true that they have no motive for self-deception.  The true cynic or nihilist holds no 
hope of recovery, nor is he or she self-deceived.  But then we must ask, can the cynic or 
nihilist be addicted?  It seems to me that the cynic or nihilist cannot be addicted, for 
recognition of addiction is a type of moral achievement, and the attribution of addiction 
ultimately a normative claim.254  Without commitment to certain goods as constitutive of 
the life of human flourishing, there are no grounds to distinguish the insatiable appetite 
to eat when hungry from the insatiable appetite to guzzle alcohol when craving.  There is 
no basis for calling the former a “natural appetite” and the latter an “addiction.”     
We are now in position to complete the argument against detachment as the 
necessary antidote to addiction.  The analysis of self-deception has put us in a position to 
see that addiction cannot be understood strictly as any dominating obsession, but rather 
as any dominating obsession that, through the production of self-deception, bespeaks its 
own inadequacy as a dominating obsession.   
                                                 
253 Moyers, Broken, 225. 
254 Gary Watson notes the inescapably normative dimension of addiction attributions in “Disordered 
Appetites: Addiction, Compulsion, and Dependence,” in Addiction: Entries and Exits, ed. Jon Elster (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999).   
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Self-deception, though not a failure rooted in moral weakness, is nevertheless a kind 
of failure, and if we grasp the source of this failure we also begin to grasp how a person 
might have the ‘purity of heart to will one thing’255 without thereby being an addict.  If 
the denial that is self-deception is not a failure of moral weakness, what is it a failure of?  
Drawing on the work of Fingarette, Stanley Hauerwas and David B. Burrell have argued 
that the failure of self-deception consists in the insufficiency of the stories we tell about 
our own identities. 
What the self-deceiver lacks is not integrity or sincerity but the courage and skill 
to confront the reality of his or her situation.  Self-deception is correlative with 
trying to exist in this life without a story sufficiently substantive and rich to 
sustain us in the unavoidable challenges that confront the self.256 
 
Addiction is not merely any and every dominating and all-consuming purpose.  
Addiction is any and every dominating and all-consuming purpose whose insufficiency 
to sustain the self in his or her pursuit of a worthwhile life is manifested in denial.  This 
is why addicts are notoriously poor at meditation, and why A.A. so frequently 
recommends meditation as central to the life of recovery.  Meditation forces us to reflect 
on the stories that we tell ourselves about our lives, and it therefore represents a very real 
threat to any addiction since it threatens to reveal the insufficiencies of those stories.  To 
the extent that would-be saints are exemplars in the practice of meditation, there is 
                                                 
255 “Aquinas readers have to reckon with his singleness of purpose.  ‘Purity of heart is to will one thing,’ 
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Interestingly, however, those protagonists often enough do not take Aristotle to be similarly alien or mad,” 
Alisdaire MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 165. 
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reason to doubt that charity is an addiction.  To substantiate the claim that A.A. or the 
twelve-step recovery model in general is merely a substitute addiction it would need to 
be shown that those who “work the steps” are in fact engaged in the world in such a way 
that necessitates denial, and in order to substantiate the claim that charity is an addiction 
it would need to be shown that would-be saints are thereby self-deceivers.  This, I think, 
has not been shown. 
 I do not mean to imply that discovering an all-consuming purpose sufficient to 
prevent self-deception is a simple task.  It is without question the most perilous of moral 
endeavors.  As Iris Murdoch says, 
That a belief in the unity, and also in the hierarchical order, of the moral world 
has a psychological importance is fairly evident.  The notion that ‘it all somehow 
must make sense’, or ‘there is a best decision here’, preserves from despair: the 
difficulty is how to entertain this consoling notion in a way which is not false.  
As soon as any idea is a consolation the tendency to falsify it becomes strong: 
hence the traditional problem of preventing the idea of God from degenerating in 
the believer’s mind.257 
 
Murdoch’s work in moral philosophy is a relentless assault on humanity’s tendency to 
console itself by interposing a fantasy between self and reality, and, for Murdoch, there 
is no greater source of such fantasy than the insistence on a totalizing monism.258 
                                                 
257 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 56-57. 
258 In the end, of course, Murdoch is a monist in the Platonic tradition, but she insists that the Good is that 
which enlightens us to see the contingent particularity of what is and prevents us from imposing our own 
pet theory on the reality that confronts us. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN AESTHETIC OF RECOVERY 
 
 Let me restate the argument as concisely as possible.  Addicts seeking recovery face 
a paradox: they are unable to overcome their addiction through straightforward exertion 
of will, but the admission of this powerlessness can be the first step in an indirect 
reformation and reinvigoration of their power to overcome their addiction.  To 
understand this paradox we tried in Chapter II to understand the nature of the first part of 
the paradox, how it is possible that someone fail to do what he or she judges is best to 
do.  This led us to the classic philosophical paradox of incontinent action and into the 
thought of Aristotle, who tried to offer an explanation of incontinent action.  We noticed 
that addiction, understood in terms of incontinence, is a uniquely particularized kind of 
incontinence that Aristotle mentions only in passing, and so we bracketed the question of 
how particularized incontinence differed from more standard kinds of incontinence.  
After delimiting our inquiry by surveying the relation of incontinence to indulgence and 
morbidity, and then the relation of simple incontinence to incontinence from early 
habituation and originally bad natures, we located in Aristotle two lines of response to 
the paradox of incontinence.  One line of response lead us to passion as a source of 
incontinence, what Aristotle called impetuous incontinence.  The other response led us 
to habit as a source of incontinence, what Aristotle called weak incontinence.  Because 
the cases in which what we called the addiction paradox was most paradoxical were 
those cases in which passion could not be identified as the culprit, we determined that 
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we might investigate habit more thoroughly as a possible key to the nature of addictive 
incontinence.  We noted in this connection Aristotle’s crucial insight into the distinction 
between abstract and embodied knowledge. 
 We began Chapter III by noticing parallels between Aristotle’s account of 
impetuous incontinence and the mark of addiction called craving.  We noticed that what 
is most salient about addictive craving is its resilience, and this lead us to a recognition 
that at the heart of incontinent action is the limitation of embodied human will.  This 
transitioned us into Aquinas’s account of the necessity of habit to any adequate ontology 
of human action, and we found that habit is necessary because it enables human persons 
to perform certain actions consistently, successfully, with ease, and on cue.  Each of 
these characteristics of habit was shown to be crucial to Aquinas’s account of how habits 
explain the ability of human agents to act well over a prolonged period of time despite 
the natural limitations on human will.  Insofar as addictive incontinence pointed to the 
inability of addicts to act well over a prolonged period of time, we confirmed that habit 
might hold the key to a more adequate understanding of the addiction paradox.  In order 
to defend this insight against the contemporary reticence to interpret addiction in terms 
of habit, we then had to show how the contemporary understanding of habit was both 
attenuated and confused.  We showed how habit mediated between many of the 
polarities that have characterized the addiction debate, including the polarities of act and 
capacity, instinct and disposition, determinism and free will, the involuntary and the 
voluntary, and, finally, the disease and choice models of addiction.  We then set out to 
explore specifically the types of habits that might be related to addictive incontinence, 
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focusing on Aquinas’s account of the habituation of the body, the imagination, the 
cogitative estimation, and the memory.  We claimed that the burden of the two 
remaining chapters would be to establish the thesis that addiction is substantially a habit 
of the cogitative estimation, and we warned that, due to the very nature of Aquinas’s 
account of the cogitative estimation and its habituation, this would require a wide-
ranging and speculative exercise in the philosophy of culture and philosophical 
psychology.  To conclude the chapter, we noticed that what Aquinas had to say about the 
ability of certain habits to function automatically offered insight into the mark of 
addiction known as loss of control, and that what Aquinas had to say about the role of 
inward “intensity” in the growth and destruction of habits offered insight into the mark 
of addiction known as relapse.   
 After beginning Chapter IV by expanding our account of habits to cover what we 
called habit groups, and noticing how habit groups made sense of Aquinas’s claim that 
right human action required an extensive coordination of a number of separate human 
powers, we moved on to a discussion of the relationship between the habit group of 
intemperance and the phenomena of addiction.  In addition to noting the distinctly 
different role played by shame and guilt in addiction as compared to intemperance, we 
argued that addiction was not best understood as an extension of the habit of 
intemperance because intemperance is concerned with sensible goods whereas addiction, 
contrary to what many suspect, is concerned primarily with moral and intellectual goods.  
We saw that addictions were, in this respect, like habits of virtue the purpose of which is 
to equip an agent to pursue with consistency, ease, and success the moral and intellectual 
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goods constitutive of a worthwhile life.  This lead us into a more careful examination of 
Aristotle’s account of the relationship between the virtues and the good life, and our 
examination prompted two questions: First, how does Aristotle suppose that the virtues 
are to be internally ordered so as to capacitate an agent for the good life?  And second, 
how does Aristotle suppose that the moral virtues are to be integrated with and ordered 
to the practice of theoria or contemplation, which is for Aristotle at least partly 
constitutive of any life worthy to be called happy.  We set out to address the first 
question, putting the second off until the final chapter.  We found, following Alasdair 
MacIntyre, that the question of how the virtues are to be internally ordered did not arise 
for Aristotle as a question for philosophical speculation since Aristotle took himself to 
be articulating the philosophical assumptions implicit in the ordering that the virtues 
already took on in the tightly circumscribed life of the Greek polis.  This led us to reflect 
on the unique urgency of such a question in the modern context and to inquire whether 
there might be a connection between the urgency of this question and the acuteness of 
modern addiction.  We claimed that modernity is characterized by the absence of a 
similarly circumscribed social context in which there is widespread consensus on a 
substantive view of the common good and the conviction that individual good could only 
be derivative of common good, and that this loss eventuated in a crises of arbitrariness, 
boredom, fragmentation, and loneliness.  We then explored the ways in which addiction 
supplies a response to each of these breakdowns in modern society.  At the heart of the 
argument was the contention that addiction supplies a unique response to the crisis 
because it brings with it its own propulsive force and incontrovertible rationale, features 
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that modern persons find lacking in their efforts to establish more socially acceptable 
commitments.  We concluded that addiction is the definitive modern habit because of its 
ability to persuade the cogitative estimations of modern persons that it offers a suitably 
meaningful way of life in the absence of other legitimate contenders. 
  In Chapter V, we returned to the question earlier posed to Aristotle: How is the 
exercise of practical rationality to be integrated with and ordered to the transcendent 
possibilities of human existence realized through the practice of theoria.  We argued that 
this question, unlike the first one posed, does expose a shortcoming in Aristotle’s 
articulation of the life suitable to human beings.  We went on to suggest that Aquinas’s 
theological ethics overcomes this shortcoming by postulating the theological virtues, 
specifically the virtue of charity.  We set out not to defend the legitimacy of this 
postulation but rather to explore the ways in which it functioned structurally as an 
integrating and ordering principle.  We found that Aquinas’s caritas is distinct from 
Aristotle’s theoria in that the former is an appetitive habit and the latter an intellectual 
habit.  Aquinas argued that whereas we are limited by a finite intellect, human desire is 
infinite and therefore can be a genuine point of contact with an infinite God.  Moreover, 
charity, unlike theoria, integrates the practical and transcendent dimensions of human 
existence by transforming practical activity from a mere means to the future pursuit of 
theoria into an actual exercise of charity that is therefore both informed by and 
contributive to the habit of charity.  We then proposed that addiction is a perennial 
temptation to human beings to the extent that it mimics the integrative and ordering 
capacity of Thomistic charity.  Like charity, addiction equips an agent with the 
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singularity of purpose—the obsession—to order every other activity to one final and 
substantial end, and, like charity, addiction extends to an agent the promise of ecstasy.  
We argued that the habit of addiction is produced by the repetition over time of active 
“connections” made in the mind of an agent between the needs occasioned by the 
deficiencies of the modern social context or the universal human desire for 
transcendence and addiction’s apparent ability to meet these needs.  But that lead us to a 
question of whether any singularity of purpose that could meet these kinds of needs was 
by that very token an addiction.  We closed the chapter by arguing that this need not be 
the case, for in addition to its ordering and integrating energy, addiction is also the 
impetus to denial.  We suggested that denial is the evidence that a particular obsession 
cannot make good on its promise to integrate and order a worthwhile life, and we left 
open the possibility that there might be dominating commitments that need not bespeak 
their own inadequacy through the production of self-deception.   
 As was mentioned in Chapter III, and as will have been apparent to the reader, an 
important shift occurs between Chapters III and IV.  I move from a careful explication of 
Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s philosophies of human action into a much different sort of 
engagement with their work.  I tried to state why this sort of transition is dictated by the 
kind of argument I am making, but my occasional reference back to the “cogitative 
estimation” as outlined in Chapter III may have seemed at times forced.  The simple 
reason for this is that the language of “cogitative estimation” is not our language, nor is 
it even front and center in the language of Thomas.  In each case, we could have 
described the matter differently by speaking, for example, of the ways in which 
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addiction recommends itself to an agent through appeal to an agent’s “tacit knowing” 
rather than to an agent’s “propositional reasoning.”259  There are a number of ways to get 
at this distinction, many of them more intuitive and familiar to us than the distinction in 
Aquinas’s faculty psychology between the intellect proper and the cogitative estimation.  
But I have preferred to refer back to the cogitative estimation in order to reiterate that, 
whatever the proper denotation of the source of this knowledge, that source is deeply 
susceptible to habituation.  I think this point needs to be reiterated and underscored 
because there is a temptation to think that the source of our “tacit knowing,” to use 
Polanyi’s description again, is in some sense primordial or unconditioned, and this is not 
so.    
 Were this a more “normal” kind of dissertation, I would feel content to leave the 
argument where it stands, but this is not a normal dissertation, at least not a normal 
philosophy dissertation.  I do not think that any genuine intellectual endeavor is ever just 
an intellectual endeavor, but such a possibility is beyond question when the theme is 
addiction.  My interest in addiction is intensely practical, as I hope my close attention to 
the first-hand reports of addicts has made clear.  I am, like almost every modern person, 
one who has experienced the extraordinary allure and destruction of addiction, both on 
my own life and over the life of entire communities in which I have lived and worked.  I 
would not have set out to think more carefully about addiction if I did not hope to find 
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something helpful and hopeful to say about it, and so in the last several pages of this 
conclusion, I would like to offer a few very brief attempts to mine some of the 
implications of my arguments for the hope of recovery.  
 
Character and Recovery 
 To a certain extent, the Big Book of A.A. traces the failure of addiction to a failure 
of character.  It offers the following analysis of how addicts are made. 
But whenever we had to choose between character and comfort, the character 
building was lost in the dust of our chase after what we thought was happiness.  
Seldom did we look at character-building as something desirable in itself, 
something we would like to strive for whether our instinctual needs were met or 
not.  We never thought of making honesty, tolerance, and true love of man and 
God the daily basis of living (TT 72). 
 
Does this not contradict my argument, for have I not argued, first, that addiction is not a 
form of intemperance and, second, that the very possibility of denial among addicts 
evidences a degree of character?  I have argued for both of these conclusions, but the 
assessment of A.A. does not necessarily contradict these conclusions.  For I have also 
argued, first, that the predominant response of modern persons to the crisis of meaning 
in modern culture is a kind of consumerist intemperance and, second, that most 
addictions find their beginnings in the exercise of such intemperance.  The upshot of my 
overall argument in relation to these points is, first, that although addictions may begin 
as diversions they become much more than diversions and they therefore represent a 
surmounting of the modern suspicion that diversion is all there is, and, second, that 
addicts as a group are probably not any less “moral” and probably have just as much 
“character” as do nonaddicts as a group.  In places, the texts of A.A. imply that the 
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addict is uniquely or specially bad, and, if this were the position of A.A., it would 
represent one point of disagreement.   
 Character is an ambiguous word.  It can be offered as a purely descriptive name of 
that distinctiveness in light of which we can make relatively accurate predictions of how 
a particular person will respond in a given situation, or it can stand as a normative 
evaluation of the degree to which a person is able to confer shape and meaning on his or 
her existence rather than merely reacting to the immediate desires of each passing 
moment.  Lack of character in this latter sense is inevitable to the extent that a 
community or society is unable to explain why it might be intrinsically valuable for a 
person to discipline his or her desires.  If pain of punishment or pain of physical 
suffering are the only reasons that a culture can provide for why anyone should 
discipline or curb specific desires, that culture lacks the resources for forming people of 
character since character is predicated on the assumption that certain goods of human 
existence are inaccessible to any person determined by his or her most immediate 
desires.  That is not to say that there are no modern people of character—the modern 
inheritance includes, alongside the pervasive skepticism about the ultimate defensibility 
of every point of view, a cross-section of traditions that nevertheless maintain to varying 
degrees some claim on modern persons.  To the extent that any of us, whether addicts or 
not, are still prone to self-deception, we see evidence of the sway that certain visions of 
the good still exert on modern persons.  To say that there is a crisis of character in 
modernity is only to say that the problem of character is one that plagues our society as a 
whole, and not the class of addicts in particular. 
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 But there is one important way in which major addicts differ from non-addicts with 
respect to character.  For non-addicts it remains a genuine option to live without 
character in this latter sense, but this is no longer true for addicts.  Major addicts, at least 
major substance addicts, are faced with two stark options: recover or die.  The 
development of character—and on this A.A. is undoubtedly right—is therefore 
indispensable to the hope of recovery.  Why should that be?  The answer given by A.A. 
is a simple one: we are addicts because when faced with challenges that demanded moral 
courage we escaped into addiction; if we are to be anything other than addicts, we will 
have to become the kind of people capable of confronting the challenges of life.  This is 
true, but it does not quite get at the crux of the matter, for addiction and character are not 
the only two options.  There is also distraction, diversion, intemperate indulgence.  Why 
not recover from addiction by becoming a consumer, by finding a worthwhile hobby, by 
taking more vacations? 
 The central thesis of my argument has been that in important respects addiction is 
unlike that response to the world characterized by distraction in immediate titillation 
because, more akin to our normative understanding of character, it does in its own 
twisted way enable an agent to confer shape and meaning on his or her existence since it 
brings with it its own impetus, ordering end, integrative energy, and world of meanings.  
Because of this, the life of distraction and diversion would in a very real sense constitute 
a loss of meaning for the addict, and it is therefore unlikely that such a life could provide 
a rationale as compelling as the rationale of addiction.  There is, then, this strange 
blessing in the curse of addiction, that addiction blocks off the way of easy diversion and 
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indulgent distraction and forces the addict, if he or she is to survive, to develop an 
alternative way of being in the world that provides a similarly substantive and 
compelling rationale as that provided by addiction.  It is this blessing in a curse that 
recovering alcoholics point to when they say that they are “grateful alcoholics.” 
I can now understand how some things, which once seemed like major disasters, 
turned out to be blessings.  Certainly my alcoholism fits that category.  I am truly 
a grateful alcoholic today.  I do not regret the past nor wish to shut the door on it.  
Those events that once made me feel ashamed and disgraced now allow me to 
share with others how to become a useful member of the human race (AA 492).   
 
It’s been ten years since I retired, seven years since I joined A.A.  Now I can 
truly say that I am a grateful alcoholic.  Had I not become a drunk, I would have 
become another sober but sad statistic (AA 543). 
 
“Character” names the alternative to being an addict or a “sober but sad statistic.”   
Dewey said that “character is the interpenetration of habits.”260  The development of 
nonaddictive character in a process of recovery therefore demands the development of 
new habits, particularly the development of new habits of imagination, cogitative 
estimation, and memory.   
 
Friendship and Recovery 
“After what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally follow” 
(1155a3-4).  The appearance of this first line of Book 8 in the Nicomachean Ethics 
seems as unlikely a transition there as it must seem here.  In the preceding seven books 
of the Ethics, Aristotle has discussed the nature of the best life for human beings, the 
role of the moral and intellectual virtues in this best life, and the characteristics of 
                                                 
260 Human Nature and Conduct, 29. 
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continent and incontinent action.  He mentions friendship hardly at all.  Why, then, 
would it seem “natural” for Aristotle that a discussion of friendship should follow a 
discussion of the types of actions and habits that make up the best possible life for 
human beings?  The answer is straightforward.  Aristotle thinks that there are two ways 
that a person can develop good habits: he or she can live in a city-state with good laws or 
he or she can have good friends, preferably both.   
If we take Aristotle as our guide, and if the development of new habits of character 
is entailed by the prospect of recovery, then we would be lead to believe that addicts in 
recovery might need a new group of friends.  We could also, of course, suggest that 
addicts in recovery might move to places with better laws.  This would be an extreme 
case of what folks in A.A. refer to as the “geographical cure.”  But our discussion of 
modern addiction in Chapter IV should have suggested the unlikelihood that the laws 
that govern any large community in the modern world could be derivative of a 
sufficiently robust conception of the common good to form substantive moral character.  
Interestingly, Gilbert Meilander contends that Aristotle leans heavily on his account of 
friendship’s role in the moral life in Books 8 and 9 of the Ethics because he had over 
time (we must remember that the Ethics is a series of lecture notes that Aristotle 
prepared for his students over the course of his time in Athens) come to doubt the 
commitment of the Athenian polis to the common good and a life of virtue.261  Whatever 
                                                 
261 Gilbert Meilander, Friendship: A Study in Theological Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1981), 71.  Meilander’s argument is supported by 1180a25-33: “In the Spartan state alone, or 
almost alone, the legislator seems to have paid attention to questions of nurture and occupations; in most 
states such matters have been neglected, and each man lives as he pleases, Cyclops-fashion, ‘to his own 
wife and children dealing law.’  Now it is best that there should be a public and proper care for such 
 225 
we are to make of this contention, it raises the question: How does Aristotle suppose that 
friends can help one another toward virtue? 
En route to answering this question, Aristotle asserts that there are three types of 
friendship: perfect friendship, friendships of utility, and friendships of pleasure.  The 
latter two are said to be friendships only incidentally and to the extent that they resemble 
perfect friendship (1157b1-4).  Aristotle describes each of these friendships as follows: 
Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for 
themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other.  So too 
with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it is not for their character that men 
love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant…Perfect 
friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these 
wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves 
(1156a10-14, 1156b7-9). 
 
These descriptions raise important questions about how to rightly describe the nature of 
the friendship that is necessary to recovery from addiction.  That special friendships are 
in fact necessary is almost universally acknowledged.  Just as the overwhelming 
majority of addicts testify to loneliness as the defining pain that addiction, for a time, 
numbed, so the overwhelming majority of addicts testify to the power of loving 
friendships as the single most important factor in their recoveries from addiction.  
Although such friendships need not be restricted to the “fellowship” of Alcoholics 
Anonymous, that is of course the most obvious place to look for reports of the 
friendships of recovery. 
                                                                                                                                                
matters; but if they are neglected by the community it would seem right for each man to help his children 
and friends towards virtue, and that they should have the power, or at least the will, to do this.” 
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But the most compelling part of A.A., the part that made me want to try this 
sober thing, was the laughter, the pure joy of the laughter that I heard only from 
sober alcoholics” (AA 333) 
 
I found my tribe, the social architecture that fulfills my every need for 
camaraderie and conviviality (AA 336). 
 
A.A. is my home now…I no longer feel alone (AA 346). 
 
The thing that kept me sober until I got a grip on honesty was the love in the 
room of Alcoholics Anonymous.  I made some friends for the first time in my 
life.  Real friends that cared, even when I was broke and feeling desperate (AA 
468).  
 
 Aristotle’s descriptions of the three kinds of friendships raise at least two important 
questions about how to understand these testimonies.  The first question, one that has 
been raised by John Cooper, has to do with the stringency of Aristotle’s definition of 
“perfect friendship,” for it almost looks as though people would already have to be 
perfect in virtue to participate in this kind of friendship.262  Cooper rightly argues that 
this is not Aristotle’s position, as is clear from several passages.  For example, Aristotle 
claims that with each kind of friendship, including “perfect friendship,” “a better man 
can make friends with a worse” (1162a37), which would imply that at least one of the 
parties of a perfect friendship need not already be perfectly virtuous.  Cooper contends 
that Aristotle’s point is not that a determinate level of moral goodness must exist in both 
parties for the friendship to be a friendship of the highest kind, but only that the 
friendship be based on a mutual admiration for the moral character of the other and a 
mutual desire for the moral growth and well-being of the other.  Cooper therefore 
                                                 
262 John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” in Amelie O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 304. 
 227 
suggests that it would be clearer if these highest forms of friendship were called “virtue-
friendships” or “friendships of character.”263 
 But this raises another question with respect to the friendships that are so central to 
the life of recovery.  How are we to describe friendships that are based on the 
expectation on the side of one party that the other party may help him or her develop 
nonaddictive character?  Is this a friendship of utility, since at least one party enters the 
relationship on the basis of some good—namely growth in moral character—that he or 
she can receive from the other(s)?  It seems to me that this kind of relationship, which I 
want to suggest should characterize the relationship between addicts new to recovery 
and those, usually former addicts, who are recovered (or rather, to use the language of 
A.A., have been recovering addicts longer), is a kind of hybrid between Aristotle’s 
friendship of character and his friendship of utility.  For these relationships are 
characterized on one side (the “newcomer’s”) by a love that is based on the character of 
the other party but not necessarily by any concern for the well being or growth of that 
other party, and, on the other side (the “veteran’s”), by a love that is based on a concern 
for the well being or growth of the other party but not necessarily out of admiration or 
respect for the character of the other party.  This is then a kind of unevenness that 
Aristotle does not think should characterize the best forms of friendship.  But, although 
this is a hybrid type of friendship, it is nevertheless on the way to a perfect friendship of 
character to the extent that growth in character entails growing in the capacity to care for 
others for the sake of the other and to the extent that as one grows in character it 
                                                 
263 Ibid., 307-308.  Cooper lists several places in which Aristotle himself supplies less stringent 
descriptions of “perfect friendship.” 
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becomes increasingly possible for the other party to recognize and admire that character.  
That is to say, effective friendships of recovery will be those that aim directly at the 
development of friendships of character. 
I raise the question of how to rightly describe friendships of recovery not because it 
is terribly important for us to find a label for friendships of recovery, but because I think 
it might help us understand a potential pitfall of friendships of recovery.  There is always 
a danger that friendships of recovery be merely friendships of utility.  This is the case 
whenever the friendship does not genuinely involve, on both sides, a willingness and 
desire for moral transformation.  This is, it seems to me, the danger in the notion of A.A. 
or similar recovery groups as “support” groups.  There is of course nothing at all wrong 
with receiving support from friends; it is surely one of the central practices of genuine 
friendship.  But one can receive support without the slightest interest in or willingness to 
change.264  Friendships of recovery must include support, but they require more than 
support.  They require a mutual desire to become different people. 
 Still, how does Aristotle think that friendship transforms people and informs 
character?  Space is short, so let me briefly mention four of Aristotle’s insights and try to 
connect them with concrete practices in the twelve-step recovery movement.  First, 
Aristotle says, “A certain training in virtue arises also from the company of the good” 
(1170a11-13).  We are not accustomed to think that training is part of friendship.  
Training is something that we do “on the job,” and friendship is our escape from the 
                                                 
264 A devastating indictment of the threat that “support groups” pose in a therapeutic culture is offered in a 
novel by Chuck Palahniuk entitled Fight Club (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996).  The book was made into 
a movie of the same title in 1999. 
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tedium and paternalism implied by “training.”  But Aristotle thinks that one feature of 
certain types of friendships is that they will involve training.  We should not be 
surprised, for training is skill language, habit language, and indeed Aristotle thinks that 
certain friendships will be characterized by a sort of master/apprentice relationship.  This 
insight, although somewhat foreign to popular conceptions of friendship, is familiar to 
recovering addicts in the A.A. tradition.  One of the more important pieces of advices 
offered to newcomers—Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions calls them “novices” (TT 
60)—is that they find a “sponsor,” usually someone who has “worked the steps” for a 
number of years and has developed habits of character, which the newcomer can 
emulate, and out of which the sponsor can advise and encourage the newcomer.  The 
philosophical assumption behind the sponsor/novice setup is ancient and deeply 
Aristotelian, but somewhat alien in our context where the moral life is most immediately 
associated with learning certain abstract rules or principles that we can apply to 
“dilemmas.”  The assumption is, in the words of one A.A., “It is easier to act yourself 
into a new way of thinking than to think yourself into a new way of acting” (AA 366).  
This is why it is rarely enough that one simply receive the advice and instruction offered 
at A.A. meetings and read from the Big Book.  The recovering “apprentice” needs a 
“master,” or several.  “I learned how to be a good A.A. member by watching good A.A. 
members and doing what they do” (AA 521).   
Second, Aristotle says, “There is nothing so characteristic of friends as living 
together” (1157b19-20).  This, too, seems to be a bit overstated given our contemporary 
lifestyle.  That our careers might physically separate us from our friends is taken to be a 
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matter of fact, and a relatively minor setback to friendship that is mitigated by the rapid 
advances in communication technology.  Would Aristotle have felt the same way if he 
could have been “on-line”?  I suspect that he would have.  For Aristotle believed that 
physical proximity, actually sharing space-time with our friends, is essential to 
friendship not simply because we delight in the company of our friends, which after all 
can be still be had although perhaps to a lesser extent “long-distance.”  Aristotle believed 
that character friendships required sharing life together because persons who are striving 
to live well need to be affirmed and confirmed in their conviction that the activities in 
which they are engaging are worthy of their time and energy.  Paul Wadell puts it this 
way:  
One cannot afford to tire of virtue because to become disengaged with its 
activities is to begin a deterioration of self no one can long endure.  Friendship is 
especially crucial because without the support and reassurance of others who are 
involved with us in the virtuous life, we invariably grow disenchanted with the 
very activities we cannot afford to doubt.265 
 
That members of A.A. actually meet in rooms and sit around tables and share coffee 
every or nearly every night of the week is not merely incidental to the recovery of its 
members.  I think the importance of place and dailiness for the success of A.A. cannot be 
overstated.  Many nonaddicts are surprised to hear from a recovering addict who has 
been sober for 10 years that he or she attends A.A. meetings four or five nights of the 
week.  But that they do is essential, not only to their own sobriety, but particularly to the 
efforts of newcomers and “novices.”  When an A.A. with his 10-year chip puts his shoes 
on, gets in his car, drives to the rented room or church basement, gets the coffee 
                                                 
265 Paul J. Wadell, C.P., Friendship and the Moral Life (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1989), 59-60. 
 231 
brewing, sits through the meeting quietly, stays after to talk with old friends and 
skeptical newcomers, locks up the room, gets in his car and drives home, none of the 
intentionality that accompanies each of those actions is lost.  Every basic act testifies and 
sanctifies the worth of the shared endeavor.  Recovery friendships require shared life. 
 Third, Aristotle says, “Not only does a man in adversity need people to confer 
benefits on him, but also those who are prospering need people to do well by” (1169b16-
18).  Today, we think that the prospering person has no need of friends.  He or she may 
enjoy them, but not need them.  But Aristotle did not think this way since Aristotle 
believed that prospering was not a state of mind but a kind of activity.  The happy person 
for Aristotle is the person of virtue and the person of virtue is the one who performs 
virtuous acts, so the virtuous person needs friends with and for whom he or she can act 
well.  Thus the importance in A.A. of the Twelfth Step, the requirement that alcoholics 
in recovery actively carry the message of hope to others who are addicted.  The 
importance of the Step is not merely or even primarily proselytization; the A.A. is 
warned not to place great stock in either his successes or failures at welcoming addicts 
into the program.  The importance of the Step is grounded in the recognition that habits 
of nonaddictive character must be solidified, deepened, and gratified by exercising them 
on friends.  “Practically every A.A. member declares that no satisfaction has been deeper 
and no joy greater than in a Twelfth Step job well done” (TT 110). 
 Fourth and finally, in the chapter on our need for friends with and for whom we can 
practice virtue, Aristotle says, “Man is a political creature” (1169b17-18).  He echoes 
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this claim in the Politics: “Man is by nature a political animal.”266  Not only are we 
moderns inclined to doubt this; we are especially inclined to doubt that this has anything 
to do with friendship.  We tend to think of the “political” as a more or less incumbent 
aspect of our “public” lives, with friendship providing gratification in our “private” 
lives.  Many modern people think the best way to keep your friends is to resist the 
temptation to talk about “politics,” or “religion.”  But for Aristotle friendship is a 
political exercise because friendship depends on the survival and flourishing of a 
community in light of which persons can recognize the worth of the projects they pursue.  
We think that even if the wider community disintegrates we still have our friends, but 
Aristotle would think that our friendships lose their power to transform to the extent that 
they become merely “private.”  I am convinced that intentional communities of recovery 
like A.A. are among the few exemplars that we have in modern culture for how to 
retrieve the priority of the common over the individual good.  A.A. puts it in the starkest 
terms: “It becomes plain that the group must survive or the individual will not” (TT 
130).  The first “Tradition” of A.A. states that “our common welfare should come first; 
personal recovery depends upon A.A. unity” (TT 129), and it is in the constant 
recurrence of the “we” in each of the Steps—“We made a searching and fearless 
inventory of ourselves”; “We made a list of all persons we had harmed”; etc.—that we 
can envisage once again the significance of the “we” of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics.267 
                                                 
266 Politics, 1253a3. 
267 The retrieval of the priority of the common good over the individual good is in tension with A.A.’s 
expressed goal of making its members productive members of society to the extent that one can be 
productive in our society only by elevating the individual over the communal. 
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This wasn’t a course of self study, I quickly learned, for the emphasis was never 
on “I” or “mine” but always on “we” and “ours.”  “We admitted we were 
powerless over alcohol and that our lives had become unmanageable” reads the 
first step of Alcoholics Anonymous.  It would take me a long time to realize 
how critically important that word we is to life-long recovery—and how a self-
centered focus on I can literally be life-threatening—but even in those first days 
at Hazelden I began to glimpse the reality that recovery happens within a 
community and not in isolation.268 
 
 
Vision and Recovery 
In his memoir Broken: My Story of Addiction and Redemption, William Cope 
Moyers tells of a letter he received from his father, Bill Moyers, the nationally famous 
journalist and one-time aid to President Lyndon Johnson.  William Cope was already in 
the pit of crack-cocaine addiction and, though neither his father nor the rest of his family 
knew this, they could tell that something was wrong.  Worried, Bill Moyers wrote to his 
son, expressing his concern and offering some fatherly advice: “Time speeds by like a 
bullet, and I hope you make within it space for those pursuits that give you such inner 
satisfaction—feeding the birds, the walks with your wife and your dog, good movies, 
dinner with friends,” and so on.  William Cope Moyers has this to say about his response 
to the letter: “My father had good reason to be worried about me, but I bitterly resented 
his assessment of my life and wanted to laugh out loud at his solutions.  He wanted me 
to feed the birds?  Was he kidding?”269  This response encapsulates the absurdity of the 
idea that a major addict could recover simply by finding other things to do with his or 
her spare time.  The point is not that feeding the birds is not worthwhile—it may even be 
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a “noble” way to spend leisure time; surely dinner with friends is.  The point, rather, is 
that from the addict’s perspective nothing could seem a more preposterous and laughable 
alternative to smoking crack than feeding the birds.  And this because of what my 
argument has meant to demonstrate, that addiction, despite its horrific effects, carries 
within itself an impetus, an ordering end, an integrating energy, a meaning, a world.  
How could feeding the birds replace that? 
 My point, again, is not to ridicule people who feed birds.  My point is, rather, that 
diversions can’t replace addictions because activities have meaning only to the extent 
that an agent sees them as expressive of who he or she is, what he or she desires, or what 
he or she desires to desire.  What William Cope Moyers needed was not more time with 
birds or even his wife but a transformation of vision that could make feeding birds and 
walking with his wife appear beautiful, as they clearly did for his father.  This is not to 
suggest that we create beauty and therefore create goodness and truth, but only that with 
respect to our actions beauty has a kind of priority over the good and the true.  “It is as if 
we can see beauty itself in a way in which we cannot see goodness itself…I can 
experience the transcendence of the beautiful, but (I think) not the transcendence of the 
good.”270 
 The habit of addiction informs a certain vision of the world and a certain intake of 
beauty, which is to say that addiction is a kind of aesthetic.  There is, despite all of its 
                                                 
270 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 60.  Aquinas’s doctrine of the “unity of the transcendentals” is that 
truth, goodness, and beauty are simply different modes of being.  Thus, to the extent that something is real, 
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depending on how we interpret her use of “experience.” 
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horror, a sustaining liturgy to the life of the addict that makes accessible certain 
experiences of beauty.   There is a liturgy of the bar, a sacred ritual of shooting up, and 
sacred rites of passage into addictions of all kinds.  These liturgies shape addicts to see 
the world in a particular way, and the iron grip of addiction is correlative to the 
compelling beauty of the objects that addiction enables addicts to see.  Part of my 
argument has been that the power of addiction lies in its fraudulent offer to the addict, 
not just of one or several objects of desire that might be pursued alongside other things, 
but of a comprehensive and self-sufficient world in which everything of worth can be 
accessed through the practice of the addiction.  The poet Holderlin’s line, “It was no 
person you wanted, believe me, it was a world,” rings true of the addict.271  It is not 
cocaine or liquor or sex that an addict wants, it is a world.  Recovery depends on vision 
because the addict must come to see the beauty of, and therefore desire, a different world 
than that which he or she saw as an addict.  Recovery therefore requires not so much 
willpower as an alternative aesthetic, one that is more compelling than the aesthetic of 
addiction.272  “We are not so free that we can suddenly alter ourselves, for what we can 
see and thus desire compels us…What we need is not will but a reorientation of the 
                                                 
271 Quoted in Wilshire, Wild Hunger, 9. 
272 This is not to say that two aesthetics cannot overlap.  Although Mariana Valverde does not talk in terms 
of an aesthetic, she makes several interesting points that highlight the role of an aesthetic in recovery.  For 
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Unlike most middle-class temperance organizations, the Army usually attempted to provide alternatives to 
the evils of pubs and saloons, not just to close them down, going so far as to make Army meeting halls 
look and feel like pubs rather than churches,” p. 90. 
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vision to a more compelling object.”273  Thus the centrality of meditation to recovery, for 
meditation is an exercise in seeing anew and seeing differently.274 
When such thoughts break in, we might recall, a little ruefully, how much store 
we used to set by imagination as it tried to create reality out of bottles.  Yes, we 
reveled in that sort of thinking, didn’t we?  And though sober nowadays, don’t 
we often try to do the same thing?  Perhaps our trouble was not that we used our 
imagination.  Perhaps our real trouble was our total inability to point imagination 
toward the right objectives.  There’s nothing the matter with constructive 
imagination; all sound achievement rests upon it.  After all, no man can build a 
house until he first envisions a plan for it.  Well, meditation is like that, too; it 
helps to envision our spiritual objective before we try to move toward it (TT 
100). 
 
I fear that, in my effort to underscore the rationality of addiction, I may have left the 
reader at times feeling that addiction sounds pretty good.  As I have said, plenty has been 
written on the misery of addiction, and I did not think that would need to be reasserted.  
But it is important to bear in mind that addicts ultimately seek recovery because they are 
miserable and because they cannot imagine going on as addicts.  This moment is often 
referred to as “rock bottom.”  It is true of the alcoholic, for example, that “he cannot 
picture life without alcohol” (152).  But it is also true once he has hit “rock bottom” that 
he cannot picture life with alcohol either.  This is important to remember lest we despair 
of being able to imagine an aesthetic that could genuinely come to seem beautiful to the 
addict.  It need not be the beatific vision.  Ann Marlowe says, “Doing dope doesn’t 
sound like so much fun in my account.  And in retrospect it wasn’t.  It was just a little 
                                                 
273 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame, IN: 
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274 This may also explain the remarkable success that some innovative recovery programs have had by 
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 237 
more fun than the other life, lived without dope.”275  If this is true, it should calm any 
anxieties about the hopelessness of recovery.  But it also points out a certain imprecision 
in the term “recovery,” for, as William Pryor has noted, “recovery” presumes that the 
addict is trying to return to what he or she was before becoming an addict, but part of the 
reason he or she became an addict is because of how he or she saw the world before 
becoming an addict.  What is needed is not so much recovery as discovery.276 
 What can we say specifically about an aesthetic of discovery/recovery?  Can we 
name its constituents?  Probably not.  If we speak of recovery from major addiction there 
is quite evidently not one aesthetic of recovery but many.  The one feature that they all 
share in common is that they involve a picture of a whole way of life, although this need 
not imply that such a way of life is ordered to one dominating end or even that it 
subscribe to a teleological account of human life.  I hope that my discussion of charity in 
Chapter V has made clear that an aesthetic of recovery could include such a dominating 
telos, and I hope it may have made intelligible why so many addicts find that their 
recovery depends on a discovery or renewal of their belief in, or even friendship with, 
God.  But I also hope that my discussion has made it clear that the nonaddicted person 
need not be committed to some all-consuming end.  He or she must simply—although it 
is far from simple—find a way to live honestly, to be in the world in such a way that he 
or she need not disavow through denial his or her activities.  It should be clear that the 
failure to live honestly threatens the person with one dominating telos indeed every bit 
                                                 
275 How to Stop Time, 145. 
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as much, probably more so, than the person who does not subscribe to or find reason to 
believe in such an ultimate purpose. 
 Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions says that the goal of recovery is “learning how 
to live in the greatest peace, partnership, and brotherhood with all men and women, of 
whatever description,” and it calls the process “a moving and fascinating adventure” (TT 
77).  This is an outline of an aesthetic of recovery, and it does not entail a commitment 
to either “monism” or “pluralism.”  The language of “adventure” is key because 
adventures take us to new places and allow us to see and experience things that we have 
never seen or experienced before.  
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